

no directive authority over the participants. It does, however, provide an opportunity to conduct information exchanges, build relationships, and synchronize efforts within the AO.

Management of the CMOC may fall to a multinational force commander, shared by U.S. and multinational force commanders, or shared between a U.S. military commander and a USG civilian agency head. As always, the specific structure depends on the situation. Civil Affairs officers typically serve as directors and deputy directors.

Other military skills present can include legal, operations, logistics, engineering, medical, and force protection. Additional expertise and resources are provided by the USG interagency community (usually through the Country Team), HN organizations, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

A Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC), similarly to a CMOC, is located outside of a secured military facility and functions similarly to a HACC. As with the other coordinating mechanisms, a CIMIC acts as a source of information and a venue for coordinating plans and projects. It also serves as an external information source for parties to the humanitarian effort and to local populations.

Though institutional suspicion, confusion, and duplication of effort remain, they are less than before. As with any interagency national or international functional area, designation of lead organizations and coordination hubs is a necessary first step. Protocols for accommodating diverse organizations and agendas lead to the establishment of procedures for information exchanges, planning approaches, and shared oversight of activities designed to bring about successfully executed humanitarian operations.

Interagency Task Force (IATF)

A IATF is made up of USG interagency representatives, including the DoD, partner nations, and others who are tasked with taking on specific issues or missions. Their primary focus is on geographic or functional responsibilities.

Unlike the FBI's JTTF or the USSOCOM IATF discussed in Chapter 1, IATFs are typically intended to be short-term organizations with specific tasks to

perform and with the authority under a single commander to act on those tasks. They then disband once their purposes are fulfilled.

The ad-hoc purpose and structure of IATFs, however, provides flexibility that allows them to adapt to changing situations and thus occasionally breed longer-than-anticipated life cycles as missions expand or threats become more immediate. IATF-South represents such an example.

Interagency Task Force-South (IATFS)

www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/

Increased DoD involvement with counterdrug operations took shape beginning in 1989 with various commanders in chief (CINCs) establishing individual task forces and other organizations focused on the mission. With reorganization in 1994 and a consolidation in 1999, the life cycle of IATF-South now spans nearly two decades in one form or another.

IATF-South fields joint, interagency, and international capabilities (Figure 17) that monitor a wide geographic area for suspected drug-related activity, train and advise counter-drug forces, and plan and execute counter-drug operations.

Although developed in the counter-drug environment, IATF-South has become a model for the organization, staffing, coordination, information sharing, intelligence fusion, planning, and execution for other IATFs faced with different complex missions. This model includes many of the interagency features of the developing USAFRICOM structure discussed in Chapter 1.

Within the DoD, IATF-South synchronizes activities with the DIA, NGA, NSA, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and the National Guard. USG interagency partners include:

- a. U.S. Coast Guard
- b. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS)
- c. CIA
- d. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DoJ)
- e. FBI
- f. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS).




Figure 17. IATF-South

To extend its reach, several Hemispheric and European countries have sent liaison teams and, in some cases, maritime assets to support the IATF-South mission.

Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan)

As U.S. military forces began their fight against the Taliban and other insurgent forces in the fall of 2001, USCENTCOM established IATF-CT (Figure 18) that deployed to Afghanistan in support of the effort. Its primary responsibilities were to act as an intelligence-gathering fusion center and to operate the interrogation facility at Bagram Air Base.

From its beginning, IATF-CT maintained a strong interagency structure. Among others, membership included:

- a. FBI
- b. CIA
- c. Diplomatic Security Service
- d. Customs Service
- e. NSA
- f. DIA
- g. New York's Joint Terrorism Task Force
- h. DoJ
- i. Department of the Treasury
- j. DoS.

A few allied nations also provided representatives who worked side by side with the others to exchange information and collectively apply their skill sets, experiences, and resources to the effort.

As conditions on the ground in Afghanistan evolved, the IATF-CT returned to the U.S. in the spring of 2002 and began a transformation from the temporary, ad-hoc structure and focus of a IATF to more sustained operations as USCENTCOM's JIACG that continues to function.




Figure 18. Interagency Task Force-CT

Both IATF-South and IATF-CT came into existence to address a specific threat to U.S. national security. Because of their effectiveness and adaptability, both continue to function well beyond the time limits one would expect for such an organization.

Though its title remains essentially the same, IATF-South's responsibilities have broadened significantly while remaining engaged in its original mission as a central player within U.S. counter-drug operations. By contrast, IATF-CT has undergone a name change that reflects the expansion of its responsibilities within a mix of related missions.

What remains the same is that both organizations have survived and grown because of their abilities to accommodate the vastly different cultures, skill sets, and procedures that make up their diverse memberships. Harmonizing these differences has allowed both to make continuing contributions to the accomplishment of national security objectives and to act as models for newer IATF organizations created to address CT and other security threats.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/c21830.htm

PRTs were first established in Afghanistan, where the Gardez City PRT opened in early 2002. PRTs are designed to assist in extending the influence of the central government from Kabul and other major cities into those isolated areas so that they are less likely to fall under the influence of destabilizing forces that breed and harbor terrorists and their networks. The goal is to assist the central government to build its credibility and support across a country roughly the size of Texas.

The PRTs vary in size depending on local needs and the prevailing security situation. In addition to military personnel, the PRT includes USG interagency representation (working through the Country Team), partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

PRT leadership consists of both military and Foreign Service officers who strive to synchronize the agendas, policies, strategies, procedures, and activities of all participants to gain the greatest impact of the shared effort. PRTs work closely with local village, district and provincial officials, and military operational units to strengthen local governance, reform the

security sector beginning with the police, and execute reconstruction and development projects.

Among others, PRT tasks involve establishing security, developing and executing plans for reconstruction and development, improving governance through the mentoring of local and district leaders and other measures, and judicial reform.

DoS, USAID, USDA, and other members of the USG interagency community play prominent roles in building government capacity, combating corruption, discouraging poppy growth, encouraging the growth of alternative crops, and local and regional planning.

PRTs also function in Iraq with structures, management, and objectives tailored to local needs. For instance, PRTs in Iraq are typically embedded within U.S. Brigade Combat Teams, which is consistent with the operational environment within that country.

As noted earlier, the S/CRS, operating through the Civilian Response Corps and other resources, is assuming a larger role in recovery efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other venues.

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, successor to the very effective Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), is a DoS-led interagency program involving DoS, DoD, USAID, and others in a broad initiative to confront the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the Maghreb and Sahel in Africa.

The five-year initiative brings together CT, democratic governance, military assistance, and public diplomacy activities. In addition to USG interagency components, regional IGOs such as the African Union (Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism) are involved with the efforts. Interagency participants have identified four specific strategic goals to be accomplished within the operational environment:

- a. Build local capacity.
- b. Counter radicalization.
- c. Foster regional cooperation.
- d. Enhance public diplomacy and strategic communication.

The partnership focuses on nine countries, including the Maghreb nations of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia

and the Sahel nations of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Nigeria and Senegal are also participants.

Military support for the TSCTP is present in the form of U.S. AFRICOM's Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which is the USG's regional war on terrorism. However, OEF-TS engages TSCTP primarily as a security and cooperation initiative. OEF-TS partners with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Funding for the TSCTP comes from a variety of USG sources. Among them are DoD Title 10 funding, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR), Development Assistance, and Economic Support financing. NGOs engaged in the region have also contributed.

Capacity-building programs focus on nurturing tactical intelligence capabilities that encourage the development of "eyes and ears" to identify and target potential terrorists and their networks. Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) efforts are also involved.

A variety of train-and-equip programs support CT efforts to provide weapons, equipment, training,

and tactical mentoring to stop the flow of uncontrolled weapons, goods, and people and to neutralize safe havens where terrorists thrive.

Efforts in counter radicalization, public diplomacy, and strategic communication have contributed with a variety of initiatives. Programs to reduce the pool of potential terrorist recruits have focused on encouraging youth employment and civic education, improving educational access and quality, and reintegrating former combatants.

Additionally, programs to increase government credibility and reduce ungoverned areas have sought to improve good governance practices at the local level, the capacity of rule-of-law systems, and the ability of the government to be seen as providing necessary goods and services to their populations.

Upgrading communication capacity within the partner countries allows the government to counter extremist claims and behavior by keeping their populations informed about what is being done to protect them and improve their quality of life. Ideally, favorable views of the USG and its support of the HN government breed popular respect for a government that is able to partner with such a helpful ally.

Chapter 3. Beyond the USG Interagency Community

Beyond the complexities of the USG interagency process experienced both in Washington, D.C. and within the Country Team, SOF must also account for and interact with representatives of the HN government and a mosaic of partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Predictably, each is operating on a separate agenda-driven path.

The USG interagency process exists to coordinate the CT activities of disparate departments, agencies, and organizations with the goal of achieving assigned U.S. national security objectives. By contrast, there is no pretense that any similar mechanism exists on the ground overseas to bring about such effects once the SOF community steps outside the USG interagency environment and the Country Team.

Representatives of the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs are not part of the USG interagency process. However, their mere presence and activities within the AO inevitably have a major impact on the establishment and sustainment of the unity of effort required to meet both U.S. and international security objectives. More than ever, knowing and understanding those working alongside you become at least as important as an awareness of active or potential adversaries.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO environment to help the special operations warrior gain a general awareness of the other players present on the ground. It is not an exhaustive survey of the environment. In fact, the specific IGOs and NGOs introduced reflect only a small slice of the total participants. However, they do represent many of the more familiar players and offer a glimpse into characteristics that are often shared.

SOF personnel soon learn that introductions around the table at the beginning of a meeting represent more than polite hospitality. They are essential to identify the various players and their organizations

and to begin to understand their agendas. Each of these other players possesses skills and resources relevant to the tasks at hand.

Again, however, it is necessary to remember that each applies its talents guided by what are often to us unfamiliar and seemingly inconsistent policies, strategies, plans, procedures, and organizational cultures. As with the USG interagency components serving the USG Country Team, HN officials, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs likewise bring with them their own unique “stovepipe” relationships.

It is frequently the case that some decisions can be made by local representatives operating at the tactical level, but more complex issues must be addressed in national capitals or in whatever country houses the headquarters of each IGO and NGO. Quite simply, many organizations operate either tactically or strategically and do not field an operational level decision maker to provide immediate guidance to their personnel or to help deconflict disputes.

These dissimilarities are not disqualifiers; in fact, such differences are inevitable and, one could argue, helpful if properly exploited. The immediate tasks become to identify who is on the ground, establish contact, identify goals and resources, and attempt to synchronize efforts to achieve a strong measure of unity of effort.

Success in relationship building is largely personality dependent, based on the ability of those on the ground to reach consensus on desired end states and to synchronize multilateral activities to achieve those end states.

Experience teaches that shared goals and objectives are not necessarily the same as a commonly accepted vision of a desired end state. *Success* will likely have many different definitions and metrics. In fact, sometimes the best one can hope for is a shared objective and an agreement to exchange information.

As with non-DoD USG departments, agencies, and organizations, no command relationships exist with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Negotiation skills and the ability to listen emerge as premium assets. Once established, the relationships will be inevitably softer and less direct than is familiar to the special operations warrior.

Respectful coordination and, when possible, accommodation of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO agendas are most useful in achieving success. Alienation is never helpful.

As a practical matter, the combining of the USG interagency process with the effective inclusion of international partners and other outside organizations introduces efficiencies into the operational environment. The base reality remains that no one can do it all alone. Ideally those best suited to specific tasks are given the responsibility to manage those tasks.

Consistent with this principle, FM3-24 notes that “In COIN, it is always preferred for civilians to perform civilian tasks.” Though not always possible, this is a solid principle for guiding USG interagency coordination, especially in an operational setting. The guidance becomes even more relevant when dealing with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

Efficiencies are also gained by applying the right mix of skill sets and resources to a specific challenge. It is not always true that the introduction of more personnel and resources inevitably results in a better outcome. Ensuring quality work is often more helpful than merely having more people performing the same tasks as before.

Ideally, cooperation among all the parties will result in a unity of effort through which USG, HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO efforts emerge as more than a collage of random, uncoordinated acts. The inclusion of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO resources assists the common effort in working smarter in a specific direction (or several paths heading in the same general direction) toward the achievement of a desired end state.

As a reminder of the size of the IGO and NGO community, the Union of International Associations identifies on its Web site 5,900 IGOs and IGO networks; 38,000 international associations-NGOs; and 4,100 regional organizations and regional networks. Individually and collectively, they represent a stern challenge for the special operations warrior trying to make sense of it all.

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

ABCA Armies

www.abca-armies.org

Initiated in 1947 with a general plan and formalized in 1954 with the Basic Standardization Concept, the ABCA Armies has a long history of seeking standardization among its member armies. Initial membership included the armies of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada who sought to sustain the partnerships in place during World War II. Australia joined in 1963, with New Zealand moving from observer status to full membership in 2006 without any change to the organization's title.

Recognizing the coalition nature of current and future wars, the ABCA Armies are concerned primarily with ensuring the standardization and interoperability necessary “to train, exercise, and operate effectively

together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.”

Strategic guidance is provided by the ABCA Executive Council, made up of national representatives at the level of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. That guidance is translated into interoperability objectives and the annual Program Plan of Tasks by the National Directors or ABCA Board, made up of officers at the one-star level. They typically meet four times annually, including one session with the Executive Council.

The work of the organization is conducted by the Program Office, based in Washington, D.C., through Capability Groups (CGs), Support Groups (SGs), Project Teams (PTs), and Information Teams (ITs).

African Union (AU)

www.au.int/en/

The AU was established on 9 July 2002, by bringing together the separate countries of the continent. Current membership stands at 53 countries. It has developed several governing institutions to include the Pan African Parliament and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.

The AU goals are to bring about political, social, and economic integration; develop common African positions on issues; achieve peace and security; and promote good governance through reform of governmental institutions and the respect for human rights. To date, AU troops have deployed to Burundi, Sudan's Darfur Region, and Somalia to address security and humanitarian needs.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

www.aseansec.org

ASEAN was established, on 8 August 1967, in Bangkok with five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined later. The ASEAN region is home to more than 560 million people. ASEAN represents a collective effort to promote economic growth, social progress, and cultural development.

In 2003, ASEAN identified three "pillars" to assist in achieving its goals: The ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 1994 saw the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that includes the ASEAN countries plus others with an interest in the region. These include the U.S. and the Russian Federation. ARF's goals are to promote confidence building, establish preventive diplomacy protocols, and develop conflict resolution strategies.

European Union (EU)

<http://europa.eu>

The EU consists of 27 European countries forming a political and economic partnership. Nearly 500 million people live within the borders of the EU. Its three major bodies are the European Parliament (representing the people of Europe), the Council of European Union (representing the governments of Europe), and the

European Commission (representing the shared interests of the EU). Among other issues, the EU is involved with free trade, borderless internal travel, a common currency, and joint action on crime and terrorism.

A major emphasis focuses on securing the external borders of the EU while allowing free trade and open travel. The EU makes use of an extensive shared database that enables police forces and judicial officials to exchange information and track suspected criminals and terrorists. The European Police (EUROPOL) is housed in The Hague, Netherlands, and maintains extensive intelligence information on criminals and terrorists. EUROPOL is staffed by representatives from national law enforcement agencies (e.g., police, customs, and immigration services). They monitor issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, financial crimes, and radioactive/nuclear trafficking.

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

www.interpol.int

INTERPOL is a structured IGO with 186 members under the direction of a General Assembly, Executive Committee, General Secretariat, and National Central Bureaus. The General Secretariat is located in Lyon, France and maintains an around-the-clock operations center staffed by representatives from the member countries.

INTERPOL supports four official languages: Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau, which serves as the point of contact for international police issues and the exchange of information. The U.S. National Central Bureau is located within the Department of Justice and is staffed jointly by representatives of numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies.

In 2005, INTERPOL and the UN issued the first INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice regarding individuals and organizations suspected of maintaining associations with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

www.imf.org/external/index.htm

The IMF is based in Washington, D.C. and is the host to 186 member countries. It encourages cooperation among its members to ensure the secure functioning

of the complex international banking systems. The IMF promotes stability of international currencies and exchange protocols. It also works to stimulate international job growth through economic development and, when necessary, assistance to countries with severe debt and other financial threats. The IMF maintains surveillance of financial and economic trends throughout the world and within individual countries. It also makes loans to countries in need and provides technical assistance to encourage self sufficiency in the operation of the world's interconnected financial systems.

Organization of American States (OAS)

www.oas.org

The OAS has 35 member countries, 34 of which are active after the 1962 suspension of Cuba. It features four official languages: English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. The OAS is the principal regional forum for discussing the major issues and concerns facing the member countries. These include terrorism, poverty, illegal drugs, and corruption.

Major policies and goals are outlined during the meeting of the General Assembly, which gathers annually at the foreign minister level. Regular activities are overseen by the Permanent Council that functions through the ambassadors appointed by the individual member countries. The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security is tasked with coordinating OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking, anti-personnel mines, organized crime, gangs involved with criminal activity, WMD proliferation, and other security threats. The Secretariat is also responsible for developing confidence-building measures and other initiatives to ensure hemispheric stability and security.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

www.osce.org

The OSCE consists of 56 countries from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. It came into existence as a result of the 1 August 1975 Helsinki Final Act to serve as a forum for east-west dialogue during the era of Détente. OSCE operates 19 missions or field operations in Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus Region, and Central Asia. These include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Zagreb,

Minsk, Moldova, Ukraine, Baku, Georgia, Yerevan, Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The OSCE seeks to address the politico-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions of conflict. Efforts include activities in arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, minority group integration, democratization, policing strategies, economic-environmental initiatives, and CT.

United Nations (UN)

www.un.org/en

Founded in 1945 at the end of World War II, the New York-based UN now consists of 191 countries. There are 30 organizations that make up the UN system and work to address the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and other goals of the organization. In 2006, the UN adopted the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which “sent a clear message that terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable.” (UN) The strategy consists of four pillars. “These address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and ensuring the respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.” (UN)

The UN is also involved with developing CT capacity within its member countries through the training of national criminal justice officials and the development of technology to assist in the effort. These approaches rely heavily on the effective application of the rule of law. In July 2005, the UN Secretary General established a Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force to coordinate CT efforts throughout the UN System. Chief among the initiatives is an online system for the exchange of CT information. The UN also plays a role in blocking terrorist funding networks through its coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO)

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping

The first UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1948 to monitor agreements between the new state of Israel and the surrounding Arab states. Over the years, the UN has undertaken 63 peacekeeping missions. During the early years, especially during the Cold War, UNPKO

were limited in their scope, usually involving themselves with the enforcement of ceasefires and ensuring stability on the ground. Military observers and lightly armed troops employing confidence-building measures typically were the norm. The recent trend has been toward involving UNPKO in operations of greater complexity.

Tasks include government institutional reform; security sector reform; human rights monitoring; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) involving former combatants. There has also been a greater emphasis on addressing internal strife and civil wars. The required skill sets have also become more diverse. There exists a persistent need for individuals with nonmilitary skills such as administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, election observers, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, and strategic communicators.

UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT)

ocha.unog.ch/dprtoolkit/PreparednessTools/Coordination/role%20and%20responsibilities%20of%20UNDMT.pdf

In coordination with the HN, the UNDMT operates through a resident coordinator who is tasked with establishing such a team in each country that has a history of disasters or national emergencies. The UNDMT facilitates information exchange and

discussion of initiatives designed to mitigate the impact of catastrophic events. Plans enable the team to respond quickly to needs at national, regional, and district levels; install long-term recovery programs and future preparedness; and provide the necessary advice, technical resources, and supplies to manage the crisis. As an example, the UNDMT in India (Figure 19) is made up of representatives from the following UN agencies: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); International Labor Organization (ILO); Development Program (UNDP); Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); Children's Fund (UNICEF); World Food Program (WFP); and World Health Organization (WHO).

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

[http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx/?/](http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?/)

Established on 28 March 2002, by the UN Security Council, UNAMA serves as the hub for international efforts to assist the recovery of Afghanistan. UNAMA operates under an annual renewal requirement; the Security Council has renewed the UNAMA mandate until 23 March 2009.

According to that mandate, UNAMA is responsible to “promote peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading efforts of the international community in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan in




Figure 19. UNDMT–India

Refugees International (RI)www.refugeesinternational.org

Based in Washington, D.C., RI is dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced persons around the world. The organization estimates that there are more than 34 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world who are fleeing from the conditions of war and internal oppression. RI also reports the existence of some 11 million stateless persons. In addition to the human cost, those conditions also contribute to international instability.

Working with local governments, IGOs, and other NGOs, RI conducts 20–25 field missions every year in an effort to provide solutions to the plight of those displaced. RI's basic services include providing food, water, shelter, and protection from harm.

Save the Children (SC/USA)www.savethechildren.org

Working through the International Save the Children Alliance, SC/USA defines its area of influence as encompassing more than 50 countries with some 37 million children and 24 million local parents, community members, local organizations, and government agencies. It divides its focus among Africa, Asia, Latin America-Caribbean, and the Middle East and Eurasia. SC/USA responds to war and natural disasters as well as addressing the consequences of political, economic, and social upheaval.

World Vision United States (WVUS)www.worldvision.org

The WVUS is a Christian-inspired NGO operating within nearly 100 countries organized by region (Europe and the Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Africa, Central, and South America). Its efforts focus on children and the development of strong families by addressing the broad conditions of poverty and providing assistance in response to disasters. Its earliest involvement in Afghanistan came in 1956 as it worked through the Kabul Christian Church. After the fall of the Taliban government, WVUS established a comprehensive program that began operating in 2002. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, WVUS works to provide

clean water, irrigation, health clinics, and pre- and post-natal care.

World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO)www.wango.org

Based in the U.S., the WANGO is interesting as it represents an effort to organize the complex NGO community to increase its collective effectiveness. There are other such organizations pursuing similar agendas. It began with 16 international NGOs in August 2001 and now counts members from more than 140 countries. Its first stated purpose is to “unite NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing world peace, as well as well-being at all levels—individual, family, tribal, national, and world.” WANGO also promotes itself as attempting to “give greater voice to smaller NGOs beyond their national borders, including NGOs from developing countries and countries with economies in transition.” WANGO supports its membership with NGO listings for networking, training seminars and conferences, and various publications that address issues of interest to their NGO membership.

Additional Selected NGOs**Academy for Educational Development (AED)**www.aed.org**American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction)**www.interaction.org**American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)**www.afsc.org**American Refugee Committee (ARC)**www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer**Church World Service (CWS)**www.churchworldservice.org**International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH)**www.iaahp.net**International Medical Corps (IMC)**www.imcworldwide.org**International Rescue Committee (IRC)**www.theirc.org**Mercy Corps**www.mercycorps.org**Partners for the Americas (POA)**www.partners.net/partners/Default_EN.asp

Project Hope (HOPE)

www.projecthope.org
 Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO)
 www.sawso.org

Stop Hunger Now

www.stophungernow.org/site/PageServer
 U.S. Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (USA for UNHCR)
 www.usaforunhcr.org

International Support for Afghanistan: A Case Study

If nothing else, the commitment of the international community to the challenge of rebuilding Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. presents a useful example of the complexities in place to challenge the special operations warrior. Figure 20 captures a flavor of the international presence.

As the Taliban regime crumbled throughout the country, members of the international community, sponsored by the UN, gathered in Bonn, Germany to discuss the way ahead.

The product of their work is called the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institution,” better known as the “Bonn Agreement” or “Bonn 1.” It established a timeline for the establishment

of an elected government and an overview of the tasks necessary to accomplish that very specific objective.

The Afghan Presidential Election of October 2004, the inauguration of President Hamid Karzai in December 2004, the National Assembly Election of September 2005, and the seating of the National Assembly in December 2005 accomplished many of the goals of the agreement.

As part of the Bonn Agreement Process, the UN and many in the international community committed themselves to various specific tasks to assist in bringing stability to Afghanistan. The interagency door opened wide as many in the world saw an opportunity to display their capabilities to help out. In addition to the U.S. and other traditional international players, new partner countries made commitments.




Figure 20. International Support for Afghanistan

The commitments included Mongolia, which undertook the mission of training Afghan artillerymen because of their experience with the Soviet-era equipment used by the Afghan National Army (ANA). The NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (www.nato.int/ISAF/index.html), established by the Bonn Agreement to secure Kabul and its surroundings, swelled to some 40 countries as nonmember countries signed on to assist.

Traditionally NATO has restricted its activities to the geographic boundaries of its member countries. The alliance is guided by the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Interestingly, the only invocation of Article 5 came in response to the 2001 attacks on the U.S.

Over the decades, NATO has largely stayed away from direct military involvement in security missions considered to be outside of its geographical boundaries or “out of area.” Thus Afghanistan is an entirely new experience for the collective alliance and the other military forces, although certainly not for the U.S. and other countries acting alone or in concert outside NATO.

Although exercised for generations and put to the test in limited initiatives since the end of the Cold War, NATO procedures are being used in an extended operation for the first time in Afghanistan. The challenges increased as NATO forces expanded the ISAF mandate to other parts of the country, as envisioned in the Bonn Agreement, and assumed new missions such as combat operations in the southern regions of the country.

In addition to ISAF, the original Coalition Force remained operational and continued the fight against Taliban remnants, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations.

Reform of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and ANA became the responsibility of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), a U.S.-led multinational organization operating from a tiny corner of a small compound in Kabul. OMC-A became the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSCA) in July 2005 when it assumed responsibility for the reform of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and other law enforcement organizations.

With the addition of new missions and more partners working on both MOD and MOI reform, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) emerged, taking over the entire compound. The expansion of USG, partner nation, and IGO involvement was having a very visible impact. The lead IGO for the entire Afghan effort is the UN and its various UN system agencies identified earlier.

Currently, Afghan security-sector reform is under the direction of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A).

In addition to the activities of the UN, NATO, IGOs, U.S., and other partner nations, many hundreds of NGOs are deployed throughout Afghanistan and have been for decades. All of these players actively coordinate with each other to gain the greatest effects from their activities.

Over the years, separate bilateral relationships have developed between various countries and the Afghan government. This was to be expected given the strong emphasis on hospitality within the Afghan culture. Many, if not most, of these arrangements exist outside the established organizations and protocols governing the reform of the Afghan Security Forces (ANA and ANP) and other government ministries.

Thus mentors from CSTC-A, various IGOs and NGOs, and individual countries might be working alongside each other to reform the same functional area. Sometimes Afghan officials suddenly depart for training in another country without the knowledge of those with the responsibility for the reform mission.

While none of these activities is ill-intentioned, they do represent a significant disruption of the unity of effort described within the Bonn Agreement and other protocols developed over the years. It is not likely to remain an unusual case as the number of countries, IGOs, and NGOs willing to invest human and material resources into an Afghan-like situation grows.

The coordination requirements for the special operations warrior working with the USG interagency and other players will only become more complicated in such environments.

Chapter 4. Navigating the Interagency Environment

As we have seen, navigating the USG interagency process represents a demanding exercise in relationship building, cooperation, and coordination. It involves a mosaic of different capabilities, resources, organizational cultures, agendas, and ways of doing business. Experience with these complexities teaches that working the USG interagency process can be confusing and frustrating. That becomes even truer when interacting with the representatives and agendas of the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

But experience also proves that the successful achievement of national security objectives is not possible without the skillful navigation of the USG interagency process. No department, agency, or organization can do it all without assistance. The evolution of the “3-D” special operations warrior—in possession of a *toolkit* of diplomatic, defense, and development skills—has become a priority in developing a force capable of applying all the elements of national power where required.

For that special operations warrior on the ground overseas, the functioning of the USG interagency community is more than a theoretical background study. What the USG interagency process produces in Washington, D.C. has a direct practical impact on what takes place overseas. The major outputs generated by the USG interagency processes are strategic direction, policies, Presidential decisions, and national security objectives translated into plans that are then provided to the operators on the ground.

As noted in Chapter 1, the specifics of interagency structure, policy, and procedures will inevitably change from time to time for a variety of reasons including the preferences of different presidents, the emergence of new issues, and the nature of the security threats facing the nation.

In general, however, the principles of the USG interagency process remain the same. For instance, the structure and functioning of the NSC remains familiar, even as administrations and political parties exchange power. However, there will be differences in other areas such as participants, numbers of IPCs, procedures, and work flow. Terminology will often change as each president’s administration adds its own particular flavor to the vernacular.

Additionally, individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations are continuously seeking new ways to approach the interagency challenge, resulting in fresh bureaus and offices, working groups, and programs that must be accounted for. Thus the reality of inevitable change within the interagency process demands flexibility and a strong sense of situation awareness by all participants.

Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the added complexity that comes from extending the reach of the USG interagency process overseas and then interacting with many players from *outside* the USG interagency community. Even under the best conditions, the introduction of HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs demands that the special operations warrior remains focused on the CT objective while accommodating an array of differing and sometimes competing agendas.

What is encouraging is that in recent years, many traditional and potential partner nations have begun to employ their own versions of whole-of-government approaches, particularly when creating infrastructure and in responding to terrorist threats. There is an emerging consensus internationally that all the elements of national power have roles to play in CT scenarios.

With so much evolving HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO expertise present in any given AO, it is possible to face situations in which solutions seem to be in

search of problems to solve. Random problem solving may provide immediate returns, but is rarely helpful in the intermediate or long term.

At such times, an individual's interagency skills can assist in defining shared long-term goals and orchestrating the resources to address them. The objective becomes to establish shared goals and then to chart a path that ensures unity of effort to achieve them as efficiently as possible.

In such an environment, it becomes tempting to make promises about resources and funding, especially to HN officials. It is generally not wise to do so unless there is confidence that you can keep the promises you have made.

An IGO official was once speaking to a group of senior Afghan military and police officials in Kabul about what assistance his organization can provide. A member of the audience aggressively challenged the official on what he charged was a failure of the IGO to make good on an earlier promise.

According to the Afghan, the IGO promised—or appeared to promise—that each family in several villages would be provided a laptop computer. The questioner wondered why the IGO never delivered any computers, providing instead a goat and sheep to each family.

One could argue that in a country of 80 percent illiteracy and no or unreliable electrical supplies, a goat and a sheep would provide a very helpful contribution to improving each family's quality of life—more so, it would seem, than a laptop computer.

Regardless, the perceived promise of laptops was not fulfilled. This outcome challenged the credibility of the specific IGO and the effectiveness of others working to improve living conditions in that district.

The critical skills—both within and outside the USG interagency process—are to learn the various cultures, identify the problems, understand the needs to be met, and encourage as many players as possible to invest in the effort to assure success. Adaptability is essential, as few situations allow for templated solutions.

Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Credibility, and News Media

While the special operations warrior is interacting within the USG interagency process and with officials from the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs, there are “evaluators” present in the form of the local, national, and international news media.

Regardless of the measurements of success defined by the USG interagency process or agreed to by other participants, modern journalists tend to define their own standards and to judge performance through their own filters.

Thus it should not be surprising to discover that a persistent gap exists between what the USG interagency community and its international partners know to be happening and what the various domestic and international publics believe is going on. News media scrutiny introduces an important variable into the interagency navigation process that cannot be ignored.

The achievement and sustainment of credibility in the CT effort are essential. Since it is clearly not possible for the special operations warrior to speak personally with each citizen of the HN, U.S., or other countries,

communicating credibly through the news media and other stakeholders is a task essential to establishing the legitimacy of any initiative.

The strategic communication challenge is to keep as narrow as possible that gap between what is being reported by the news media or discussed by various influential opinion leaders and what is happening within the AO. The need for accuracy and candor by both the strategic communicator and the news media is an essential requirement. This is because public support is essential to the successful accomplishment of CT operations. If the narrative developed by the news media persists in inaccuracies or negativity, either because of the flow of events or the tone of the reporting, public support will surely wane.

It has long been understood that the explanation and communication support of foreign policy and military activities is best achieved by consistency of message or, as it is better known, *speaking with one voice*. To achieve this goal, the Country Team is supported by the work of the Public Affairs officer who is

then backed up by the DoS Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the wider USG strategic communication community.

All USG Public Affairs programs are part of a collective interagency effort that seeks to provide accurate information to the news media while providing context and meaning through carefully crafted and coordinated strategic messaging.

The National Framework for Strategic Communication, signed by President Obama and submitted to the U.S. Congress under the provisions of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, acknowledged that there is a “need to clarify what strategic communication means and how we guide and coordinate our communication efforts.”

Given the uncertainty over the precise meaning of *strategic communication*, the report describes the process as the “synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences.” This attempt at a definition is particularly useful for the special operations warrior as it reminds all players that the “word-deed gap” must also be kept as narrow as possible to prevent the loss of credibility in the eyes of the HN population, government, regional audiences, partner nations, IGOs, NGOs and other stakeholders.

More precisely, the negative consequences of even the best-intentioned efforts cannot be explained away by denials of responsibility, clever marketing slogans, or other persuasive techniques. Above all, it is necessary to be aware of what is being said about the efforts of the USG, HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs within an AO. Awareness of what is being said does not imply acceptance of the content; but it does allow for the development and implementation of appropriate strategic communication initiatives that affirm, challenge, or ignore that content depending on the circumstances.

Unity of effort for the USG strategic communications effort originates within the White House with the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication (DNSA/SC) and the principal deputy DNSA/SC, the Senior Director of Global Engagement (SDGE). Deliberate communication and engagement efforts are worked through the National Security Staff Directorate for Global Engagement (NSS/GE) and

through the Interagency Policy Committee for Strategic Communication (IPC/SC). The DNSA/SC and SDGE chair the IPC/SC. The Interagency Policy Committee for Global Engagement (IPC/GE) also plays a critical role within the NSS on matters of strategic communication. Thus at least two IPCs within the National Security Council Structure have an impact on USG interagency strategic communication activities.

Within the wider USG interagency community (see discussions in Chapter 1), the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs serves as the central coordination hub. That individual works with functional and regional bureaus within the DoS to coordinate and create integration among policy, communication, and engagement objectives.

A variety of organizations and programs within DoS, DoD, and other USG agencies play critical roles within the interagency process to ensure the most influential strategic communication effects. Some of these include the following:

- a. The DoS Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R/PPR), which provides long-term strategic planning and performance measurements
- b. Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)
- c. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
- d. Bureau of Public Affairs (PA)
- e. Public Affairs Officers on Country Teams
- f. The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC)
- g. The Public Diplomacy Office Director (PDOD)
- h. DoD’s Global Strategic Engagement Team (GSET)
- i. Various Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) initiatives
- j. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD)
- k. DoD’s Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (GESCC)
- l. Broadcasting Board of Governors, who are responsible for USG nonmilitary, international broadcasting to include, among others, the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio and TV Marti, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television.

These and other efforts are coordinated, as appropriate, with the USAID, IC, NCTC, and other interagency members.

The distribution of common strategic messages and public affairs guidance assists all USG departments, agencies, and organizations to breed consistency into their unilateral and collective information programs. The ultimate goal is to sustain a single-voiced relationship with the news media and other relevant national and international audiences.

It is a difficult challenge, one made even more so by the introduction of scores — perhaps hundreds — of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO voices and agendas that are competing for exposure. It is important to remember that each serves a variety of stakeholders who provide both active and passive support. The interest of each stakeholder must be accounted for within the many disparate media relations programs that are in play.

The strategic communication environment is made even more complex by the presence of sophisticated terrorist propaganda initiatives that skew the truth while frequently attracting sympathetic news media coverage. Thus the difficult challenge of synchronizing all the Public Affairs agendas within the USG interagency process is just a first step toward establishing and sustaining a credible agenda internationally where both friendly voices and enemy propaganda compete for finite air time and column inches.

Experience teaches that pursuing complete strategic message control in such an environment is a waste of time. Some participants such as the HN, partner nations, and some IGOs may be willing to coordinate some messages to improve their effectiveness. However, those other players must also serve constituencies that are not relevant to the USG agenda and who must be addressed separately.

IGOs and NGOs frequently present special challenges as many operate sophisticated Web sites and frequently issue their own reports on their own progress

and that of others within the AO. Those in the USG who are used to the comfort of speaking with one voice are often shaken by what those assessments assert and the degree of instant credibility they are often afforded by the national and international news media, especially if they appear to contradict official USG positions.

When such reports are not supportive of counterterrorist operations within the AO or are inconsistent with ongoing USG strategic messaging, they are frequently cited by the news media as evidence of policy failure by the USG and its various partners.

During the summer of 2004, a dispute between Doctors Without Borders (*Médecins Sans Frontières*-MSF) and the Coalition operating within Afghanistan caused the NGO to withdraw its representatives from the country. The squabble focused on what the NGO felt was an unacceptable threat to its personnel because of the appearance similarity between vehicles they used and those driven by the Coalition. MSF believed that the vehicles used by their representatives had become indistinguishable from the military's and thus placed them in increased danger.

A similar episode took place in the summer of 2008 when aid workers from Refugees International were murdered by Taliban forces near Kabul, causing the NGO to leave the country.

In both cases, the announcement of NGO withdrawals led to flurries of reports in which the news media, many reporting from far outside the country, amplified the circumstances and drew conclusions about the poor state of security in the country that may or may not have been accurate.

Considering these and other cases, those USG personnel involved with Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations should be attentive to the chorus of potentially conflicting voices present in the AO and prepare contingencies for addressing their impact on public perceptions. Once again, explanation and context—not message control—offer the most promising path to success.

The USG Interagency Community Way Ahead

Considerable effort has gone into formalizing the structure, work flow, and cohesion of the USG interagency process. Even so, that process frequently remains uncertain in its purpose and direction while remaining confusing in its complexity.

By its very nature, the USG interagency process remains a coordinative system that largely depends on the relationship-building skills of individuals for its success. What is required for that success is for leadership to take the initiative within the midst of uncertainty and imprecise direction. Experience teaches that such steps do not always happen.

Institutional and personal credibility are essential to functioning successfully within the interagency process. Those who are the most responsive, provide the best databases, listen closely, craft the most perceptive assessments, and present the most promising options are most likely to have the greatest positive impact.

Major strategic and operational challenges remain to cut through the stovepipes that flow vertically through the traditional management practices of individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations. The goal is to ensure inclusion of the relevant skill sets, experiences, and resources needed to address the most pressing security challenges. Ideally, the USG interagency process will fit the appropriate expertise to the specific problem.

Predictably, the special operations warrior within the AO will face situations that do not fit traditional military problem-solving models. Even those most skilled and experienced within the SOF community will face expertise limitations from time to time.

For instance, special operations warriors are not necessarily well positioned to offer advice to local mayors on how to interact effectively with village councils and community opinion leaders to build a consensus for action in a given situation. Others within the USG and throughout the private sector, however, have those experiences and can contribute if properly engaged and deployed.

The broad question remains how best to gather the necessary human and material resources and set them on the path to achieve the nation's national security

objectives. The USG interagency process has progressed to some extent in precisely defining those objectives.

Shortcomings remain, however, in determining how the interagency process should improve the efficiency of information exchanges; technology interface; analysis; assessment; development of policy options and operational courses of action; anticipation of consequences; presentation of recommendations; the translation of strategic guidance, policies, and Presidential decisions into workable operational plans; and the management and adaptation of those plans once introduced into the operational environment.

Put another way, how does the USG most efficiently and effectively employ all of the elements of national power (DIME-FIL: diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement) to address specifically the threats posed by terrorism overseas?

In the absence of standardized USG interagency work flow and coordination procedures, gaining agreement in identifying shared end states remains a challenge. This situation is particularly true overseas where HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO influences beyond the USG interagency community inevitably complicate the factors of where we are going (goals), how we are getting there (ways), and how we are going to resource the effort (means).

For instance, those from the international community assisting with the institutional reform of HN parliaments or national assemblies inevitably bring with them their own knowledge and expectations of how the systems function within their own home countries. An American mentor relying on U.S. congressional history as a backdrop will offer different advice than someone from a parliamentary tradition or individuals from several different parliamentary traditions.

Faced with what appears to be conflicting guidance, HN officials sincerely trying to develop the most effective representative democracy for their own country may find themselves receiving different and perhaps conflicting advice on how legislative bodies "should" work.

The presence of representatives from several different military forces — each with its own doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures—introduces similar confusion when all are advising the same HN military using their own familiar points of reference. The problem is compounded when those from different services from within the U.S. military and those of other countries train the HN more narrowly on “how we do it” in our service or, more narrowly, on our base.

Whether domestically or internationally, the USG interagency process seeks to achieve efficiencies by leveraging diverse human and material resources toward a shared end state. Part of the effort involves minimizing task duplication and structural redundancy. Elimination of either is not possible.

While horizontal coordination is necessary within the USG interagency process, it is essential within the AO.

In the absence of the familiar *unity of command*, the special operations warrior must learn to work within an interagency process guided by lead agencies pursuing a *unity of effort* or, in some cases, the even-softer *unity of purpose*.

As always, individual and organizational credibility is gained through producing results. Operating within the USG interagency process requires a difficult balancing act between loyalty to one’s own home agency and allegiance to the objectives of U.S. policy. Understandably, that loyalty to home agency is a powerful motivator, one correctly viewed as essential to self-preservation.

Those seeking to improve the functioning of the USG interagency process must wrestle with that reality and others. The USG interagency process is in a condition very similar to the one that led to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). Goldwater-Nichols reorganized the DoD and redirected the efforts of the U.S. defense community.

Though shortcomings remain, the DoD is a vastly more efficient defender of U.S. national security than it was 25 years ago. The process has taken time, as will any broader effort to bring similar reform to the entire USG structure.

Though complex in its provisions, Goldwater-Nichols answered the basic question, “Who’s in charge?” Such clarity would quickly boost the effectiveness of the

USG interagency process. Establishing responsibility within any context enables the reform of relationship-building, coordination, and work flow shortfalls.

It also leads to a harmonization of organizational cultures, but not their replacement. If done well, establishing clear responsibility and follow-on reform initiatives will improve interagency flexibility and responsiveness by creating consistency. It has worked in the IATF structures and can, with effort, in more complex organizations.

Just as many countries display maps that portray themselves as the center of their region or of the entire world, many participants regard the USG interagency process with themselves as the central point of focus. Thus the question for them becomes, How does the interagency process support my department, agency, or organization?

It is the wrong question. Rather we should ask how the interagency process can better support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives.

The seemingly simple act of identifying *who’s in charge* is an important first step in interagency reform. Until then, the 3-D special operations warrior must continue to navigate through a situationally and personality dependent environment, with all its attendant uncertainties and frustrations, to accomplish the CT mission.

Appendix A. List of Organizations

The following USG departments, agencies and organizations, IGOs, and NGOs provide the human and material resources to wage the fight against terrorists, their networks, and their ideologies. They also work to eliminate the conditions that breed terrorism and seek to replace them with reforms and initiatives that bring about stability and good governance. Some of the components listed here are not discussed in the text or have only a limited mention, but can be reached through the links to allow for individual research as required.

The CT environment is ever changing with new structures and programs regularly joining the fight. This list is not exhaustive, but it does identify the major players. As noted several times, this caveat is particularly apt for NGOs because there are many thousands that operate around the world. A comprehensive list would be more confusing than helpful; it would also never be completely accurate.

ABCA Armies (IGO)

www.abca-armies.org/Default.aspx

Academy for Educational Development (AED) (NGO)

www.aed.org

Action Against Hunger (USA) (NGO)

www.actionagainsthunger.org

Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (DoS)

www.state.gov/r/adcompd

Afghan New Beginnings Program (UN) (IGO)

<http://undpanbp.org/index.html>

Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (DoD)

African Union (Regional IGO)

www.africa-union.org

Africare (NGO)

www.africare.org

American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction) (NGO)

www.interaction.org

American Friends Service Committee (NGO)

www.afsc.org

American Refugee Committee (NGO)

www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer

Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) (DoJ)

www.justice.gov/usao/moe/attf.html

Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) (DoS)

www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm

www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16885.htm

Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Regional IGO)

www.apec.org

Assistant Attorney General for National Security (DoJ)

www.usdoj.gov/nsd/

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)

www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511114p.pdf

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities)

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

(Regional IGO)

www.aseansec.org

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) (Regional IGO)

www.state.gov/s/ct/intl/io/arf

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)

www.bbg.gov

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF) (DoJ)

www.atf.gov

Bureau of Business and Security (BIS) (DoC)

www.bis.doc.gov

- Bureau of Consular Affairs**
travel.state.gov
- Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) (DoS)**
www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/cent_progs/central_dcha.html
- Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance-Office of Military Affairs (DCHA-OMA) (DoS)**
www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/cent_progs/central_dcha_oma.html
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)**
www.state.gov/g/drl
- Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) (DoS)**
www.state.gov/m/ds/
- Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) (DoS)**
www.state.gov/e/eeb
- Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)**
www.ice.gov/index.htm
- Bureau of Industry and Security (DoC)**
www.bis.doc.gov
- Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)**
www.state.gov/s/inr
- Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) (DoS)**
www.state.gov/r/iip
- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)**
www.state.gov/p/inl
- Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)**
www.state.gov/t/isn
- Bureau of Justice Assistance (DoJ)**
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA
- Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)**
www.state.gov/t/pm
- Bureau of Public Affairs (DoS)** www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htm
- Business Executives for National Security (BENS)**
www.bens.org/home.html
- Business Transformation Office (BTO) (DNI)**
- Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (NGO)**
www.crs.org
- Center for Security Evaluation (CSE) (DNI)**
- Center for Special Operations (CSO) (USSOCOM/DoD)**
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**
<https://www.cia.gov>
- CIA Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC)**
<https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/organization-1/winpac.html>
- Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (DoS)**
www.jcs.mil
- Chief of Mission (COM) (DoS)**
- Church World Service (CWS) (NGO)**
www.churchworldservice.org/site/PageServer
- Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America**
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/07/107063.htm
- Civil-Military Cooperation Center**
- Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)**
- Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC)**
- Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) (DoD)**
- Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) (DoD)**
- Coalition Support Funds (CSF) (DoD)**
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R
- Combatant Commanders Initiative Funds (CCIF) (DoD)**
- Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (DoD)**
www.hqda.army.mil/ogc/Fiscal%20Links%202007/DoD%20GC%20Links/CERP%20TJ%20Signed%20guidance%20050907.pdf
- Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) (USAID)**
www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
- Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) (NGO)**
www.care.org
- Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) (DoD)**
www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/programs/index.cfm
- Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related Training (DoD)**
- Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) (DoD)**
- Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) Training (DoD)**
- Counterterrorism Financial Unit**
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16662.htm
- Counterterrorism Section (CTS) (DoJ)**
www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm

Counterterrorism Training Coordination Working Group www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003806.2005.html	Department of Energy (DoE) www.energy.gov
Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) (NSC/PCC)	Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) www.hhs.gov
Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/mission/index.html	Department of Homeland Security (DHS) www.dhs.gov/index.shtm
Counterterrorism Training Working Group (DoJ)	Department of Justice (DoJ) www.usdoj.gov
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS) www.cbp.gov	Department of State (DoS) www.state.gov
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) www.darpa.mil	Department of State Counterterrorism (S/CT) www.state.gov/s/ct
Defense Attaché (DATT) (DoD/DIA)	Department of the Treasury (Treasury) www.treas.gov
Defense Attaché System (DAS) (DoD/DIA) www.dia.mil/history/histories/attaches.html	Department of Transportation (DoT) www.dot.gov
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) www.dfas.mil	Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) (DoS)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) www.dia.mil	Deputy to the Commander for Civilian-Military Activities (DCMA) (USAFRICOM) www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp
Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) (DoD)	Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) (USAFRICOM) www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp
Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) www.fas.org/irp/program/core/dodiis.htm	Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) (DoS) www.state.gov/m/ds
Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) (DoD) www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Press/press020.pdf	Director of National Intelligence (DNI) www.dni.gov
Defense and Management Contacts (DMC) Programs (DoD)	Directorate for Global Engagement (NSS/GE) (White House)
Defense Planning Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO) www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070102.htm	Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (DoD) www.dsca.mil	Department of Defense Counterdrug Programs
Defense Security Services (DSS) www.dss.mil	Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (DNSA/SC) (White House)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) www.dtra.mil	Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (NGO) www.doctorswithoutborders.org
Demining Test and Evaluation Program	Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DoJ) www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm
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- Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (FLETC) (DHS)**
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- Federal Protective Services (FPS) (ICE/DHS)**
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www.fda.gov
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- Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)**
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- Humanitarian Information Center (HIC)**
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- Information Sharing & Fusion Centers**
www.ise.gov/pages/partner-fc.html
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- Office of Commercial and Business Affairs (EEB/CBA) (DoS)**
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- Office of Economic Policy Analysis & Public Diplomacy (EEB/EPPD) (DoS)**
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- Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) (Treasury)**
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- Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA)** (CIA)
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- Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy** (DoS)
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- Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC)**
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- Office of Transition Initiatives** (USAID)
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- Office of Transitional Issues (OTI)** (CIA)
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- Public Designations Unit** (DoS)
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- Security Assistance Officer (SAO)**
- Security Assistance Team**
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat
- Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)**
www.defenselink.mil/osd/
- Senior Director for Global Engagement (SDGE)**
 (White House)
- Special Operations Forces (SOF)**
www.socom.mil
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- Special Security Center (SSC)** (DNI)
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www.stophungernow.org/site/PageServer
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 (DoJ/FBI)
www.fbi.gov/hq/siocfs.htm
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- Technical Support Working Groups (TSWG)** (DoS/DoD)
www.tswg.gov
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- Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (TIVASD)** (DoJ)
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 (DoS/USAID/DoD)
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- Transportation Affairs (EEB/TRA)** (DoS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/tra
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- Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence-USD(I)**
 (DoD)
www.intelligence.gov/0-usdi_memo.shtml
- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-USD(P)** (DoD)
www.defenselink.mil/policy
- Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs**
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- United Nations (UN)** (IGO)
www.un.org/english
- UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)** (IGO)
www.unama-afg.org

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www.unicef.org
- UN Development Program (UNDP) (IGO)**
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- UN Humanitarian Operations Center (UNHOC) (IGO)**
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www.unmaca.org
- UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)**
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- UN Peacekeeping Operations (IGO)**
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- United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)**
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- United States Army Corps of Engineers**
www.usace.army.mil/
- United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) (DoD)**
www.cid.army.mil/Documents/CID%20Lab%20Release_final.pdf
- United States Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)**
<https://pksoi.army.mil>
- United States Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)**
www.usaforunhcr.org
- United States Coast Guard (USCG) (DHS)**
www.uscg.mil/default.asp
- United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (DHS)**
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
- United States Marine Security Detachment (MSG)**
- United States Mission to the United Nations**
www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov
- United States Navy Oceanographic Office (NAVO-CEANO) (DoD)**
<https://oceanography.navy.mil/legacy/web>
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- Voice of America (BBG)**
www.voanews.com/english/news
- Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) (DoD)**
www.pims.org/book/export/html/174
- Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) (CIA)**
<https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/organization-1/winpac.html>
- White House**
www.whitehouse.gov

World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO) (NGO)

www.wango.org

World Bank

www.worldbank.org

World Food Program (WFP) (UN) (IGO)

www.wfp.org/english

World Health Organization (WHO) (UN) (IGO)

www.who.int/en

World Intelligence Review (WIRe) (DNI)

<https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/products.html>

World Trade Organization (WTO) (IGO)

www.wto.org

World Vision (United States) (NGO)

site.worldvision.org

Appendix B. Ranks of Military, Foreign Service, and Civil Service Officials

Military	Foreign Service	Civil Service
Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral	FE-CM (Career Minister)	SES-6
Major General, Rear Admiral (Upper Half)	FE-MC (Minister Counselor)	SES-3/4
Brigadier General, Rear Admiral (Commodore)	FE-OC (Counselor)	SES-1/2
Colonel, Captain (USN)	FO-1, FP-1	GS-15
Lieutenant Colonel, Commander (USN)	FO-2, FP-2	GS-13
Major, Lieutenant Commander (USN)	FO-3, FP-3	GS-12
Captain, Lieutenant (USN)	FO-4, FP-4	GS-11
First Lieutenant, Lieutenant (Junior Grade)	FO-5, FP-5	GS-9
Second Lieutenant, Ensign (USN)	FP-7	GS-7

Appendix C. Interagency-Related Definitions

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with U.S. allies or coalition partners that allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. (JP 1-02, JP 4-07)

Ambassador. A diplomatic agent of the highest rank accredited to a foreign government or sovereign as the resident representative of his own government; also called the Chief of Mission. In the U.S. system, the Ambassador is the personal representative of the President and reports to him through the Secretary of State. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

Antiterrorism (AT). Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorists acts, to include limited response and containment by local and civilian forces. (JP1-02, 3-07.2)

Area of Operations (AO). An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operation of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Asset (Intelligence). Any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use

in an operational or support role. Often used with a qualifying term such as agent asset or propaganda asset. (JP 2-0)

Assistance. Activities that provide relief to refugees, conflict victims, and internally displaced persons. Such relief includes food, clean water, shelter, health care, basic education, job training, sanitation, and provision of physical and legal protection. Humanitarian assistance is often given in emergencies, but may need to continue in longer-term situations. (State Department)

Asylum-Migration Nexus. Refers to “mixed flows” of migrants — an undifferentiated combination of documented and undocumented travelers, smuggled migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and trafficking victims — moving through an area. (State Department)

Attaché. A person attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status who is not normally a career member of the diplomatic service. In the U.S. system, attachés generally represent agencies other than the Department of State such as the Department of Defense (DoD) and others. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

Bilateral. Bilateral discussions or negotiations are between a state and one other. A bilateral treaty is between one state and one other. “Multilateral” is used when more than two states are involved. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

Capacity-Building Activities. Training staff of humanitarian organizations to provide better quality service to refugees and internally displaced persons. (State Department)

Chargé D'affaires, A.I. Formerly a chargé d'affaires was the title of a chief of mission, inferior in rank to an ambassador or a minister. Today with the a.i. (ad interim) added, it designates the senior officer taking charge for the interval when a chief of mission is absent

from his or her post. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

Chief of Mission (COM). The principal officer (the Ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government (USG) executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission's direct responsibility. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

Civil Administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

Civil Affairs (CA). Designated active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs Activities. Activities performed or supported by CA that 1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present and 2) involve application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)

Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or

national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces and other USG agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Civil Society Entities. Nongovernmental associations of citizens, charitable or otherwise, formed for the purpose of providing benefit to the members and to society. The term includes nongovernmental organizations engaged in humanitarian work. (State Department)

Coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Collection. In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. (JP 2-0)

Combatant Command (COCOM). A unified or specified command with a broad continuing command under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Combatant Commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Combating Terrorism. Actions, including AT (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and CT (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

Capacity Building. The process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems. (FM 3-07)

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one U.S. military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The CJSOTF may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 3-05)

Comprehensive Approach. An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

Consequence Management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. (JP 1-02, JP 3-28)

Consulate General/Consulate. A constituent post of an embassy in a foreign country located in an important city other than the national capital. Consulates General are larger than Consulates, with more responsibilities and additional staff. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

Counterinsurgency (COIN). Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP-2)

Counterterrorism (CT). Actions taken through approaches applied directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior

member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

Crisis State. A nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory. (FM 3-07)

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the DoD components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts from the USG. (JP-2, JP 3-13)

Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS). The combination of DoD personnel, procedures, equipment, computer programs, and supporting communications that support the timely and comprehensive preparation and presentation of intelligence and information to military commanders and national-level decision makers. (JP 2-0)

Developmental Assistance. U.S. Agency for International Development function chartered under Chapter 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Displaced Person. An individual who has been forced or obliged to flee or leave his or her home temporarily and who expects to return eventually. Internally displaced

persons (IDPs) have moved within their country, while externally displaced persons have crossed an international border. Depending upon their ability to return, and whether they are subject to persecution in their home country, externally displaced persons may be entitled to recognition as refugees under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) mandate. (State Department)

End State. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Essential Elements of Information (EEI). The most critical information requirements regarding the adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (JP 2-0)

First Asylum Country. A country that permits refugees to enter its territory for purposes of providing asylum temporarily, pending eventual repatriation or resettlement (locally or in a third country). First asylum countries usually obtain the assistance of UNHCR to provide basic assistance to the refugees. (State Department)

Foreign Assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters; U.S. assistance takes three forms — development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. The FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Fragile State. A country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. (FM 3-07)

Fusion. In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (JP2-0)

Governance. The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (FM 3-07)

Host Country/Host Nation (HN). A nation that permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP-2, JP 2-01.2) A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP-2)

Host Country/Host Nation Support (HNS). Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02, JP 4-0)

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to 1) medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine care provided in rural areas of a country; 2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; 3) well drilling and construction of

basic sanitation facilities; and 4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations (UN), or a USG agency during a United States unilateral operation. The HOC should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the UN, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Indications and Warning (I&W). Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of hostile actions or intentions against the United States, its activities, overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Information Operations (IO). The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, military information support operations (MISO), military deception, and operations security — in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities — to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02, JP 3-13)

Information Sharing. Providing a common platform for ideas, information (including databases), strategies, approaches, activities, and plans and programs. (UN)

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

Intelligence Community (IC). All departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 2-01)

Interagency. USG agencies and departments, including the DoD. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Interagency Coordination. Within the context of DoD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DoD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Internal Capacity Building. Facilitating capacity building and skills development of members with critical expertise to support actors in disaster management and other activities through training, joint activities, and sharing lessons-learned experiences. (UN)

Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 3-07.1)

Internally Displaced Person (IDP). Any person who has left his residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.6)

Irregular Warfare (IW). A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. (JP 1, JP 1-02)

Intergovernmental Organization (IGO). An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed

to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05.1)

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking SOF and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0) The inclusion of a CJSOTF into a JFSOCC changes the title to a Combined/Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (C/JFSOCC).

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the DoD, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level that is integrated with national intelligence centers and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE). A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. (JP 2-01)

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between

civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force commander, the JIACG provides the joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other USG civilian agencies and departments. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Lead Agency. Designated among USG agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Letter of Assist (LOA). A contractual document issued by the UN to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them subject to reimbursement by the UN. A letter of assist typically details specifically what is to be provided by the contributing government and establishes a funding limit that cannot be exceeded. (JP 1-02, JP 1-06)

Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). Standard DoD form on which the USG documents its offer to transfer to a foreign government or international organization U.S. defense articles and services via foreign military sales pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. (JP 1-02, JP 4-08)

Local Integration. One of the three “durable solutions”—voluntary return, local integration, third-country resettlement—sought for refugees. When voluntary return to their home country is not possible, refugees can sometimes settle with full legal rights in the country to which they have fled (also known as the country of first asylum). This is local integration. (State Department)

Measure of Effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

Measure of Performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

Military Civic Action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

Military Information Support Operations (MISO)—formerly Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-53)

Mobile Training Team (MTT). A team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon HN requests. (JP 1-02)

Multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Multinational Force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1, JP 1-02)

National Defense Strategy. A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with DoD agencies and other instruments of power to achieve national security strategy objectives. (JP 3-0)

National Intelligence. The terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security” each refers to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside of the United States, which pertains, as determined consistent with any guidelines issued by the President, to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and that involves a) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; b) the development, proliferation, or use of WMD; or c) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other IC agencies as required. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

National Policy. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

National Security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, b) a favorable foreign relations position, or c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service Representative. The senior theater or military command representative of the director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service in a specific country or military command headquarters who provides the director, NSA with information on command plans requiring cryptologic support. The NSA/Central Security Service representative serves as a special advisor to the combatant commander for cryptologic matters, to include signals intelligence, communications security, and computer security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

National Security Strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national

power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Nongovernmental Organization (NGO). A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Partner Nation (PN). Those nations that the United States works with to disrupt the production, transportation, and sale of illicit drugs or to counter other threats to national security, as well as the money involved with any such activity. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.3)

Persona Non Grata (PNG). An individual who is unacceptable to or unwelcome by the host government. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

Preventive Diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Protection. Any of the activities that provide safety, meet basic needs, or secure the rights of refugees in the places to which they have fled. Examples of protection include the following:

- a. Providing documentation to stateless persons
- b. Preventing forced returns
- c. Preventing and combating rape and domestic abuse
- d. Securing education and job training for refugees
- e. Maintaining an international presence in places where refugees have fled. (State Department)

Refugee. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided and who is unable or unwilling to

return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. (State Department)

Repatriation. Voluntary return of a refugee to his or her country of origin when conditions permit. Worldwide, this is the "best case scenario" in which a refugee feels comfortable returning home to rebuild his or her life. Recent examples of repatriation have been in Kosovo and South Sudan. (State Department)

Resettlement. The process of relocating a refugee from the country of first asylum to another country. When it is clear that a refugee will not be able to return to his or her home and cannot be integrated into the country to which he or she has fled, resettlement is often the only solution left. However, worldwide refugee resettlement figures are very low; fewer than 1 percent of refugees will ever be considered and accepted for resettlement. The U.S. has the largest refugee resettlement program in the world. (State Department)

Rules of Engagement (ROE). Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

Security Assistance (SA). Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

Security Assistance Organizations (SAO). All DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)

Security Cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)

Security Force Assistance (SFA). The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, HN, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. (FM 3-07)

Security Sector Reform. The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (FM 3-07)

Stability Operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

Statelessness. According to UNHCR, a stateless person is “someone who, under national laws, does not enjoy citizenship—the legal bond between a government and an individual—with any country.” While some people are *de jure* or legally stateless (meaning they are not recognized as citizens under the laws of any state), many people are *de facto* or effectively stateless persons (meaning they are not recognized as citizens by any state even if they have a claim to citizenship under the laws of one or more states). (State Department)

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters

affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as Civil Affairs agreements. (JP 1-02, JP 3-16)

Strategic Communication. Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 2-0, JP 3-0)

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

Terrorist. An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

Terrorist Group. Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological goals. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

Trafficking in Persons. Any person who is recruited, harbored, provided, or obtained through force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude, forced labor, or commercial sex qualifies as a trafficking victim. (State Department)

Unity of Effort. The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

Vulnerable State. A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population. (FM 3-07)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/

or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. WMD can be high explosives or nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. (JP 1-02, JP 3-28)

Whole-of-Government Approach. An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

Appendix D. USG IA Abbreviations/Acronyms

AAH-USA. Action Against Hunger-United States of America (NGO)	ATF. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (DoJ)
AED. Academy for Educational Development (NGO)	ATFC. Afghan Threat Finance Cell
AFIAA. Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency (DoD)	AU. African Union (Regional IGO)
AFISRA. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (DoD)	BBD. Broadcasting Board of Governors (DoS)
AFRICOM. U.S. Africa Command (DoD)	BENS. Business Executives for National Security
AFSC. American Friends Service Committee (NGO)	BIS. Bureau of Industry and Security (DoC)
ANBP. Afghan New Beginnings Program (UN, IGO)	BJA. Bureau of Justice Assistance (DoJ)
AO. Area of Operations (DoD)	BTO. Business Transformation Office (DNI)
AOR. Area of Responsibility (DoD)	CA. Bureau of Consular Affairs (DoS); Civil Affairs (DoD)
APEC. Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Regional IGO)	CARE. Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (NGO)
ARC. American Refugee Committee International (NGO)	CBM. Confidence-Building Measures
ARF. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (Regional IGO)	CBP. Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
ASD. Assistant Secretary of Defense	CCDR. Combatant Commander (DoD)
ASD/GSA. ASD for Global Security Affairs	CCIF. Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (DoD)
ASD/ISA. ASD for International Security Affairs	CCIR. Commander's Critical Information Requirement (DoD)
ASD/ISP. ASD for International Security Policy	CDC. Civilian Deployment Center (USAID)
ASD/SOLIC&IC. ASD for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities)	CERP. Commander's Emergency Response Program (DoD)
ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Regional IGO)	CFIUS. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (DoJ)
ASFF. Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (DoD)	CFSOCC. Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (DoD)
AT. Antiterrorism	CI. Counterintelligence
ATA. Antiterrorism Assistance Program (DoS)	CIFA. Counterintelligence Field Activity (DoD)
ATAC. Antiterrorism Advisory Council (DoJ)	CIMIC. Civil-Military Cooperation; Civil-Military Information Center

CJCS. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (DoD)	CTFP. Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (DoD)
C/JFSOCC. Combined/Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (DoD)	CTR. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (DoD); Cooperative Threat Reduction-related Training (DoD)
CJSOTF. Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (DoD)	CTS. Counterterrorism Section (DoD)
CMCC. Civil-Military Coordination Center	CTTSO. Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (DoD)
CMM. Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID)	CWS. Church World Service (NGO)
CMO. Civil-Military Operations (DoD)	DARPA. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DoD)
CMOC. Civil-Military Operations Center (DoD)	DART. Disaster Assessment Team (DoS)
CMPASS. Civilian-Military Planning and Assessment Section (DoS)	DAS. Defense Attaché System (DoD/DIA)
CMSE. Civil-Military Support Element (DoD)	DATT. Defense Attaché (DoD/DIA)
CNT. Counter Narco-Terrorist Training (DoD)	DCHA. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
COA. Course of Action (DoD)	DCHA/OMA. Office of Military Affairs (USAID)
COG. Center of Gravity (DoD)	DCM. Deputy Chief of Mission (DoS)
COI. Communities of Interest	DCMA. Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DoD/AFRICOM)
COM. Chief of Mission (DoS)	DCMO. Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DoD/AFRICOM)
CONOP. Concept of Operation (DoD)	DCS. Direct Commercial Sales
CPG. Contingency Planning Guidance	DDR. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
CRC. Civilian Response Corps (DoS)	DEA. Drug Enforcement Administration (DoJ)
CRC-A. Civilian Response Corps-Active Component (DoS)	DEST. Domestic Emergency Support Team (DHS)
CRC-R. Civilian Response Corps-Reserve Component (DoS)	DFAS. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DoD)
CRC-S. Civilian Response Corps-Standby Component (DoS)	DHHS. Department of Health and Human Services
CRS. Catholic Relief Services (NGO)	DHS. Department of Homeland Security
CRSG. Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (DoS)	DIA. Defense Intelligence Agency (DoD)
CSE. Center for Security Evaluation (DNI)	DIAC. Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DoD)
CSF. Coalition Support Fund (DoD)	DIME. Defense, Information, Military, Economic [traditional elements of national power]
CSG. Counterterrorism Support Group (NSC/PCC)	DIME-FIL. Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement [expanded elements]
CT. Counterterrorism; Finance (DoS)	

DIOCC. Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DoD)	EEB/CBA. Commercial and Business Affairs (DoS)
DJIOC. Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DoD)	EEB/CIP. International Communications and Information Policy (DoS)
DMAT. Disaster Medical Assistance Team	EEB/EPPD. Economic Policy Analysis & Public Diplomacy (DoS)
DMC. Defense and Military Contacts Program (DoD)	EEB/ESC. Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities (DoS)
DNI. Director of National Intelligence	EEB/IFD. International Finance and Development (DoS)
DNSA/SC. Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (White House)	EEB/TPP. Trade Policy and Programs (DoS)
DoA. Department of Agriculture	EEB/TRA. Transportation Affairs (DoS)
DoC. Department of Commerce	EEI. Essential Elements of Information (DoD)
DoD. Department of Defense	EIPC. Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
DoDIIS. Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoD)	ERO. Enforcement and Removal Operations (DHS)
DoE. Department of Energy	ERT. Emergency Response Team
DoJ. Department of Justice	ESC. Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities (DoS)
DoL. Department of Labor	ESF. Economic Support Fund
DoS. Department of State	EU. European Union (Regional IGO)
DoT. Department of Transportation	EUROPOL. European Police Office (IGO)
DPC. Defense Planning Committee (NATO)	F3EAD. Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (DoD)
DRL. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DoS)	FAO. Food and Agriculture Organization (UN; IGO)
DS. Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DoS); Directorate of Support (CIA)	FAS. Foreign Agricultural Service (DoA)
DS&T. Directorate of Science & Technology (CIA)	FATF. Financial Action Task Force (IGO)
DSCA. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DoD)	FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation (DoJ)
DSPD. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DoD)	FDA. Food and Drug Administration (DHHS)
DSS. Defense Security Service (DoD); Diplomatic Security Service (DoS)	FEMA. Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
DTRA. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DoD)	FEST. Foreign Emergency Support Team (DoS)
ECA. Educational and Cultural Affairs (DoS)	FEWGW. Forensics Engagement Working Group
EDA. Excess Defense Articles	FHA. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (DoD)
EEB. Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs (DoS)	FID. Foreign Internal Defense (DoD)
	FIG. Field Intelligence Groups (DoJ/FBI)
	FIRST. Federal Incident Response Support Team
	FISA. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

FISC. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

FLETC. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (DHS)

FMF. Foreign Military Financing (DoD)

FMS. Foreign Military Sales (DoD, DoS)

FPS. Federal Protective Services (ICE/DHS)

FSI. Foreign Service Institute (DoS)

FTO. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (DoS)

FTTTF. Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (DoJ)

GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GESCC. Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (DoD)

GMSC. Global Mission Support Center (DoD/USSOCOM)

GPF. General Purpose Forces (DoD)

GPOI. Global Peace Operations Initiative (DoS)

GSEC. Global Strategic Engagement Center (DoS)

GSET. Global Strategic Engagement Team (DoD)

HACC. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (DoD)

HA/DR. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (DoD)

HAP. Humanitarian Assistance Program (DoD)

HCA. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

HDM. Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (DoD/DSCA)

HIC. Humanitarian Information Center

HIU. Humanitarian Information Unit (DoS)

HN. Host Nation/Host Country

HNS. Host Nation/Host Nation Support

HOC. Humanitarian Operations Center

HOPE. Health Opportunities for People Everywhere (Project Hope, NGO)

HSCC. Homeland Security Coordinating Committee (DoS)

HSI. Homeland Security Investigations (DHS)

HSIC. Homeland Security Intelligence Council (DHS)

HUMINT. Human Intelligence

IA. Interagency (USG)

I&A. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)

IAAH. International Alliance Against Hunger (IGO)

IACG. Interagency Coordination Group (DoD)

IAEA. International Atomic Energy Agency (IGO)

IARPA. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (DNI)

IATF. Interagency Task Force (DoD)

I&W. Indications and Warning (DoD)

IBRD. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IGO)

IC. Intelligence Community (USG)

ICAF. Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (DoS)

ICE. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)

ICITAP. International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (DoJ)

ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross (IGO)

IDA. International Development Association (IGO)

IDAD. Internal Defense and Development (DoD)

IDP. Internally Displaced Person

IE. Intelligence Enterprise (DHS)

IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IGO)

IGO. Intergovernmental Organization

IHL. International Humanitarian Law

IIP. International Information Programs (DoS)

IMAT. Incident Management Assistance Team

IMC. International Medical Corps (NGO)

IMET. International Military Education and Training (DoS, DoD)	ITACG. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (DNI/ISE)
IMF. International Monetary Fund (IGO)	JCC. Joint Collaboration Center (DoD/USSOCOM)
IMS. Interagency Management System	JCET. Joint Combined Exchange Training (DoD)
IN. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DoE)	JCS. Joint Chiefs of Staff
INCLE. International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement Program	JFCC-ISR. Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence (DoD/USSTRATCOM)
INL. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DoS)	JFSOC. Joint Force Special Operations Component (DoD)
INR. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DoS)	JFSOCC. Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (DoD)
INTERPOL. International Criminal Police Organization (IGO)	JIACG. Joint Interagency Coordination Group (DoD)
INTERPOL-USNCB. United States National Central Bureau (DoJ)	JICC. Joint Intelligence Community Council (DNI); Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (DoD)
IO. Bureau of International Organization Affairs (DoS); Information Operations (DoD)	JIOC. Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DoD)
IOB. President's Intelligence Oversight Board (White House)	JIOPE. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (DoD)
IOM. International Organization for Migration (IGO)	JISE. Joint Intelligence Support Element (DoD)
IPC. Interagency Policy Committee (White House)	JITF-CT. Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (DoD)
IRC. International Rescue Committee (NGO)	JMISC. Joint Military Information Support Command (DoD)
IRTPA. Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004	JOA. Joint Operations Area (DoD)
ISAF. International Security and Assistance Force (UN Mandate/NATO)	JOC. Joint Operations Center (DoD)
ISC. Information Sharing Council (DNI)	JSCP. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (DoD)
ISE. Information Sharing Environment (DNI)	JTF. Joint Task Force (DoD)
ISN. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (DoS)	JTTF. Joint Terrorism Task Force (DoJ/FBI)
ISN/RA. Office of Regional Affairs (DoS)	LOA. Letter of Assist (UN); Letter of Offer and Acceptance (DoD)
ISO. Office of International Security Operations (DoS)	MA. Management and Administration (DHS)
ISPI. International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (DoS)	MBN. Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (BBG)
ISR. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (DoD)	MC. Military Committee (NATO)
ISSF. Iraq Security Sector Fund (DoD)	MCIA. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (DoD)
	MILDEP. Military Department (DoD)
	MILGP. Military Group

MIP. Military Intelligence Program (DoD)

MISO. Military Information Support Operations (formerly PSYOP) (DoD)

MIST. Military Information Support Team (DoD)

MOA. Memorandum of Agreement

MOE. Measures of Effectiveness (DoD)

MOP. Measures of Performance (DoD)

MOU. Memorandum of Understanding

MSF. Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (NGO)

MSG. U.S. Marine Security Guard detachment

MTT. Mobile Training Team (DoD)

NADR. Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (DoS)

NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Regional IGO)

NAVOCEANO. U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office (DoD)

NCIRC. National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCTC)

NCIX. National Counterintelligence Executive (DNI)

NCO. Narcotics Control Officer (DoS)

NCPC. National Counter-Proliferation Center (DNI)

NCR. National Capital Region

NCS. National Clandestine Service (CIA)

NCTC. National Counterterrorism Center (DNI)

N-DEx. Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (DoJ)

NDIC. National Defense Intelligence College (DoD)

NDS. National Defense Strategy (DoD)

NEO. Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

NGA. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (DoD)

NGO. Nongovernmental Organization (NGO)

NIC. National Intelligence Council (DNI)

NIC-C. National Intelligence Coordination Center (DNI)

NIMA. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (DoD)

NIP. National Intelligence Program (DoD)

NIPF. National Intelligence Priorities Framework (DNI)

NIRT. Nuclear Incident Reporting Team (DHS)

NISP. National Intelligence Support Plan

NIST. National Intelligence Support Team (DoD)

NIU. National Intelligence University (DNI)

NJTTF. National Joint Terrorism Task Force (DoJ/FBI)

NMCC. National Military Command Center (DoD)

NMIC. National Maritime Intelligence Center (DoD)

NMJIC. National Military Joint Intelligence Center (DoD)

NOAA. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DoC)

NOL. NCTC Online (NCTC/DNI)

NORTHCOM. U.S. Northern Command (DoD)

NRO. National Reconnaissance Office (DoD)

NRP. National Reconnaissance Program

NSA/CSS. National Security Agency/Central Security Service (DoD)

NSB. National Security Branch (DoJ/FBI)

NSC. National Security Council (White House)

NSC/DC. Deputy's Committee (White House)

NSC/IPC. Interagency Policy Committee (White House)

NSC/PC. Principal's Committee (White House)

NSC/PCC. Policy Coordination Committees (Bush Administration)

NSD. National Security Division (DoJ)

NSG. National System for Geospatial Intelligence (DoD)

NSPD. National Security Presidential Directive (Bush Administration)

NSS. National Security Staff (White House); National Security Strategy

NSS/GE. National Security Staff Directorate for Global Engagement (White House)	OSCE. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (IGO)
NTC. National Targeting Center (DHS/CBP)	OSD. Office of the Secretary of Defense (DoD)
NTM-A. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan	OTA. Office of Technical Assistance (Treasury); Office of Terrorism Analysis (CIA)
NTRG. Nuclear Trafficking Response Group	OTI. Office of Transnational Issues (CIA)
OAA. Operations, Activities, and Actions (DoD)	OUSD/I. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DoI)
OAS. Organization of American States (Regional IGO)	OUSD/P. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DoD)
OAS/CICTE. Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (Regional IGO)	OXFAM. Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (NGO)
OASD/PA. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (DoD)	PA. Public Affairs
OCHA. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)	PAO. Public Affairs Officer
OEF-TS. Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (DoD/AFRICOM)	PCC. Policy Coordinating Committee
OFAC. Office of Foreign Assets Control (DoT)	PD. Public Diplomacy (DoS)
OFDA. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)	PDB. President's Daily Brief (DNI)
OGA. Other Government Agency	PDOD. Public Diplomacy Office Director (DoS)
OHDACA. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (DoD)	PIAB. President's Intelligence Advisory Board (White House)
OIA. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Treasury)	PIR. Priority Intelligence Requirement (DoD)
OIPR. Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (DoJ)	PKO. Peacekeeping Operations
OJP. Office of Justice Programs (DoJ)	PKSOI. U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
OJVOT. Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (DoJ)	PM. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DoS)
OMB. Office of Management and Budget (White House)	PM/PPA. Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (DoS)
ONI. Office of Naval Intelligence (DoD)	PNG. Persona Non Grata
ONSI. Office of National Security Intelligence (DoE)	PNSP. Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program
OPCW. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (DoS)	POA. Partners of the Americas (NGO)
OPDAT. Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (DoJ)	POLAD. Political Advisor
OPIC. Overseas Private Investment Corporation	PPD. Presidential Policy Directive (White House)
OSAC. Overseas Security Advisory Council (DoS)	PRM. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DoS)
	PRT. Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSI. Proliferation Security Initiative (DoS)	SOST. Special Operations Support Team (DoD)
R&S. Reconstruction and Stabilization (DoS)	S/P. Policy Planning Staff (DoS)
RDT&E. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DoD)	SSC. Special Security Center (DNI)
RFA. Radio Free Asia (BBG)	SSR. Security Sector Reform
RFE/RL. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (BBG)	SWAT. Special Weapons and Tactics (DoJ)
RFI. Request for Information	TARS. Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (DoD)
RI. Refugees International (NGO)	TEL. Terrorist Exclusions List (DoS)
RLA. Resident Legal Advisor (DoJ/FBI)	TFFC. Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (Treasury)
R/PPR. Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DoS)	TFI. Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Treasury)
RSO. Regional Security Officer	TFOS. Terrorism Financing Operations Section (DoJ)
SA. Security Assistance	TIDE. Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (NCTC/DNI)
SAO. Security Assistance Officer	TIP. Terrorist Interdiction Program (DoS)
SA/WSO. Salvation Army World Service Office (NGO)	TIVASD. Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (DoJ)
SC. Security Cooperation (DoD, DoS)	TSA. Transportation Security Administration (DHS)
S/CRS. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (DoS)	TSC. Terrorist Screening Center (DoJ/FBI)
S/CT. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (DoS)	TSCTP. Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (DoS/USAID, DoD)
SC/US. Save the Children Federation, Inc. (NGO)	TSOC. Theater Special Operations Command (DoD)
SDGE. Senior Director for Global Engagement (White House)	TSWG. Technical Support Working Group (DoS, DoD)
SECDEF. Secretary of Defense (DoD)	UCP. Unified Command Plan (DoD)
SFA. Security Force Assistance	UN. United Nations (IGO)
SIGINT. Signals Intelligence	UNAMA. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (IGO)
SIOC. Strategic Information and Operations Center (DoJ/FBI)	UNDMT. Disaster Management Team (IGO)
SMEE. Subject Matter Expert Exchanges	UNDP. Development Program (IGO)
SOCOM. U.S. Special Operations Command (DoD)	UNDPKO. Department for Peacekeeping Operations (IGO)
SOCOM/IATF. Interagency Task Force (DoD)	UNESCO. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IGO)
SOF. Special Operations Forces (DoD)	UNHCHR. High Commissioner for Human Rights (IGO)
SOFA. Status of Forces Agreement	

UNHCR. High Commissioner for Refugees (IGO)	WIRe. World Intelligence Review (DNI)
UNHOC. Humanitarian Operations Center (IGO)	WMD. Weapons of Mass Destruction
UNICEF. Children’s Fund (IGO)	WRI. World Relief Institute
UNJLC. Joint Logistics Center (UN)	WTO. World Trade Organization (IGO)
UNMACA. Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (IGO)	WVUS. World Vision United States (NGO)
UNRWA. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East	
USACIL. United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (DoD)	
USA for UNHCR. United States Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)	
USAID. United States Agency for International Development	
USAID/FFP. Office for Food for Peace	
USAID/OFDA. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	
USCG. United States Coast Guard (DHS)	
USCIS. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)	
USD/I. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DoD)	
USD/P. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DoD)	
USG. United States Government	
USSOCOM. United States Special Operations Command (DoD)	
USSOCOM JICC. Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (DoD)	
USSS. United States Secret Service (DHS)	
USSTRATCOM. United States Strategic Command (DoD)	
VOA. Voice of America (BBG)	
WANGO. World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)	
WFP. World Food Program (UN, IGO)	
WHO. World Health Organization (UN, IGO)	
WIF. Warsaw Initiative Fund (DoD)	
WINPAC. Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (CIA)	

Appendix E. Bibliography

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