

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN — the Thick Blue Line



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Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN

Joseph D. Celeski



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Joint Special Operations University and the Strategic Studies Department

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On the cover. India's state paramilitary police support and reinforce police superintendents and local and regional civil police as the armed response to insurgent activities in central India under their policing and law enforcement COIN model. Shown here is one of the company-sized unit outposts.



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the Thick Blue Line*

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Foreword

Terrorism in the post-Cold War world rose in its level of sophistication and magnitude of threat. Terrorists shifted essentially from small-scale attacks on individuals for purpose of political protest to a more dangerous model of mass casualty attacks. It is significant the first use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a terrorist group was by the Aum Shin Rikyo in the Tokyo subway gas attacks of 1995. This was followed by the innovative Al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. in 2001; while not using WMD, they did inflict large numbers of casualties. Since terrorist groups have expressed a desire to obtain WMD, terrorism has shifted from essentially a tactical to a potentially strategic threat. Consequently, governments will need to use a broad spectrum of government capabilities to combat terrorist networks.

Joe Celeski's current work on the role of policing in confronting security threats highlights the need to shift resources and emphasis towards policing, law enforcement, and internal security. Law enforcement and internal security are key pillars in a comprehensive national security strategy and are often underemphasized. As the campaign against terrorist networks shifts out of a combat phase, the competition between governments and terrorist groups for the public's support, a key element in irregular warfare, will occur in noncombat zones. It is in these noncombat zones that the police and other internal security elements of governmental power will be critical in negating terrorist network access to populations. The military's role in these operational environments will be significantly reduced, but select support will be required and this effort will fall heavily on the Special Operations Forces.

This monograph explores the complexity and challenges a government faces in organizing and training multiple levels of a nation's various police institutions. Through a thorough and excellent analysis, the author highlights the differences of policing in a counterinsurgency environment versus traditional, peaceful societies. He further amplifies his discussion of counterinsurgency policing through a series of vignettes. The true danger of failure in the current campaign is that a successful irregular warfare campaign in one region may spur additional challenges across the globe,

and Joe Celeski argues persuasively that the police are the “thick blue line” in this type of campaign.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

About the Author


Joseph D. Celeski is a senior fellow and adjunct instructor with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. His current research focuses on matters relating to unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, terrorism, urban warfare, joint SOF warfighting, and senior leader competencies.

Retired from active duty with the U.S. Army as a Special Forces colonel, he served in a variety of special operations command and staff positions for over 20 years of his 30-year Army career. Prior to retirement, he commanded the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (May 2002 to June 2004) and commanded coalition and joint SOF for two tours in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. He is a fully qualified joint specialty officer. Additionally, he is a Middle East area expert, trained in the Arabic language, and has served throughout the Middle East and the Horn of Africa regions.

In his capacity as the chief of staff and deputy commander for the United States Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, Colonel Celeski was the project officer for force modernization initiatives, development of the command's Program Operating Memorandum input, and the unconventional warfare transformation initiatives. He was awarded the St. Philip Neri Bronze Award from the Special Forces community in 2002 for his career work.

Mr. Celeski is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, the U.S. Air Force Command and Staff College, the Marine Amphibious Warfare Course, the Army Force Management School, and the U.S. Army War College. He has a B.S. in Political Science from Columbus College in Georgia and a Master's of Public Administration (MPA) degree from Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania. He will begin work toward his Ph.D. in History from the University of Georgia in the fall of 2009.

Mr. Celeski has published works on the Somalia conflict and on the use of Special Forces in Joint Urban Operations and in unconventional warfare



in the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School journal, the *Special Warfare Magazine*. His September 2005 JSOU publication was *Operationalizing COIN in the 21st Century*, and he has submitted his first draft of “Special Forces History in the Somalia Conflict, 1992-1995” for inclusion into *Army SOF in Somalia 1992-1995*, a fiscal year 2010 proposed publication sponsored by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command historian. Mr. Celeski has also been a keynote speaker at a variety of forums, including the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) symposium, the Association of United States Army (AUSA), Royal Canadian War College, the Naval War College, and the Joint Forces Staff College on matters of leadership, urban operations, and unconventional warfare.

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1. Introduction

Experience shows a clear link between effective police operations and successful counterinsurgencies.¹

Rarely a week passes without news of terrorists or insurgents around the world targeting police and law enforcement personnel or a bombing attack on their facilities. More recently (25 January 2009), *The New York Times* reported the increasing threat of local Taliban in the tribal region of Swat, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. and Pir Zubair Shah, the authors of the front-page article, reported “Last year 70 police officers were beheaded, shot, or otherwise slain in Swat and 150 wounded.” As relayed by Malik Naveed Khan, the police inspector general for the North-West Frontier Province, the authors went on to say “The police have become so afraid that many officers have put advertisements in newspapers renouncing their jobs so the Taliban will not kill them.” Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan routinely target police patrols, stations, and police leadership.

News media reporting on the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, noted that one of the first targets struck was a police headquarters among the various objectives. Insurgents killed most if not all of the police present and stole uniforms. Accurate or not, such reports intensified the impact of the attacks by increasing doubts about the effectiveness of the police and stoking public doubts about safety for themselves and their families.

Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan routinely target police patrols, stations, and law enforcement leadership. One of the reasons for this targeted violence is insurgents clearly understand police and other internal security personnel act as the first responders in counterinsurgency (COIN) environments and frequently provide the most immediate check on insurgent activities. Police and law enforcement personnel—the so-called *Thick Blue Line*—normally comprise the bulk of tactical manpower on the street as the primary government response to internal security threats. Three brief examples illustrate the scale of police and other law enforcement involvement during COIN campaigns:

- a. Force ratios of police and law enforcement personnel deployed during the Malayan Campaign, conducted between 1948 through July 1960,

exceeded the size of the military effort by almost 3 to 1. (By 1953, police and paramilitary police units exceeded 290,000; military forces during the conflict were under 100,000.)²

- b. Throughout 2007 in Iraq, local, national and border police units comprised approximately two thirds of the manpower employed as security forces and continued to increase in numbers throughout 2008.³
- c. The reform of the Afghanistan security sector initially anticipated some 62,000 police. Early in the process a new requirement for 20,000 more was added. (The Afghan National Army in 2008 exceeded 70,000 trained with new requirements to raise the force to over 100,000).⁴

These numbers become significant for leaders of COIN campaigns in appreciating the law enforcement contribution to their effort when incorporated into Security Force Assistance (SFA) measures to Build Partner Capacity (BPC). Law enforcement's local knowledge of the populace, cultural mind-set, innate appreciation for the environment, and operational procedures associated with fighting crime can be crucial enablers to the interdiction and capture of insurgents and terrorists.

A recent RAND Corporation report analyzed how terrorist groups come to their ends. In those cases in which terrorists specifically participate as part of the insurgency, the research indicated a high percentage of these groups are eliminated through policing or through combined military and policing operations. Of course, such outcomes occur only when insurgent activities are not ended by the terrorists themselves adopting nonviolent tactics and joining the political process.⁵

Given the efforts to achieve progress in the COIN security line of operation, one formula for success is the conduct of combined military operations in concert with *offensive-policing* actions (police and law enforcement reoriented and retailored to aggressively tackle insurgents and their infrastructure). The credulity of police involvement rests with the success of community policing activities, which contribute to perceptions of the government legitimacy.

In recognition of the crucial role the police and law enforcement sectors play in COIN and in other irregular warfare environments, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently testified on that subject in a House Armed Services Committee hearing. He requested more funding authority to enhance and enable Department of Defense (DoD) assistance to police

and paramilitary forces under the Global Train and Equip Program. He stated:

We must also expand Section 1206's coverage beyond 'military forces' to include 'security forces.' As currently written, 1206 can only be used for the military, even though constabulary, coast guard, border guards, and similar units often perform the functions essential to fighting terrorism and maintaining stability. While security forces abroad come under many different names and categories, they often look like our own military forces.⁶

During the U.S. Air Force Counterinsurgency Symposium, held as a nonattribution forum in the late spring of 2007 at Maxwell Air Force Base, a speaker commented on the role of police and law enforcement in successful COIN, but conceded the dearth of military literature on the topic for COIN practitioners. However, one can find extensive literature on police roles in international peacekeeping, insurgencies, and persistent conflict in a variety of law enforcement journals and in peacekeeping operation reports. (The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 had just been fielded in December of 2006 and provided a consolidation of the assessment and use of police forces in Chapter 6, Developing Host-Nation Security Forces.)

Colonel Lewis G. Irwin (U.S. Army) returned from Afghanistan in February 2008 where he participated in work to reform the Afghan National Police. In a recent article, he commented on the lack of doctrine, standards, and evaluation techniques for police training when the Security Forces operation requires law enforcement training:

As members of an action-oriented organization, another of our tendencies as military officers is to want simply to get something done. Partly as a result of this tendency, the police force's basic doctrine lagged well behind the actual fielding of personnel, equipment, and facilities with many adverse consequences. The Army uses the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) model of force development.... There is good reason that the D—doctrine—comes first in that acronym. However, in Afghanistan it has been necessary to get as much force structure into the field as fast as possible due to the ongoing

insurgency. As a result, there are major gaps in the base doctrine, covering police force structures, roles, and missions.⁷

This monograph explores the concepts and utility of police and law enforcement actions across the insurgent-like spectrum of irregular warfare threats. The thoughts here are intended for the consideration and use by various civilian and military personnel who will have to operate in an era of irregular and persistent conflict. It provides an overview of law enforcement and civil internal security forces' capabilities—especially offensive policing—and their contributions to success in governance and security in COIN lines of operation and in global persistent conflict against irregular warfare adversaries.

The monograph contributes to the expansion and widening of our knowledge of policing operations during COIN now established in the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24/U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (December 2006) and seeks to fill in any gaps in awareness and understanding. Currently, U.S. military forces and the U.S. Coast Guard are involved in counterdrug, maritime security operations, paramilitary policing training programs (Building Capacity of the Pakistani Frontier Corps program budgeted at \$75 million annually), and the training of national police, police commandos, and border police in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Portions of this writing contribute to providing information and expanding awareness for commanders, planners, and strategists on the appropriate employment of police and law enforcement personnel in COIN-like campaigns. The monograph explores the theoretical aspect of law enforcement operational and strategic utility, primarily in COIN. However, it is also a focus on longer periods of irregular warfare anticipated in an era of persistent conflict against guerrilla-like terrorist and criminal organizations.

This paper provides salient points for future joint doctrine, in light of the recent action to make the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) the Security Force Assistance (SFA) joint proponent along with the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. USSOCOM will lead in the identification of required joint SFA capabilities, which may also include regional security forces such as police and law enforcement.

As noted throughout this monograph, Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a major role in the training, mentoring, and conduct of combined

operations to build law enforcement capacity and effectiveness. SOF exhibits great strategic utility in implementing foreign policy when it acts in consort with credible law enforcement efforts on the ground. SOF's unique capability to operate "through, with, and by" indigenous forces is easily extended to include local and regional police and law enforcement agencies.

For COIN practitioners at the tactical level, the issues, insights, and lessons learned from discussion of the capabilities and employment of indigenous police and law enforcement can point the way for the most efficient use of U.S. military and SOF in police and law enforcement tasks.

Several questions drive any discussion of the role of the Thick Blue Line within COIN operations: Why do insurgents view police and law enforcement as such a high threat? What makes law enforcement personnel and nonmilitary internal security forces important to the outcome of a successful COIN campaign? Conversely, why do ineffective and corrupt police and law enforcement activities deter and detract from achieving successful end states in COIN? Is a policing and law enforcement strategy the best model to tackle the global insurgency-like actions of Al Qaeda and its associates?

Until guerrillas and insurgents move to organize as main force maneuver units, their small, disaggregated organizations can best be fought by policing efforts. By their presence, police and law enforcement agencies represent prominent symbols of governance and security. Because of the nature of their responsibilities and their skill sets, police and law enforcement agencies play central roles in any government's COIN response to counter insurgents who target government sector personnel for assassination or plan other disruptions to public order. Thus the police sector is crucial to meet the community security needs within a social framework, predominantly for enforcing rule of law and governance amongst the populace.

FM 3-24 states the paramount principles of successful COIN operations are protection of the civilian populace and legitimacy in governance. FM 3-24 (page 37) states "legitimacy is the main objective," which requires the government to meet the needs of the public (security being an essential need). These principles are central to any strategy to defeat insurgents.

Police and internal security forces are the primary enforcement arm of the government in reaching these two objectives. Although law enforcement organizations are not designed to maneuver in strength comparable to the military (the exceptions are in constabulary and police paramilitary units),

they do provide a crucial service in hunting down and arresting individuals who make up the irregular warfare groups.

If successful, police and law enforcement expose the criminal nature of the insurgent's activities, thus destroying public perception of them as "freedom fighters" and refuting the myth of the insurgent as a legitimate actor. This action is important to winning the "hearts and minds" of the populace and proving daily the government's ability to govern. Left unchallenged, insurgencies easily move to a takeover and mobilization of the populace, with space afforded to begin the creation of their main force army. The government's police and law enforcement agencies must compete against insurgents in areas where the irregular warfare adversaries destroy government functions or fill the void left by lack of governance. Working alongside the military response, the Thick Blue Line at such times is well positioned to provide the capabilities that are crucial to COIN success.

2. Law Enforcement in COIN: Offensive Policing

Military forces might have to perform police duties at the start of an insurgency; however, it is best to establish police forces to assume these duties as soon as possible. U.S., multinational, and host-nation partners should institute a comprehensive program of police training. Moreover, plans for police training need to envision a several-year program to systematically build institutions and leadership.

— FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, paragraph 6.94

Police and law enforcement employed in classic COIN or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations in support of a country's Internal Defense and Development Plan (IDAD) play multiple roles (if not the main effort) in defeating internal insurgencies and the global insurgency espoused by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Police and law enforcement comprise the main response in the insurgency-like threat posed by the growing nexus of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Tactical police actions must be linked to wider operational and strategic objectives to effectively deal with an insurgent threat—the conduct of offensive-policing measures. If employed effectively, police and law enforcement resources can be the best means to halt an insurgency while in its initial phases.

Police and law enforcement comprise the main response in the insurgency-like threat of the growing nexus of terrorists and criminal enterprises.

Internationally, police and law enforcement activities will become the preferred option when dealing with the global and transnational aspects of irregular warfare enemies and when major military intervention is not feasible or desired. Increasingly, police and law enforcement activities are the optimal tool to take on the nexus of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Insurgents resort to criminal activities to support their activities when either external or populace support dries up, or when they eschew the political end state because the profits of crime become more lucrative for the insurgent organization.

This phenomenon was captured as an observation and insight, titled “Beware the Insurgent to Criminal Evolution,” by RAND Corporation researchers studying joint urban operations:

Given some evidence that Iraqi urban residents are tiring of insurgent violence, it is necessary to consider how the insurgent forces are likely to adapt to a possibly reduced level of support (or tolerance) in the nation’s cities. Among the possible responses is a movement toward criminal enterprise as a means of supporting continued violence. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and elements once professing dedication to revolution in Northern Ireland have both transitioned. Despite propaganda efforts that state otherwise, the groups have left the vestiges of insurgent fervor far behind to become full-fledged players among world organized crime syndicates.⁸

Many countries experiencing insurgency have failed to recognize the importance insurgents place on eliminating law enforcement as a precursor to their seizing space to establish bases and alternate governance. Countries that have a weak policing effort initially, or have given in and pulled back on their police and local law enforcement resources, soon experience failure in dealing with insurgency as it emerges. In such cases, the government response is often to order mobilization and deployment of the military instead of funneling more resources to the policing effort. Two historical insurgencies provide stark case studies.

Algeria. The Algerian War of Independence was a nationalist, anti-colonialist insurgency that lasted from 1954 until the gaining of Algerian independence from France in 1962. The Algerian revolution was rooted in national and religious identity—a direct conflict with French national identity. The Algerian Muslim society contributed to the nationalist movement ranging from acceptance of the status quo to active/passive resistance.

Between the world wars, this latent but growing sense of nationalism led to the formation of a separatist movement in the 1930s, named the Algerian People’s Party. Native Algerian frustration grew from the lack of political progress, and the movement became militant. This movement would ultimately manifest itself in the formation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and its military arm, the Algerian National Army (ALN) by 1954. As

resentment for the French authority grew, native Algerian militant nationalists chose a new path for change: armed aggression, beginning their campaign with *propaganda of the deed*—terrorist acts.

On 1 November 1954 the ALN struck in over 50 places throughout Algeria in a series of coordinated attacks against police, military barracks, and symbols of government in the cities designed to keep the French authorities off balance. These attacks ranged from bombings, killings of settlers to burning farm fields and attacking the Oran city power plant. Terrorism was the prevalent tactic. The major outbreaks occurred in the Aurès and Kabylia mountains with about 350 armed fighters.

The ALN correctly understood they could not concentrate and make a major stand in one region or city because the French response would quickly overwhelm and eliminate them. The French were highly populated along the Mediterranean coast and in the major cities with very strong military and police forces. The FLN adopted a rural guerrilla warfare strategy in the mountainous regions of Algeria, where French law enforcement was weak. As a show of their political might and organization, Ahmed Ben Bella—one of the most influential political and intellectual leaders of the FLN—simultaneously issued a communiqué from Cairo calling on independence for Algerian Moslems.

The initial French reaction was to treat the “emergency” as a tribal uprising. Lacking any precise intelligence to indicate a growing insurgency, it appeared to authorities to be a law enforcement problem. Thus, the initial response was not in the form of any organized COIN effort, but rather a policing action based on their colonial experiences. The response came from their constabulary police—the Gendarmerie and riot-action police. Failing to appreciate the scope of the problem doomed the policing effort to failure as the Gendarmerie were soon overwhelmed, thus requiring intervention by the army to overcome the consequences of the official failure to understand the threat.

Later in the war, as the battle shifted to urban terrorism in Algiers, the civil police were again overwhelmed while attempting to conduct a counterterrorism campaign in an urban environment. In response, French paratroopers were given extraordinary legal powers to conduct repressive population and resource control measures in the Moslem Casbah sector of the city of Algiers. The French military virtually ran the city during this period. After months of police-like tactics consisting of curfews, census,

arrests, and interrogations, the 10th Parachute Division destroyed the FLN and ALN organizations in Algiers by the fall of 1957.

Nepal. Although some form of insurgency in Nepal had existed for decades during the latter half of the 20th century, it was not until February of 1996 that the Communist Party of Nepal declared open war. Ultimately (and after significant losses of friendly forces and civilian lives throughout the country) the Maoist-based insurgents achieved political victory in 2006. In their attempt to intimidate the government, drive it out of the rural areas of Nepal, and establish their alternate state, the insurgents targeted Nepalese police for removal or assassination because police bore the brunt of the initial response and fighting on behalf of the government.

Dr. Thomas Marks, noted expert and historian on Maoist People's War, writes of the Communist Party of Nepal's intimidation tactic in his recent publication of *Maoist People's War in Post-Vietnam Asia*:

Even as terror forced society in on itself, the main target of guerilla action was the 46,500-man police force, the first line of armed defense—for Nepal possessed no local forces of any kind. An essentially unarmed “watcher” force, two thirds of whom carried nothing heavier than a patrol stick, the police were unprepared for the demands of counterinsurgency.... Efforts to stand up a more properly armed and equipped police force, the Armed Police Force (15,000 men), made slow progress under the pressure of operational demands. By January 2003, the Civil Police had suffered 985 dead, while the APF experienced 108 dead. Predictably, the only possible police response was to abandon outlying stations and consolidate in a defensible mass When the post at Ghartigaun in western Rolpa was attacked in 1999, for example, it had a complement of 19 personnel. Fifteen were killed, the others wounded. The station was totally destroyed and not re-garrisoned. In 1998, two such stations were abandoned; in 1999, a further 16; in 2000, six more; in 2001, another four; and in 2002, three—leaving a total of just two for the entire population of nearly 211,000. Such was the lack of national integration that, once the police presence was eliminated, the insurgents became the state.⁹

In these two examples, both countries lacked sufficient offensive-policing capability.

Ultimately, police and law enforcement offensive-policing actions can be an indirect approach to support U.S. national security objectives when America finds itself confronting irregular warfare enemies. U.S. military actions for COIN and FID (along with Security Force Assistance) are demonstrably enhanced by the addition of these capabilities when integrated into overall country Internal Defense and Development Plans (IDAD). Offensive policing consists of a conscious shift in employment of police and law enforcement assets in the COIN fight: from defensive reactions to common criminal acts over to the police actively attacking and deterring insurgents. This offensive shift begins to diminish the insurgent capability to employ their strategic and operational art tools—time, space, and will.

Offensive policing consists of a conscious shift... from defensive reactions to acts of criminality over to the police attacking and deterring insurgents...

The use of sound policing and law enforcement measures employed by the civil internal security forces are relevant means and ways in support of U.S. policy and are consistent with the Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept, the National Military Strategy, and the National Strategy for combating terrorism. They are relevant in regional efforts to build partner capacity (BPC) and capability. Information sharing concerning the analysis of arrests of terrorists and the data gleaned on their organizations indicates police are the critical tool in defeating “armed action” of the insurgents (their “propaganda of the deed” often involving terrorist acts, sabotage, and subversion).

The natural state for democratic nations is one in which a representative government provides the venue for peace and prosperity on behalf of its citizenry, addresses major issues and societal grievances, and ensures a secure environment based on the rule of law and monopoly on the use of force within the state structure. Key within this hierarchy of needs is security.

For the purpose of this monograph, *rule of law* consists of both the derivation of laws from constitutional documents along with the enforcement procedures to ensure the laws of the land are obeyed within the internal security structure: law enforcement agencies, the judicial system (courts and judges), and a penal system. The internal security system also includes law enforcement measures taken to protect against external and transnational threats to the nation’s sovereignty. This framework for the rule of

law is acceptable only when it is within a legitimate level of governance that is viewed as fair and just by its citizenry within the context of cultural norms.

Most insurgent and terrorist strategies attack some or all of the components of this framework in order to delegitimize the existing level of governance or to go even further by providing an alternate version of the power structure of the state. What becomes most common within COIN environments is the insurgents' intent to conduct "armed propaganda." They use subversion and acts of terrorism against the symbols of authority to slowly erode the public confidence in the ability of the affected government to provide security.

If insurgents succeed in this form of attritional warfare, or war of exhaustion against the government forces, they often move to bolder phases of armed action that may include increased military actions on the part of the guerrillas. Or, as in classic Maoist strategy, they may move to a final conventional military phase with the insurgent army arrayed against the government's military forces.

A nation-state's first experience with insurgency will usually surface in the form of increased banditry, criminality, and other illicit activities that on the surface are not apparently linked to the insurgency, but could, in fact, represent aspects of insurgent financing, logistics, recruiting, and build-up of sanctuary measures. The failure to recognize these activities, often obscured within the cloud of armed propaganda, as elements of an internal security threat to the state, plagues counterinsurgents seeking the correct response to important phases of enemy strategy, intent, and movement.

Historically, most nation states miss this opportunity to employ police and law enforcement measures to quell an insurgency at its very beginning. Rather, governments often find themselves moving directly to a military solution. The intensity of insurgent threats now exceeds the capacity of policing and rule of law, thus forcing a military response to the insurgent action arm—the guerrillas. This decision on behalf of the government is precisely what the insurgent leadership desires and is a key part of insurgent strategy to force the state's strategic failure.

A key lesson in COIN for the state is the mobilization of the military drains state resources and increases the risk of repressive acts and undesirable population control on its citizens. Thus, the ultimate goal for any strategy chosen by the counterinsurgent is to keep terrorist and budding

insurgent activity to a manageable level or to return it to a level that local and international law enforcement can effectively control.

Police and law enforcement agencies are positioned precisely where the insurgents operate—in the “sea” of the population—and in this manner alone, provide the most valuable service to the COIN campaign. Nothing replaces a local or regional law enforcement officer, recruited from the village or region of birth, often of the same cultural and demographic makeup of the citizenry over which the rule of law is enforced. No military unit or formation, with its depersonalized demeanor or temporary occupation status within the populace could replace the familiar and personal face of home-grown law enforcement officers and agents.

Kurt Campbell (senior vice president and director of the International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.) and Richard Weitz (associate director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.) put it succinctly in their treatise on nonmilitary strategies effective in COIN and counterterrorism campaigns:

In both counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns, the police often provide the main link between central government security institutions and local communities. Unlike soldiers or special antiterrorist units, police units typically establish a long-term presence in a locality and can cultivate relations with community leaders. Police officers often can enforce security-motivated restrictions on civil liberties (such as curfews and checkpoints) that would arouse greater resistance if conducted by soldiers, especially foreigners. Placing police outside a mosque, religious school, or other sacred institution usually provokes less outrage than deploying soldiers there. Established police tactics—regular patrols, patient observation, establishing a rapport with community leaders—tend to yield substantially more information about potential terrorist or guerrilla operations than quick “search and destroy” or mass detention operations—especially in urban areas, where the terrorist and insurgent civilian infrastructure often locate to facilitate intelligence collection and command and control. Similarly, law enforcement personnel usually can more effectively capture and detain suspected terrorists than regular soldiers.¹⁰



Figure 1. An Afghanistan National Police sergeant informs a U.S. Army captain that he has two special agents who have gathered a lot of information about the Taliban in the Ghazni province, 7 June 2007. U.S. Army photo by SSgt Justin Holey.

Another consideration for the counterinsurgent is the manpower needed during expanded security operations. Police and law enforcement agencies often provide the overwhelming bulk of forces during the government's response, but the military often ignores this force-multiplier function. Cultural bias or organizational dysfunction residing within the type of command structure chosen to prosecute a COIN campaign often hinders the achievement of unity of effort. The opportunity missed is this: the complementary nature of military operational art and maneuver and the strategic and operational nature of rule-of-law campaigns.

Regardless of the cultural dislikes of mixing military and police under one security line of operation, the fact remains that police and law enforcement agencies bring more capacity (in terms of manpower) than what the host government can normally raise and sustain in their professional military formations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, programs to enhance the internal security forces of both nations call for the numbers of police, internal security forces, and border control forces to almost equal or outnumber the military end strength. Additionally, Neighborhood Watch organizations, with a loose "deputation," can also expand the capability of local police to enforce security and lend assistance in fighting criminals and maintaining law and order, even as the wider insurgency efforts continue.

Although police and law enforcement organizations are key to population resource and control and for augmenting the government's military response (with traditionally the military setting the security environment in which police can operate), aggressive COIN campaigns can change the mission of law enforcement from one of supporting to a decisive force-multiplier

role through offensive policing measures. However, as word of caution, the government will still require maintaining a community-policing function to continue the fight against criminals, secure the populace locally, and provide the means for population resource and control. Thus, an aggressive security line of operation technique is to use the law enforcement in both roles.

The wise counterinsurgent and irregular warfare strategist recognizes that this vast pool of manpower—employing the principles of *offensive policing*—should be incorporated into the overall security line of operation within the COIN campaign plan as a major, operational maneuver element. Once provided an enhanced capability to deal with insurgents, police and law enforcement agencies can take the lead, augment, support, or replace military forces during all phases of a COIN campaign.

SOF involvement in the useful training and mentoring roles identified earlier requires a shift in judgment about the role of military forces in police missions. Institutional and cultural bias within the DoD and the rest of the interagency with regards to police and military coordination often hamper efforts to conduct U.S. security assistance and regional engagement in critical areas around the globe when the courses of action chosen rely more on police and law enforcement activities than on military conflict.

There are good reasons for this cultural reluctance. The American constitutional background has historically ensured civilian rule of law as paramount over the actions and purpose of military organizations (standing, formal, or militia); a variety of commensurate political safeguards ensures that the military does not trammel on civil liberties.

Joel Casmann studied the effects of police-military relations in Latin America and their consequences for establishing the rule of law. In his work, he discovered the unique aspects of the military's reluctance to partner in security assistance programs involving law enforcement. He also characterized the military's psychological barrier against incorporating the law enforcement element of national power into their campaign and regional engagement plans as a logical extension of U.S. legal and judicial cultural heritage:

The U.S. Constitution also establishes a strong, independent judiciary autonomous from political control, with specific protections for individual rights. These institutional controls over the military were reinforced by the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the

Constitution), which delineate safeguards against military intervention in government Moreover, these constitutional protections have been buttressed over the years by legislation, particularly the “Posse Comitatus Act” of 1878 (Title 18 USC section 1385), which prohibits direct military involvement in domestic law enforcement activities.¹¹

Casman illustrates other legal barriers that delineate and define the roles of police and military services of the U.S. when operating in consort with one another:

Additionally, Title 10, USC Chapter 18, “Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Guidelines” provides basic guidance to military personnel supporting police operations and restrictions from directly participating in arrests, searches, seizures, or other similar domestic law enforcement activity unless specifically authorized by law. The “Mansfield Amendment” to the Foreign Assistance Act (22 USC 2291 c1) prohibits U.S. government personnel from performing certain law enforcement activities overseas.¹²

This cultural, legal, and organizational bias on the part of the military to tread lightly when it involves matters of police and law enforcement clouds the insight needed to incorporate and embrace the Thick Blue Line into COIN campaign planning and execution. At best, the training and advising of police and law enforcement units are traditionally seen as an adjunct and a supporting activity to major military COIN operations as opposed to a core component of the overall strategy—the now-named offensive-policing component when police also perform in the role of force multiplier (as in the Malaya model).

In a telephone interview conducted *by Inside the Army* on 23 August 2007, Colonel Sean Ryan, acting deputy director of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, touched on the role of the military vis-à-vis policing. He said that expertise for developing nonmilitary security forces, such as police and border control personnel, lies outside the realm of the Defense Department, but conceded that the DoD is one of the few agencies capable in hostile environments of handling that type of mission. (Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with U.S. military trainers embedded with police are changing this view.)

This expertise requires recasting COIN through a lens of policing while preserving major military forces to tackle main-force guerrilla armies or to intercede when police assets become overwhelmed. Secretary Gates' desire to move in this direction during his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee is evidence of a policy shift to involve the DoD in more of these activities.

In a high level war game held during the summer of 2007 in the Washington, D.C. area, planners struggled with an irregular warfare scenario to craft an indirect strategy for assisting a friendly government. In the process, the notional actors of the National Security Council restricted the planners from involving the direct intervention of a large U.S. military contingent. The total host-nation military forces of 70,000 personnel from all branches of service were assessed as insufficient to address the irregular warfare challenges facing the country. The planners struggled with a course of action to effectively provide enough security forces and address the severe irregular warfare challenges existing in the friendly nation.

Before it became “A Bridge Too Far” scenario, further analysis of the country area study illuminated the fact the host nation had police and other various internal security forces (nonmilitary) of over 300,000 personnel. Matching this additional manpower (capacity) to a security assistance program for providing offensive-policing capability to the host nation, while conducting the necessary supporting function in consort with host-nation military to combat the irregular warfare threat, ultimately supported the indirect strategy that the game players and strategists desired.

It was simply a matter of shedding organizational blinders to view the other half of the police and law enforcement security line of operation during COIN—the law enforcement sector beefed up with offensive capabilities to tackle the insurgents—then fusing their efforts with the military campaign plan (or vice versa if civilian agencies lead). Once again, and this is an important realization: few COIN efforts are successful without the effective employment of indigenous law enforcement resources and capabilities.

It was simply a matter of shedding organizational blinders to view the other half of the police and law enforcement security line of operation . . .

Of most importance and what may constitute the highest threat to insurgent forces and their network (e.g., their political organization, underground,

auxiliary, guerrillas, and supporters) is the level of information and intelligence about the threat police and law enforcement units can generate. Law enforcement agencies have the inherent capability to conduct detective and investigative activities, along with the tedious but necessary collection of forensic evidence, used to bring individual or criminal organizations to justice.

Commensurate with these duties are the historical background files collected by law enforcement personnel over time, which can serve in COIN as an immediate information and intelligence database to identify the nexus of criminal and insurgent activities. Where police are good at manhunting, most militaries are not. Police or law enforcement organizations should be used as the lead agents to penetrate and operate against insurgent organizations from snitches and informants all the way up to the employment of pseudo organizations.

Sir Robert Thompson was emphatic on the use of police for strategic and operational intelligence gathering against insurgents based on his experiences in the Malaya Emergency:

The best organization to be responsible for all internal security intelligence is the special branch of the police force rather than a completely separate organization. It is a great advantage if intelligence officers have police powers and are able to call when necessary on the other branches of the police force for support and assistance in developing their intelligence networks. The police force is a static organization reaching out into every corner of the country and will have had long experience of close contact with the population.¹³

Sir Thompson was aware of the need for tactical intelligence on behalf of military units, but had seen the corrosive effects of several intelligence organizations, working in their stovepipes, with all the professional and cultural jealousies extant amongst any government bureaucracy. He worked to openly advocate for a singular intelligence-gathering function for high level intelligence fusion. Sir Thompson felt militaries, by their nature, are not traditionally embedded and close to the societies they protect, particularly rural populations, and will often have to be transient during a COIN campaign, thus obviating any continuity they may be able to achieve from long service in one security sector. Police forces, however, are just the opposite.¹⁴

Police and law enforcement agencies serve on the front lines of enforcing the daily sovereignty of their respective nation states. Much of modern insurgency can have transnational attributes such as the movement of illicit arms, the transfer of terrorists and insurgents across borders, acts of international criminality imposed on a nation in order to finance the insurgency, and outside support and assistance from unfriendly states that may be providing sanctuary and political support to the insurgent.

Many of these assaults on the sovereignty of a nation cannot be countered by and through military forces alone. Customs, border agencies, immigration services, and a variety of other internal security forces serve as the line of defense against the insurgent threat at the national-international level.

This international contribution of policing and law enforcement as it relates to insurgency (e.g., disruption of recruiting and financing) manifests itself occasionally in the media:

A Syrian arms dealer previously accused of arming militants from Iraq to Somalia was arrested in Spain in a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration sting in which he allegedly plotted to send millions of dollars in weapons to rebels in Colombia to attack American forces there . . . (“Arms dealer seized in U.S. terror sting,” *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*, 9 June 2007)

Regardless of the type of irregular warfare or regional security threat, conventional forces and SOF will continue to train and advise foreign and indigenous forces. Internal security forces (nonmilitary) that comprise the police and law enforcement capability of a nation may be the premier tool used to prevent or combat internal security threats from irregular warfare adversaries. These nonmilitary forces provide a clear and relatively good indirect strategy niche, especially for SOF; they may well be the 21st century partners used in unconventional warfare plans.

The study and analysis on the use of offensive policing as an element of campaign design by interagency, conventional military, and SOF planners and strategists will contribute to the adaptive nature of the force and ensure the United States is postured to defeat the enemy in the era of persistent conflict. Armed with the initial knowledge of the role police and law enforcement have in addressing irregular warfare scenarios, the goal is for strategists and planners of all types to incorporate offensive-policing capabilities of allies within their regional and theater engagement plans.

Certainly, offensive policing should be a key element of any COIN campaign plan and also serve as a key buttress to the various synchronization plans to combat terrorism.

3. Law Enforcement: Indirect Approach for COIN

To maintain security in peaceful countries, the proper ratio of policemen to population is somewhere between 1 and 4 officers per 1,000 citizens, with cities needing higher levels than other areas. ... By contrast, analysis of successful 20th century nation-building and stability operations suggests that a much higher ratio—between 13.26 and 20 troops/policemen per 1,000 civilians—is necessary to establish security in strife-torn countries. The figure climbs above 20 when the situation involved outside intervention.¹⁵

Strategic Dilemmas, Global Insurgency

Why examine law enforcement approaches in irregular warfare? The most pernicious enemy we face in insurgency and persistent conflict operates at the strategic level through an association of networks and franchises with a global strategy having protractedness as one of its hallmarks. The unassuming name for this protractedness is the *Death of a Thousand Cuts* (based on War of Exhaustion principles). The enemy's operations are bolstered by a global, external support system that has migrated to the ethnic Diasporas inside of democratically aligned states as well as to the Internet.

What is needed is a strong threat analysis and appreciation on this new form of enemy similar to the databases generated during the Cold War against communist adversaries. The irregular warfare adversaries range from the highest threat—the so-called *global Jihad*—to the nexus of criminal and terrorist organizations, operating at the substate and nonstate actor level and directing massive enterprises. Although this is not state-on-state conflict, and is now popularly named 4th Generation Warfare or *hybrid war* by some, the enemy could still enjoy support from a select few nation states and find sanctuary in under-governed or ungoverned space. To achieve any level of victory in this type of struggle, it will be necessary to adopt a grand strategy of alliances with countries who share the same fundamental value of the rule of law.

Changing Security Environment

The strategist can extrapolate from intelligence trends analysis, the Joint Operating Environment publication, and various emerging future operating concepts some key predictions that make law enforcement responses (i.e., COIN-like campaigns with offensive-policing options) attractive:

- a. The propensity for major, preemptive war and regime change operations might be low.
- b. A shift back to regional vice global strategies (disaggregated) as a result of allies and partners realistic approach to fighting the threat (local vs. global).
- c. The Criminal Justice Model (CJM) will become preeminent again, but with an offensive-policing component (over 75 to 85 percent of terrorists captured or eliminated are as a result of law enforcement, policing, and internal security organizations; statistics are generalized from a survey of 180 days of international law enforcement, police, internal security, and military actions during fiscal years 2007 and 2008).
- d. Building partner capacity and capability will shift from military-to-military programs to include support of civil law enforcement and internal security organizations.

New forms of insurgency are seen in Osama bin Laden's call to his followers to conduct a world-wide guerrilla campaign. (Bin Laden's calls for action throughout his 1996 Declaration of War and in his *fatwas* are similar to measures taken to conduct insurgency.) As state sponsors and external supporters for insurgents and irregular warfare enemies (who become more substate and nonstate as actors) diminishes, the irregular warfare adversary looks at new ways to finance operations, often seeking a terrorist, insurgent, and criminal nexus for synergy (called *Grey Stew* herein to describe the phenomenon). This newer form of insurgency-like activity will pose complex problems when developing a COIN-like response.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command publication, *Joint Operating Environment: Trends & Challenges for the Future Joint Force*, states:

Any future operational environment will include the presence of criminal elements. International organized crime, motivated by greed and self-interest, will increase as potential security threats to

the developed world. Along with a rise in the number and presence of criminal organizations, there will also be an increased blurring of criminal activities, civil conflict, and potential terrorist activities. These elements will blend with the population and become ever more difficult to penetrate. Drug and human trafficking are expected to continue. Such organizations and activities will threaten national or regional stability, structure, and legitimate political authority. This in turn, can affect U.S. interests. Criminal organizations and elements will take advantage of information and communication technologies and the proliferation of weapons to develop very sophisticated capabilities. The destructive social, economic, and political impact of crime will increase in both its severity and sophistication.

Transnational criminal activity, fueled by global connections to money and arms, will blur the lines between traditional military action and criminal activities. Criminal organizations will continue to form strategic alliances with states and nonstate actors, including terrorists. Terrorists and criminals will also be active in such an environment, ready to exploit the situation for their respective gains.

United States joint forces, combined with law enforcement and intelligence activities in a collaborative information environment, will have to deal both with enemy military forces and other nontraditional forces, such as criminal organizations, terrorists, or religious fanatics, who will seek to profit from instability.¹⁶

The model for effectively operating in the era of persistent conflict illustrates that an adopted grand strategy must take into account the correct use of the elements of national power, DIMEFILE, combined with a counter-strategy to defeat the Death of a Thousand Cuts. These strategies will have deterrence and prevention as core concepts. Strategies to tackle persistent conflict will enable campaigns of preventative security assistance, and active security measures of containment or management, similar to our Cold War model of containment against communism. The author proposes the focus of operations in these strategies as follows:

- a. Extended cooperation and security assistance with aligned nations to include police and law enforcement mechanisms
- b. Assistance to building of capacity and capability for those allies in need (like proxy war at the grand strategy level)

- c. Maneuver within the ungoverned spaces to deter and prevent their use as sanctuaries by the enemy.

Clearly, this focus will not be a military victory in the classic sense, and over time the emphasis will shift to law enforcement and policing operations. The chosen path should be predicated on an effort that will last at least three to four decades to match this recent, longer episodic wave of terrorism. A measure of effectiveness for operations of long duration will be in ascertaining when a generational shift occurs, enemy leadership dies off, and the enemy’s ideology and will sustaining the movement have lost their spark. Law enforcement models are particularly successful in this arena of analysis.




Figure 2. A conceptual model based on a 6-month analysis of world-wide activities against irregular warfare enemies indicates a large percentage of adversaries removed or neutralized are a result of policing and law enforcement activities. In massive COIN operations, the percentage of forces applied will be military; the graph, therefore, also illustrates what an effective end state could be: the return to policing and law enforcement as the insurgency subsides.

Framing the Requirement

Persistent conflict with irregular warfare adversaries is characterized by elements that are insurgency-like. The premise here is that a component of this conflict is a *global* insurgency, even though most of our allies view it from a regional, *local* level with only some elements of transnational terror and insurgency contributing to the regional, local crisis (thus the term *glocal*). Much of the response will resemble COIN measures based on our collective experiences from this decade.

The nontraditional (or irregular) nature of this conflict is well documented in various irregular warfare publications, but essentially has the following characteristics:

- a. Action arms consisting of networked enterprises and franchises of terrorists, insurgents, and criminals—the strategy somewhat Maoist in application and an insurgent application of protracted war
- b. Adversary support systems from unfriendly states, cultural and ethnic pockets existing throughout the world, financing (both legal and illegal) terrorist activities and providing sanctuary in ungoverned spaces
- c. Irregular warfare adversaries also attempting to build an alternate state with competing power and political agendas.

Recognizing the nature of the threat will prevent ad-hoc responses or the standing up of new “counter” systems each time we are exposed to the threat in nontraditional war. Reacting in this manner generally defaults to the military element of national power based on its organizational capacity and responsiveness (a direct approach). However, the response should be one of an enduring nature, synthesizing the assets we have at hand in a more creative manner (the indirect approach).

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) framed the requirement to shape our responses and choices at critical crossroads across the globe. The quad-matrix form of the QDR conceptual overview for our strategic posture indicates the acceptance of long war attributes; three of the quadrants are *Irregular*, *Catastrophic*, and *Disruptive* (the remaining quadrant is reserved for Traditional War).

The implications of the QDR are in a strategic commitment for prolonged activities that contribute to stability in the international security arena.

Deterrence, influence, shaping operations, multipurpose forces, security assistance, and FID will be some of the array of “prolonged” tools in the tool kit to implement national responses. Other mechanisms to outlast the enemy and defeat his strategy must also be formulated. It is in the arena of offensive policing and law enforcement that such a solution resides.

Unity of effort cannot be achieved, over time, with all the elements of national power if organized in the Cold War model at the national level and within the military (diMefile vs. DIMEFILe—changing from an overwhelming use of the military instrument of national power to greater responses in the other arenas). Persistent conflict requires a national mobilization of resources to solve the strategic dilemmas before us: How will the U.S. prevent future growth of the nontraditional enemy? How will the U.S. counter ungoverned space? How will the U.S. insert ourselves deep within the enemy’s structures in order to defeat him? How will the U.S. marshal all the capabilities required to fight generational war?

The superpower rivalry is over, yet over the horizon loom disaffected and extremist populations, combined with a lack of legitimacy on the part of predominantly secular and democratic governments in the region (or a lack of capacity to deal with the problem by these governments) creating an environment for illicit activities and transit and sanctuary for radical extremists. This situation is the motivator to once again become strategically engaged at the regional level throughout the world.

A strategic haven for violent extremists with mechanisms to connect to other extremist organizations must be countered with strategies that gain advantage over the enemy. The National Security Strategy maintains a preemptive component (thus it has a deterrence factor). As a reaction to the threat, a policy with attributes of containment, isolation, and management could be adopted. However, there is strategic time to get ahead of the enemy, proactively, and shape the region to our advantage. This venture will not be predominantly military, nor will military tactical acumen and military operational art skills work alone.

These actions must truly be conducted within the realm of “grand” strategy and with a regional-based approach. It cannot be interventionist, smack of colonialism, or imperialistic in nature. The U.S. has learned in earlier responses to global terrorism that although some states may not look like we want them to, and could be weak and failing, sovereignty still matters when considering deterrence options (to include preemption).

Massive deployments of U.S. forces can often achieve a negative effect of alienating whole populations. The dilemma for the strategist contemplating this changing world is to ask, what is the alternative? America's enemies do not fight or operate in the Westphalian model of states and often create states within failing or weak states. Again, classic operational art is weak in this area. Robert Leonhard hit the nail on the head:

A form of conflict that concentrates on detecting an illusive enemy, as well as ameliorating the political, economic, social, and cultural conditions that produce and support enemies, will find little that pertains in classic operational art.¹⁷

One must not discard strategic art merely because the threat and the enemy are more complex than Clausewitz imagined. Unconventional problems need unconventional solutions, and strategists are at least still informed of the asymmetric form of warfare in Sun Tzu and B. H. Liddel Hart's works on indirect approaches in warfare. Indirect strategies mitigate risk and often provide low cost (e.g., in money, resources, and elements of national power) options for consideration.

Preventative strategies make up one of those options—they help the U.S. and its allies prioritize regional initiatives in the campaign. Adopting any indirect war strategy will be a change in the approaches to classic warfare; it will look like a continuum across a protracted effort vice a clear and measurable phase in a campaign plan—another strategic dilemma. Law enforcement and policing campaigns will provide an effective approach as an indirect strategy to regional and global-like insurgency movements.

The theoretical nature of ideological warfare illustrates the importance of containing terrorists and insurgents below a threshold where they can be managed by internal security forces and police. Figure 3 shows what occurs when extremism challenges weak or failing states. Generally with ineffective militaries or small militaries, the state opts to utilize police and internal security forces to handle extremists. If successful, the state satisfies the condition of security and stability at some modicum of tolerance acceptable by the populace and can even prevent an insurgency outbreak.

When extremism, in any form, overwhelms the capability of these internal security measures, the first intervention point (A) must be activated by either becoming more aggressive or changing the *modus operandi* to meet the changing condition. This action could include intervention by




Figure 3. Depiction of Extremism Challenging Governments of Weak or Failing States

outside assistance, but sovereignty becomes a sensitive issue and outside forces could actually tip a populace to be more in favor of the extremists than the government.

In a failing or weak state, the intervention point (providing additional resources to the law enforcement sector) is often missed due to lack of capability and capacity to handle the growing problem. Over time, the form of extremism has free reign until a crisis is reached, challenging the government and reducing the rule of law in areas where the insurgent intends to form alternate governance.

With this second intervention point (B), the reaction is often dominated by a military response, based on the size of the challenge (police do not go away; they traditionally assume their supporting role to military operations). A country then has one chance to get it right, for in failing, the extremists win and achieve their aims. If the application of the chosen strategy works, the extremism is damped back down under the threshold level, where policing and law enforcement can once again apply.

This phase concludes quicker if an offensive-policing component is added to provide force multiplier to the military effort as the government's

response to insurgency. Note the criticality of policing and law enforcement in this theoretical model—it is essential to consider their contributions in this form of warfare and focus on strengthening partners for the duration of this type of struggle. *For the success of the state, it is critical to act early, with police and internal security forces.* The preventative mode avoids a full outbreak of insurgency (or civil war). The end state of a successful COIN campaign is a return to rule-of-law scenario where policing and law enforcement can handle the problem.

Implications

Preconflict nation-building—vice postconflict Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) measures—helps to create secure environments, establishes the rule of law, enhances legitimacy of governance, denies strategic space to extremists, and might even create the conditions for assimilation of violent extremists and insurgents back into society commensurate with the standards of civilization (an end state).

The grand strategy (indirect) objective is to get nations capable of their roles in tackling the dilemma of the security problems in the 21st century, particularly when they may be threatened by home-grown or regionally based insurgencies. Fighting will occur on local turf, where ethnic and religious belief systems continue to foment grievances. If not countered, it only remains for the disaffected to gain an operational capability and provide an alternative to ongoing governance.

The strategic objective of U.S. policy and strategy—the process of directing every action towards a clear, defined, decisive, and attainable goal—must be in the denial of radical extremists reaching this point. The deter, defend, deny, and defeat mechanisms of current strategy must add *prevent*. The aim of U.S. strategy must be in the defeat of the violent extremist strategy (the rejection and denial of secular government, westernism, and globalization).

One of the ways to defeat irregular warfare adversary threats is through offensive policing. Policing and law enforcement venues will also serve as the entry point for future Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) activities in pre- or ongoing insurgency responses. The ongoing alliance with Pakistan illustrates the intrinsic importance of our *law enforcement*

element of national power, applied indirectly, as a means to achieve success against irregular warfare adversaries confronting our military forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. While U.S. military forces implement the Building Capacity of the Pakistani Frontier Forces program—a paramilitary police training project to enhance the Frontier Forces’ capability to conduct COIN operations—the U.S. government interagency effort also contributes to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement and internal security for Pakistan in an indirect approach.

U.S. Interagency Indirect Policing Strategy, Enhancing Pakistani Internal Security

The U.S. government assistance to Pakistan enhanced the country’s internal security sector. It was established in 2003 in support of grand-strategy objectives (i.e., support partner nations in the ongoing efforts against terrorists and irregular warfare adversaries). The program illustrates an indirect strategy, focused on law enforcement, to solve a COIN-like situation in the country. Pakistan was chosen to be the recipient of a comprehensive law enforcement and policing assistance package based on two factors:

- a. An analysis of threats to the region
- b. Objectives to overcome operational and strategic dilemmas of U.S. forces in Afghanistan as a result of Taliban and Al Qaeda using the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for transit, sanctuary, and the conduct of illicit activities to support the ongoing insurgency.¹⁸

The threats to Pakistan are daunting and consist of jihadist extremism, local Taliban insurgents, sectarian violence, illegal commodity smuggling (drug trafficking paramount), endemic police corruption, and problems with the provision of justice and law enforcement. Pakistan also has an ongoing insurgency within its own Balochistan Province. Since it was apparent that the U.S. military would not be deployed to assist Pakistan with its insurgent-like problems, the interagency indirect approach to help strengthen the Government of Pakistan’s law enforcement capacity and capability became the adopted preventative FID and COIN strategy.

The United States and the Government of Pakistan established a joint working group in Washington, D.C. for counterterrorism and law

enforcement in May of 2003. The coordination mechanism represented an interagency effort with the Department of State and the Department of Justice serving as leads. The goals and objectives of the program were basically as follows:

- a. Enhance the government of Pakistan's control over their border areas (thus assisting counterinsurgents in Operation Enduring Freedom to deny sanctuary and conduct border interdiction against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces).
- b. Counter illicit movement of goods (most often those financing the insurgency in Afghanistan and Balochistan).
- c. Enhance Pakistani police and law enforcement counterterrorism capabilities (counterorganization against the Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership).
- d. Professionalize Pakistani investigative capabilities along with a commensurate police reform program.

Thus far the program has cost \$30–70 million a year. A number of diverse U.S. agencies have conducted and completed various activities and actions since 2003. The following agencies participated in the policing indirect strategy to enable one of our allies: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; the Office of Counter Terrorism; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). What follows are some of the Pakistani internal security enhancements that the program has achieved thus far:

- a. The Department of Justice/DEA established the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program—trained Frontier Corps as well as Anti-Narcotics Force (trained by the DEA) and assisted in border security augmentation.
- b. Established an air wing in the Ministry of Interior for counterterrorism and counternarcotics.
- c. Enhanced border posts, entry/exit routes, and border security roads.
- d. USAID contributed to solving root causes—money and assistance for schools in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, national education, health care, employment, governance.

- e. Established several police reform and senior executive leadership programs.

Lacking, and still needed, is the creation of a financial intelligence unit, a DNA training program, and a countering-organized-crime training program.

Some caveats exist to indirect approaches of this nature, and COIN strategists and planners should take note.¹⁹ It will be important to find the correct balance for all agencies of the U.S. government, including the DoD, when developing 21st century indirect strategies that enhance partner capacity in the realm of policing, law enforcement, and COIN internal security. Here are three key factors:

- a. The U.S. military must play in this arena, and certainly SOF using FID missions and Combating Terrorism (CbT) skills would be highly appropriate to work in consort with interagency partners.
- b. High threat and high risk areas in any host country threaten the capability of the U.S. interagency to deploy and monitor personally the programs they are trying to implement. Lack of first-hand access and knowledge of an area also contributes to lack of accountability on how a program is being administered.
- c. Tackling organized crime and its effects on insurgency outcomes must be based on how local cultures assess criminality in their part of the world, especially in areas where corruption is high and rule of law is low (under-governed space). This dilemma is precisely where local and regional police and law enforcement officers have leverage. The detective and forensic skills to tackle organized crime are similar to counterorganization techniques that military organizations use to neutralize insurgent leadership. This is one potential area where military law enforcement cooperation, along with intelligence, should be strengthened. Local police are also closest to the populace when they help to establish and maintain Neighborhood Watch organizations—another valuable source of information.

The U.S. assistance program continues, and valuable lessons and approaches are adding to our knowledge of how to use offensive policing, with regional partners, as a component of a potential, indirect strategy to defeat irregular adversaries. This chapter posited a model for application

of the elements of national power to reinforce successful application of law enforcement and policing in regional COIN-like campaigns, often when military force application is not desired, and a need to consider a major shift to that modality. Certainly the case is clear that any successful COIN effort will end when a normal state of policing and law enforcement (to secure the populace and resume governance) returns.

The new security environment, and its irregular warfare threats—dubbed the era of persistent conflict—will be a generational fight. This period will be a protracted geopolitical struggle to marginalize extremists and put into place enduring mechanisms that allow for continuous pressure to defeat the adaptations of the enemy. It will require constant, COIN-like activities to defeat global insurgency by Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and new ground will be explored to apply COIN-like actions against criminal enterprises.

All of these efforts will require the patience and perseverance to outlast the enemy and to maintain the continuity of rule of law for the affected societies. Strategists will ponder second- and third-order effects that do not have clear and definable end states and in some cases, no exit strategy. End states will form vaguely around a condition where legitimacy by nations is predicated in a moral value system, within the international norms of rule of law, and acceptable to their populations. Such conditions will feature the capability and capacity to prevent further destruction or regional collateral damage amongst their neighbors. No concept of a concluding mechanism may exist; persistent conflict may require management of the regional security environment in a local law enforcement context to continually enhance our nation's interests.

A preventative (either indirectly or as a main effort) campaign of offensive policing and law enforcement, based on the regional security model, and in consort with international norms for rule of law within the nation-state security construct, is attractive as a strategic concept designed for this type of war. This new era resembling a form of ideological warfare nullifies our past notions of strategic relevance for functional uses of military power (e.g., sea, air, and space power). By its nature, this type of war is being fought on the ground where people live and breathe; it is also being fought on “human terrain” and in cognitive realms. The best counterinsurgent warriors operating within this landscape wear the police and internal security uniforms of the Thick Blue Line.

4. Operational Design Considerations for Policing and Law Enforcement Campaigns

Early in the struggle it is also important to ascertain the strategy of the insurgents and the prominent forms of violence they employ Once analysts understand the insurgent strategy, they can focus on the most important requirements for insurgent success associated with that strategy and look at ways to frustrate insurgent efforts to fulfill those requirements Experience and the experts suggest that the most effective way to deal with internal terrorism or small-scale urban guerrilla attacks against soldiers and policemen is to emphasize police work, good intelligence, and judicial sanctions.²⁰

Policing and law enforcement actions adopted at governmental level, particularly those actions anticipating roles for the military, can essentially be divided into two strategic approaches:

- a. Military-led with a supporting offensive-policing component, which includes employing the military *as police*, or constabulary-like
- b. Police-led, with the military supporting—so named due to the characteristic relationship of design between the *ways*, *ends*, and *means* of the approach chosen.

Strategists will have to ensure the three variables (ways, ends, and means) are in balance to ensure the success of the approach taken and to prevent a strategic mismatch.

Measures to calculate risk are also important as are the answers to the following questions: Is the approach taken feasible given existing government resources? Is the approach acceptable to the polity and populace (and perhaps the wider international community)? Is it a suitable approach given the context of the problem?

For any of these strategies, the political *ends* generally are similar: achievement of a level of law and order acceptable to the general populace and within an environment of security that their government can maintain. At the operational level, the objective for policing is to provide a security framework of enforced law and order in areas where the insurgents are

attempting to control the populace or trying to establish an alternate state. Both approaches reinforce the legitimacy of the state and the government's plan to resolve the problem.

Either approach chosen is dependent on the scope of the problem and how organizing a campaign with this strategic approach supports the government's attempts to delegitimize the insurgent threat while promoting its own legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. For example, if the government views the insurgent movement as a law-and-order problem, then a police-led COIN campaign emphasizes the rule of law as the defeat mechanism.

If the government feels overwhelmingly threatened by the military nature of the insurgency, then the host-nation military will often be employed to conduct a campaign to reach the desired political end state: the enemy defeated sufficiently to revert back to the rule of law. Resources can also drive the choices of governments fighting insurgents; militaries are often expensive for small or impoverished countries to maintain, so reliance on police or paramilitary police organizations may be the only useful solution.

The first of these strategic approaches, and the most recognized, is the use and deployment of the military in support of civil authority to protect the national or international security interests of the state—in other words, the military operating as police to support civil authority. Major General Sir Charles Gwynn described this expeditionary form of maintaining law and order, which he named *imperial policing*, in his written works published in 1934.²¹

The decision for deploying military as police (or as constabulary) hinged on correct timing of the intervention in order to preclude the need for larger military actions in case civil authorities hesitated and the civil disorder problem grew out of control. General Gwynn characterized the military's police duties as falling into three categories:

- a. Deliberate campaigns (punitive expeditions) with military predominant until objectives were met and the situation could be returned to civil control
- b. Military actually taking over as civil control due to its breakdown or abdication (often involves martial law)
- c. Military deployed to bolster the existing police and law enforcement agencies extant, but which need reinforcement during the crisis at hand.²²

The key aspects of this strategic approach are its expeditionary nature and the selection of the military as an instrument of national policy specifically to bolster civil authority or secure a national security interest outside the boundaries of the state (and of course its primary role as a policing force). A good example of an imperial-policing strategic approach is the deployment of U.K. military forces to Northern Ireland in support of the civil authority—that is, to restore law and order and return the situation to one where the police could effectively handle the problem.

The strength of this strategic approach lies in the speed, flexibility, and amount of resources the military can bring to the conflict as an agent of the state. Often government agencies take time to marshal their assets for the problem, and the military can fill the immediate void. Its weakness lies in one's military adopting a policing mind-set over its traditional function of fighting other militaries, thus diffusing its capability. Militaries used in this role most often require a retraining period to get them back into a mind-set of warfighting.

The military-led approach to policing works best with the incorporation of the existing internal security forces sector. The police and law enforcement capabilities are used as a *supporting/economy of force* effort. This course of action may be reinforced by the United States with an indirect component, such as an interagency approach, to assist a partner nation in enhancing the effectiveness of existing police and law enforcement capability (e.g., through reform measures, training, education, and advanced technology). This supporting, indirect component may resemble a logical line of operation within a COIN campaign plan.

The second strategic approach to policing and law enforcement is typified by the choice of the government affected to handle the situation internally with its own security sector assets rearranged to adapt to the situation. This police-led type of approach is often characterized by martial law and hyper-law—that is, the declaration of special legal emergency powers during the crisis. This is often called the *emergency powers* approach.

The government response is to criminalize the threat and turn it into a special, legal problem. The security force sector assets of the state often hinge on an expansion of police and law enforcement agencies with extra legal and paramilitary powers, along with a commensurate retooling of the military forces to become more police-like. All activities are based on special legal authorities above and beyond the standing legal norms of the

land to give the security forces enhanced capabilities to bring the “criminals” to justice.

This type of campaign was used as the government response in the Kenyan troubles beginning in 1952 (Mau Mau uprising) and during the Malaya Emergency (1948–1957). Authors Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz wrote about Malaya and the importance of police and law enforcement in counterinsurgencies in their paper prepared for the Princeton Project on National Security:

In Malaya, the British undertook a sustained effort to strengthen the local police forces. The British upgraded their equipment, recruited thousands of additional members, and seconded British Army officers to police units, including several hundred sergeants demobilized from Palestine, to help improve tactics and training. They also formed a Special Constabulary of some 30,000 men (mostly Malays) to guard critical infrastructure targets such as bridges and road junctures, which released British troops for mobile operations. Police officials enjoyed formal equality in operational matters with military officers and civilian government representatives. Due to their knowledge of local conditions and criminal procedures, they took charge of many intelligence-gathering operations and most interrogation sessions. In urban areas, moreover, they arrested many guerrillas and impeded insurgent attempts to expand their recruitment base beyond alienated ethnic Chinese. At the peak of the insurgency, the number of police in Malaya (70,000 regulars) exceeded the number of soldiers (40,000 British and Commonwealth troops, which included 10,000 Gurkhas).²³

The strength of this strategy lies in keeping the insurgency within the legal context of a criminality problem, allowing for full use of the judicial system to help neutralize the insurgents. Its weakness lies in a potential overreach of the state in creating laws that restrict the civil liberties of the populace. Often police formations assume military-like postures and similar to armies performing policing functions, must eventually be retrained and deprogrammed to resume civil-policing functions.

The government may choose not to employ the military in a police-led approach if rule-of-law resources are deemed sufficient to handle the problem; this variation is characterized as a *direct-policing* concept. Within this

concept, the internal security threat is handled only by the police and law enforcement agencies of the host nation. Very little assistance is needed from the military. This approach works best against low level, internal security threats to a nation—threats that do not appear to have the volatility and capacity for expansion into a larger phase based on a Maoist-type model for insurgency.

The insurgents themselves may only be capable of low level banditry and criminality and do not enjoy a popular or mass-base appeal from the populace. The insurgents are also containable, due to vagaries of terrain and environment. India and Bangladesh are two good examples of countries who address their internal, low level insurgencies by a law-enforcement-only government response.

The strength of this course of action lies in the fact the state can husband its military resources for more extreme contingencies. Its weakness lies in the lack of resources that police organizations have to fight insurgents.

Operational Art Considerations

COIN practitioners, strategists, and planners can take specific steps to ensure the strategic concept ultimately chosen to address internal security threats from insurgents—particularly an indirect strategy like policing and law enforcement—has the best chance for optimal success. Doctrinally, COIN is all about legitimacy, manifested in security, rule of law, and governance. Lessons learned from military COIN strategies and from various types of counterterrorism strategies (which include law enforcement measures as part of their tiered structure) form the initial basis of the author's insights for operational campaign design and the commander's estimate. These insights include the following:

- a. It is essential to conduct an accurate threat assessment; this analysis dictates the proper matrix of police and law enforcement response to achieve the desired end state.
- b. The internal security forces, in the aggregate, must pose a credible threat to the insurgents.
- c. The plan works best when decentralized to account for regional and local approaches.

- d. Policing and law enforcement techniques within a COIN environment should also follow established COIN doctrine and principles.
- e. The police and law enforcement officers represent the government and its capability to provide services better than the insurgents can; these forces must be forces for good and draw the highest respect from the populace; if needed, ensure reform and anticorruption measures are in place, early on.
- f. High quality intelligence and intelligence sharing between law enforcement and the military will be the essential enabler for the strategy.
- g. Information Operations (IO) will require a supportive media campaign reflecting best attributes of the law enforcement sector.
- h. It is absolutely essential that the policing and law enforcement effort be well coordinated and integrated at all levels of plans throughout the government and military.
- i. The approach requires a corrective mechanism, adaptable to changing conditions; well-developed assessment and measurement systems to ascertain progress will be essential.

Courses of Action

The predominant *ways* of utilizing police and law enforcement within a COIN strategy are based on the experiences amongst counterinsurgents gained over several decades. These *ways* consist of the adoption of the *community-policing* approach supported by *offensive-policing* actions such as paramilitary operations, counter guerrilla patrolling, pseudo operations, and raids. They assist the COIN effort by providing in lieu of or economy-of-force assets for area security, point security, and cordon and search operations when military forces are not sufficient or the level of government response chosen is one of minimal force.

Community policing is based on an interaction between community members and their law enforcement agencies to solve crime, identify suspects, and prevent neighborhood problems in a proactive manner. Police do not simply react to crime; they conduct a series of actions that prevent the outbreak of criminal activity. This philosophy is transferred to the pursuit of insurgents and their activities within the community during offensive policing.

Community policing in essence . . . proposes a partnership with civil society so that communities can have input into policing and, in return, participate and give support Community policing has come to be accepted as a positive way of policing society, especially by policy makers and senior police in Western societies and has become very popular. Different models of community policing are found in Western, Asian and other societies, some focusing on city areas, others on more rural areas.²⁴

Community policing requires an in-place, indigenous police force (such as was learned during the Sunni Awakening in Iraq). Offensive policing often requires the expansion of the existing force and specialized training of new police and law enforcement formations. If they are nonexistent or ineffective, the counterinsurgent will be required to intervene and develop such a police and law enforcement capability. This approach is known as *executive policing*, whereby the international community often assists to provide a democratic policing system under the auspices of the United Nations.

The United Nations Civilian Police (UNPOL) has contributed in numerous peacekeeping operations over the last 45 years since their inception for use in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. In the last decade, the number of United Nations police deployed per month averaged 1,677; in 2005 this number had increased to over 6,000. Over the years, the charter and mandate for United Nations police have grown to include the monitoring, mentoring, assisting, and training of local police forces as well as direct law enforcement.²⁵

The *executive policing*—also called *international policing*—goal is one of supporting, establishing or reestablishing, and reforming (if necessary) the rule-of-law mechanisms within a democratic social system. Most international actors who participate in these United Nations operations take into account the social, cultural, and political context of the policing environment. Reform is a key component of the executive or international policing effort. Other best practices for executive and international policing include the use of regional law enforcement organizations as the initial, rapid deployers, trainers, long-term peace-building actors, and source of specialized resource providers.²⁶

Operational Resources

Police and law enforcement agencies provide a variety of assets for use within a COIN environment. For planning, these internal security forces can be broken down into the following four components:

- a. Local and regional police
- b. National level law enforcement agencies
- c. Constabulary or paramilitary forces
- d. Special police forces.

International police and law enforcement actually could comprise a fifth means to employ COIN forces, but are not discussed here because they do not come under the authority of the state.

Currently, analysts are still developing the appropriate force ratios for COIN forces required in various irregular warfare scenarios based on war games conducted under the scope of the Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare. This paper is not intended to specify percentages and ratios of various types of law enforcement and police needed, but rather to describe their form and use.

A caution is also offered by JSOU senior fellow Dr. Graham Turbiville to planners: "... these forces are also sometimes accused of the worst war crimes and human rights abuses precisely because they are close to the population, well armed, and dealing intimately with a frustrating array of police-like problems that cross into combat on occasion. So if poorly led or directed—and if not integrated into the overall strategy—they do more harm to the COIN campaign than good."²⁷

Local and regional forces. Police and law enforcement personnel who are generally most familiar with the town, village, tribe, and region in which they perform their duties focus primarily on preventing crime within the community. In COIN situations, these personnel may become more militarized to handle insurgent attacks and ambushes. Their primary duties in a wider COIN context are to provide information on insurgents and the activities of insurgent auxiliaries to paramilitary or military forces for the latter to act upon.

Local and regional police may expand through the use of reserves during COIN operations in order to perform home guard or home militia type

operations, and, in some cases, to conduct counter guerrilla operations based on their localities. The overall planner's intent for the employment of local and regional police and law enforcement personnel is twofold:

- a. Rapidly grow their numbers through reserve structures or civilian populace auxiliary in order to provide for point and area security.
- b. Handle the requirements of population resource and control measures (e.g., traffic control points, convoy escort, curfews).

Ultimately, these measures contribute to freeing up the military to focus on priority counter guerrilla operations.

The Neighborhood Watch system, although not comprised of formally trained law enforcement officers, can also serve to increase the information-gathering and surveillance capacity of the local police. Many good citizens volunteer to assist in traffic control, accident mitigation, reporting of suspicious behavior, and providing transport and logistics to local police when needed. During the bush war fought in Rhodesia, private pilots in small aircraft volunteered as the Police Reserve Air Wing to transport police and constables and to conduct aerial surveillance in support of COIN operations.

Other assistance from citizens provided a force-multiplier effect to local police in order to maintain public good order. Much insurgent activity resembles criminality, and village guard personnel readily expand the much needed manpower for the COIN effort. The cautionary note, however, is when organizations begin to take law and order into their own hands, such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), they can turn to brute force and repression to run their neighborhoods.

National Forces. The National Police and the other law enforcement agencies of the state—organized normally under the Ministry of Interior, such as Highway Patrol, Border, Customs, and Port Security—comprise the National Forces. These may also include capabilities assigned at the national level, tailored to preserving the nation state itself and for the protection of the sovereignty of the state (e.g., unique organizations such as national counterterrorism units and centers, Homeland Defense departments, special police branches, and intelligence assets).

National Police are generally used as the main link between central government authority and the local level law enforcement during an insurgency.

Historically, the National Police perform the role of a Quick Reaction Force for local units, assisting local forces to secure areas once they are rid of insurgents and to conduct operations against the insurgent organization to capture or neutralize their leadership. The National Police also perform duties in the gaps and boundaries created by regional or provincial jurisdictions. Some of their duties may include performing as hostage rescue or as national SWAT teams, and even to provide distinguished-visitor or diplomat-protection services.

Figure 4. An Iraqi highway patrolman pulls security from his turret in the back of a patrol vehicle at a checkpoint along a highway near Mahawil, Iraq, 7 June 2007. U.S. Army photo by SSgt Sean Foley.



Constabulary or Paramilitary Forces. Constabularies provide the bridging in the gap created between military operations and police security operations. The purpose for employment of these police paramilitary units—or conversely, military police-like units—is to employ these organizations with police and law enforcement powers for the restoration and enforcement of law and order amongst a civilian populace. Generally, these types of units are created and directed under the responsibility of either a Minister of Interior or Minister of Defense. At the high end, these units are manned and equipped to handle insurrections and larger armed groups who are contesting the legitimacy of the established government.

The most common of these units are *Gendarmerie* and *Carabinieri*-like organizations, which can fight as military formations and still perform law-and-order duties, armed with the power of arrest (but again, these units may be ordinary soldiers used to restore and keep law and order as part of occupation duties). The end state for the use of constabulary or paramilitary

police forces is the transformation of the security situation back to civil police and judicial organizations.

The U.S. military experienced constabulary operations during its COIN campaign in the Philippines (1899–1902) and deliberate occupation duties in Europe after the end of World War II. These duties were performed by the U.S. military as a result of lack of host-nation governance capabilities along with our status as one of occupation force (required under international law).

Today, the U.S. military could be required to perform policing law-and-order duties as a result of the Pentagon Directive No. 3000, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, dated 28 November 2005. Under the mandates and requirements of international law and now within U.S. doctrine, American military forces will potentially be organized into constabulary-like units, or may form indigenous or irregular constabulary units, within a security line of operations.

What is clear, however, from recent high level war-gaming and doctrinal review of Joint warfighter tasks required in COIN environments, is that little support exists for the creation of a standing U.S. military constabulary organization; it is not currently needed. However, initial experiences as occupation forces in Iraq should not restrict considerations on what may be required in future conflict.²⁸

Other paramilitary policing organizations are normally formed as part of a police reserve in order to keep within the proper legal bounds for their employment. The counterinsurgent should know, however, that the creation of paramilitary organizations can lead to vigilantism and the people's ultimate loss of confidence in one of the symbols of government.

Special Police Units. The counterinsurgent has flexibility in meeting the demands of the insurgency through the use of specialized police units; they can tailor their use in each situation to the context and mission requirements. On the low end of potential uses is the formation of a police reserve to conduct specialized duties, which free up other security forces to focus on the insurgents and their structure.

During the Rhodesian War of 1965–1980 (also known as the second *Chimurenga*—struggle), the police reserve served as a trained and standing pseudo-army and provided specialized units for missions such as convoy escort and area patrolling (“The Blackboots” were a Police Support Unit).

The Police Reserve Air Wing also contributed immensely to the manhunting and tracking of insurgents by forming air surveillance counterterrorism units and utilizing their private, fixed-wing aircraft. For further study, the story of special police units in COIN during the Rhodesian War can be found in Group Captain PJH Petter-Bowyer's book on his experiences during the war, *Winds of Destruction*, Trafford Publishing, 2003.²⁹

Additionally, the Rhodesian, British, and South Africa police created Police Antiterrorist Units to conduct hunter-killer and counter guerrilla operations against insurgents operating in the vicinity of border zones. These paramilitary units were formed from police officers and indigenous Africans.

The best use for specialized police units is in the area of intelligence collection, insurgent "turning" operations, and penetration of insurgent organizations. This counterorganization technique is also known as *pseudo operations*—the deliberate masking of origin and intent to fool the enemy and convince him you are one of them.

Pseudo and counterorganization operations are best conducted by police as part of a centralized intelligence function. Professor Lawrence Cline remarked on the use of these intelligence techniques in a 2005 paper:

The term 'pseudo operations' (or some variant of it) indicates the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled areas. They should be distinguished from the more common police or intelligence infiltration of guerrillas or criminal organizations. In the latter case, infiltration is normally done by individuals.³⁰

The U.S. conducted pseudo operations during the Vietnam War under the auspices of the Phoenix Program. The Rhodesians conducted pseudo operations into insurgent sanctuaries in a highly effective manner using the specialized unit *Selous Scouts*. The British were also adept at counterorganization techniques under the auspices of police Special Branch intelligence directorates, most notably in Kenya and to some extent during their COIN operations in Malaya and Northern Ireland. Of importance to the counterinsurgent, however, are some key caveats in the use of pseudo operations offered by Dr. Cline:

- a. Pseudo operations must be well funded in order to be successful; reward programs make up a huge portion of the effectiveness of pseudo operations.
- b. It is extremely critical to coordinate and deconflict pseudo operations between other friendly security forces operating in the same area of operation, thereby preventing compromise of missions or fratricide of friendly agents.
- c. The military must be involved as the Quick Reaction Force to back up police pseudo operations.
- d. Well trained intelligence personnel will be required to actually “turn” insurgents and use them effectively.

Effective employment and task organization of existing and potential police and law enforcement units—retailored, trained, and equipped to handle the unique requirements of the government’s response to its internal security threat—provide an effective solution. Such initiatives solve the manpower requirement needed to provide security for the populace and provision of law and order as one aspect of governance. Along with manpower, some additional historical policing and law enforcement measures are offered for consideration and inclusion into the formulation of the COIN campaign plan:

- a. Generally, special police and law enforcement powers are needed in COIN operations—for example, the increase of government powers to deal with terrorism (criminalizing the insurgent) like strengthening of the judiciary during the emergency period, a prison system tailored to handle insurgents, and the adoption of unique policies and laws (e.g., extradition, no concessions, preemption, immigration restrictions, surveillance, search and seizure measures, and public speech); extra legal protection for soldiers and police to ensure no indemnification occurs when arresting insurgents; and well-written rules of engagement, for soldiers and paramilitary police, unique to the context of the insurgency
- b. Establishment of consequence management assets, force protection measures (e.g., for a distinguished visitor, civil air safety, and infrastructure), and public education and awareness programs

- c. Design of measures to attack insurgent support and logistic structures (e.g., special task forces created for organized crime and the freezing of financial assets)
- d. Ensuring international law enforcement capabilities are incorporated into the plan.

Regardless of the option chosen, or the *ways* and *means* to achieve the *ends* of the strategy for the COIN campaign, military planners must recognize and acknowledge the often significant contribution of manpower that police and law enforcement bring to the fight as part of the government response. The counterinsurgent cannot ignore the Thick Blue Line and its capabilities to conduct offensive policing during COIN responses. This lesson is clear from the early years of COIN efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

5. Insight into Policing Roles in COIN Operations

Coercive practices may deter or crush rebellions, but democratic governments generally favor strategies that mingle force with finesse. Armed services, paramilitary formations, and police conduct tactically offensive albeit strategically defense operations against undergrounds and guerrillas.³¹

Throughout the available research and analysis on various roles for police and law enforcement in COIN environments, some key insights consistently appear across the spectrum of any given scenario chosen and should be added to our knowledge of assessment and planning factors for police roles in COIN. They are very similar in form to *governing factors* used in course-of-action analysis. Examining their nature helps strategists and planners understand their impact when conducting initial assessments and considering incorporation of police and law enforcement into their COIN campaign plans—*police and law enforcement should always be included in COIN planning as a key element of government legitimacy.*

Police and Law Enforcement COIN Functions Assessment. COIN success lies in the effective and legitimate use of the government’s capabilities in delivering the rule of law, as an alternative to the insurgent message, with the police playing an essential role to achieve these ends. *Rule of law* includes the institutions responsible for its procedural steps and the legislation—*due process*—designed to ensure equality and justice to the governed. FM 3-24 (page 42) discusses it as institutions suggesting law and processes. Appendix D identifies the rule of law as three key aspects (page 361):

- a. Government derived from the governed
- b. Sustainable institutions (courts, penal systems, and the police)
- c. Fundamental human rights.

The COIN strategist and campaign planner must conduct a specialized assessment of the existing rule-of-law structures and of the capabilities of the entire police and law enforcement assets of the country, analyze the threat,

then ascertain what additional COIN tasks will be required from police and law enforcement (thus making them more offensive-like in nature).

FM 3-24 provides the COIN practitioner with sound guidance on the assessment procedures in Chapter 6, Developing Host-Nation Security Forces. The section “Police in Counterinsurgency” is thorough and provides COIN planners well-thought-out considerations. The following insights are intended to augment this chapter, specifically to change the dynamic from community policing to COIN offensive policing. These insights are derived from the research conducted for this monograph. The COIN practitioner can enhance the integration of efforts to develop offensive policing by also considering:

- a. Expansion of police reserve units for additional capability in patrolling, security, air capability, and distinguished-visitor and infrastructure protection (consequence management from acts of terror and subversion)
- b. The conduct of reconciliation activities with former insurgents (e.g., demobilization, demilitarization)
- c. Counterorganization, countersanctuary, and counterrecruiting techniques that can be employed by law enforcement agencies
- d. Special border interdiction tasks (Customs and border patrol agencies)
- e. Provision for COIN training in police and law enforcement academies.

Figure 5. More than 300 Afghans went through the Afghan National Auxiliary Police training program at the Regional Training Center, Jalalabad, Afghanistan, 17 June 2007. The two-week course is designed to give the force the basic skills to function as part of the Afghan National Security Forces. U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Scott Cohen.



Making police and law enforcement agencies more offensive-like requires the militarization of their posts and camps and must take place along with the provision of military-like equipment (including ground and air mobility) and technology to handle tactical-level combat with insurgents.

Corruption. One of the most prevalent and endemic problems in many countries experiencing insurgency and irregular warfare challenges is with assuring credible governance on the part of internal security forces. Corruption is the decay and denigration of moral framework within a society when any large organization representing the state does not perform in the way intended and misuses its unique position *vis-s-vis* the populace for power or private gain.

Corruption in police and law enforcement agencies manifests itself traditionally in compromised forensics, establishment of a bribe system, misconduct, and worst of all, abuse of the state's citizens resulting in a climate of fear. In an insurgency, the net effect of any form of state corruption is as follows:

- a. Corrodes the public's faith and confidence in their government (lessens perceptions of efficacy).
- b. Decreases government legitimacy (lack of efficiency).
- c. Provides the enemy with a source of easy subversion and sabotage as well as a ready source of antigovernment propaganda.

Corruption is the first detractor in gaining the favor of the populace to support the government's COIN efforts and not side with the insurgent's offer of alternate governance. Insurgents also use corrupted governmental institutions to finance their activities. The largest contributor to corruption in law enforcement is low pay. Out-of-hand drug markets, black markets, and smuggling franchises often serve to fuel the fire. Fortunately, a good body of insights gleaned about corruption from the experiences gained during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom can be accessed through searches in the archives of the various military services.

The planners who foresee the need to train and develop (and perhaps enhance) law enforcement and police as part of their security line of operation should take into consideration steps needed to control corruption. Corruption has an historical and cultural context as its background, depending on where the COIN operation is taking place. It may be a normal method

for law enforcement officials to augment meager pay and thus tolerated to some extent by the populace.

Planners and leaders should understand what is and what is not acceptable in the society at large before imposing U.S. or Western values on the elimination of corruption. As a minimum, steps derived from the U.S. Army lessons-learned documents on corruption-in-governance operations consist of the following for situations involving U.S. oversight of suspected personnel or units:

- a. Monitor and investigate the illicit activities of senior leadership; attempt to emplace or enhance some type of internal affairs investigative division at various levels of the Ministry of Interior.
- b. Account for money used in all payrolls and contracts for programs designed to support law enforcement and police.
- c. Supervise and monitor the daily activities of police and law enforcement in their transactions with the public (e.g., traffic police, local police posts, beat cops on the block).
- d. Conduct frequent inspections for accountability on equipment assigned to police and law enforcement agencies and monitor the level and usage of supplies.

Training. The goal for training indigenous security forces (nonmilitary) is to have individual units *enforcing* the law and order with constabulary and paramilitary police units *establishing* law and order in troubled regions of the country. The best trainers for police and law enforcement security forces are indeed other police and law enforcement personnel. Soldiers generally do not make the best individual law enforcement trainers because they lack cultural, policing, and native social skills. However, soldiers—especially military police—can make great advisors when embedded for community policing, constabulary operations, and paramilitary police combat operations as evidenced in Iraq. SOF can often augment these activities as an economy-of-force measure, similar to the activities of the U.S. Navy SEALs in al-Anbar Province during the Battle of Ramadi during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In his recent work, *The Sheriff of Ramadi* (Naval Institute Press, 2008), retired SEAL Dick Couch captured the contributions of the Navy SEALs to train with and employ local police as one of the COIN measures to win the battle. In one of the author's interviews with SEALs, Commander Rick Leonard commented on this aspect of the operation [pg. 144]:

The biggest thing for us in all of al-Anbar was the transition from working with the Iraqi army to working with the Iraqi police. Things really didn't settle down in Al-Anbar until we got the local police on the streets, and nowhere was that change more important and more dramatic than in Ramadi.



Figure 6. U.S. Marine Corps Cpl Roberts coaches a female police officer during a weapons training exercise at the pistol range of Joint Security Station Iron in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, 28 July 2007. DoD photo by SSgt Michael Kropiewnicki.

Contractors, and to some extent U.S. allies, are far better and more useful to run police recruiting, basic patrolmen skills, and schools and academies. More important, allies may be able to contribute types of forces, such as SOF, that are essential but consistently in short supply even for precautionary actions. Even more relevant to COIN, with its demands for conducting policing under conditions of threat much greater than those faced by American civilian law enforcement agencies, are paramilitary police forces, such as Spain's *Guardia Civil*, Italy's *Carabinieri*, and France's *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité*. The United States has no equivalent organization capable of sharing its expertise with local government forces that need to develop similar capabilities, so U.S. allies could be invaluable in filling this gap.³²

However, the military does have a role to play in the collective and advanced skills training to prepare law enforcement units for COIN tasks. SWAT and counterterrorism units can be reoriented to the demands of urban guerrilla warfare; all units will need basic combat tactical skills in patrolling and defense and force protection in order to survive their first

contact with insurgents. The following examples, derived from earlier COIN operations, identify additional situations where military training programs can help prepare the police for challenges beyond their basic law enforcement duties:

- a. Intelligence training, human rights training, mission planning, new equipment training (for military-like gear), Public Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs training, leadership training, and command and control techniques
- b. Specialized training by the military could also include explosive ordnance and bomb disposal, unmanned aerial vehicle and surveillance training, sniper training, aviation skills, medical skills, riverine and port and harbor maritime small-unit tactics, and use of canines.

The military can play a significant role in the preparation of police and law enforcement units to operate within the COIN arena as outlined in FM 3-24. If employing paramilitary police formations, the military should exclusively serve as the trainers, mentors, and advisors.

COIN planners should consider early on incorporating the variety of specialized law enforcement and policing programs offered by the Department of State, Department of Justice, and the various training and mentor venues offered by the United Nations and European Union assets. International policing efforts under the auspices of the United Nations (such as executive policing) can also contribute in the security line of operations against insurgents based upon the level and type of external assistance requested by the host country experiencing the insurgency.³³

Mobility. One of the key principles of COIN is the need to be as mobile, or more mobile, than the insurgent. This principle is not only important from a tactical maneuver aspect but also for community policing and law enforcement forces to be able to act faster than the insurgents (e.g., reaching a contested village before the insurgents can occupy it or before they can ambush a key government position). Surprisingly, one of the biggest weaknesses in employment of police and law enforcement out in the COIN environment is their lack of suitable vehicles and air transport to give them the same capability in mobility that may be enjoyed by the military. The basic patrol car with lights will not long survive.

Police will require up-armored vehicles and electronic countermeasure (ECM) devices if the insurgent threat includes ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); paramilitary police forces need specialized and militarized vehicles for transport and convoy escort and to conduct security missions within their areas of responsibility. All police forces, including border patrol forces, need light Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) aircraft and rotary-wing assets to conduct surveillance, patrolling, transport, and medical evacuation functions in the performance of their duties.



Figure 7. 6th SOS Special Operations aviation advisory works with Colombian rotary-wing aircrew to enhance their capabilities in law enforcement actions during counter-narcotics operations. Source: AFSOC.

The counterinsurgent should take into consideration the level of armaments required on these airframes needed to support the expanded police and law enforcement COIN role. Many police and law enforcement units will need to be able to defend themselves from insurgent attacks prior to the arrival of National Police or a military Quick Reaction Force unit. Lastly, large, fixed-wing transport is not normally in the complement of police air wings, but police and law enforcement should have access to this means of transportation when required to deploy long distances in support of the COIN effort.

Pseudo Operations. Infiltrating contested civilian communities or operational areas to develop intelligence on enemy organizations (counterorganization) are key contributors to success in COIN when they have been *generally run as a police intelligence function*. The use of specially trained

police, organized into pseudo and tracking teams, mirror or are disguised as insurgent and terrorists forces. Special police pseudo operations are tasked with the penetration and isolation of the insurgent leadership and their primary organizations—for example, tracking key leadership, subversion and sabotage once within the organization, the reconnaissance for finding insurgent bases, safe houses, and caches—and ultimately the elimination of key leaders, cells, and infrastructure.

Measures of Effectiveness. The question for analysts and campaign planners is to ascertain what law enforcement should be measured within the context of the insurgency. The focus is on those policing tasks needed above and beyond those required for normal peacetime rule of law performed by the various sectors of law enforcement available—local/regional, national, and specialized units. Examples of extra-normal policing tasks follow:

- a. Increased security of the populace (requires police to become more militarized to take on insurgent attacks and acts of subversion)
- b. Economy-of-force operations (static security tasks on critical and vulnerable assets) in order to free the military to do counter guerrillas operations
- c. Cross-border sanctuary operations
- d. Counterorganization (attacking the insurgent political and military organizational and leadership structure)
- e. Counterfinancing and counter criminality to attack source of funds for insurgents.

Generally, at the national level, the police have been used historically for state-level counterterrorism organizations, combating terrorism tasks (such as distinguished-visitor protection), mobile Quick Reaction Forces, intelligence gathering, and for pseudo operations to get at enemy leadership and organizational structure. The key role for National Police is intelligence gathering and their ability to pass on the information and intelligence to other law enforcement and military organizations in the fight. Thus, COIN metrics for national level police should be formed around their ability to generate intelligence of a useful nature and to penetrate and damage enemy organizations. They also need to be measured on their ability to have operational flexibility in reacting as a national Quick Reaction Force.

Some comments on metrics for National Police—from Afghanistan COIN Academy (afghanistanCOINacademy@gmail.com) discussions during

a roundtable debate—also include the requirement to measure political loyalty, or at least measurable actions between the populace and the local/regional police peculiar to COIN, such as support for the government vice the insurgents.³⁴ Bribes or collection rates amongst governmental law enforcement agencies (e.g., those dealing with customs and immigration) may also illuminate key factors important to the counterinsurgent.

One of the panel members recommended a system similar to New York City Police Department's COMPSTAT (Computer Statistics), an accountability system used to enable operational decisions on where, when, and how to employ law enforcement measures with respect to the threat, modified to the context of the COIN environment. Also, police trainers and mentors in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom are using the Army's Training Readiness and Assessment Tool to measure the police capability in conducting activities without assistance from the coalition.

Regardless of any measurement system chosen, the key metrics must accurately measure those items that indicate progress and success or failure *within the government response to the insurgency*. For instance, instead of how many foot patrols are conducted, a better metric would indicate how large an area is secured from the effects of the insurgents; instead of how many criminals are arrested, a better metric is how many informants and snitches are effectively providing information on the whereabouts and activities of insurgents or any underground and auxiliary personnel.

Finally, unity of effort and coordination between the various levels of police and law enforcement, in conjunction with military efforts along the security line of operations, are paramount to success in COIN. Therefore, a useful metric to measure liaison, coordination, communication, and interoperability effectiveness would be of great benefit.

Other Factors. A few observations from this research (e.g., case studies and doctrine) have emerged concerning police and law enforcement application and are offered to assist the counterinsurgent or the campaign planner in developing the logical lines of operation (LLOs) or lines of operation (LOOs) for governance and security:

- a. It is important early in the planning process to thoroughly analyze the host nation's internal security forces (nonmilitary), their roles, and their capabilities. This analysis will establish a baseline of what needs to be achieved to build capacity and capability for the conduct

of a COIN effort on behalf of the government forces. A chart of deficiencies (i.e., what is not present and needed to conduct operations in an irregular warfare environment) should be considered in order to establish what will be needed above the baseline during the conduct of COIN.

- b. Distinct functions of police and law enforcement are based on their role within the governmental structure. COIN campaign planners should attempt to delineate what local and regional internal security forces will be employed at the tactical level, what forces will be employed at the higher levels of government, and what internal security forces are matrixed against sovereignty issues (e.g., border, customs, immigration). Once complete, the delineation will be useful in selecting the most appropriate FID and security assistance measure for training by the U.S. government and/or its partners and allies.
- c. Clearly identify those areas where military forces, trainers, and advisors serve best to reinforce the enhancement of law enforcement (e.g., tactics, force protection, special SWAT and police commando, or paramilitary organizations) and leave basic police training and police administrative training to the interagency and contractor process.
- d. Establish a security plan to account for where military forces must be present, visible, and reactive to situations that cannot be handled by local law enforcement.
- e. Integrate the efforts of law enforcement into the COIN security plan in order to enable military forces to concentrate on priority military operations.
- f. Mechanisms for coordinating and integrating operational command and control and for intelligence fusion must be established to achieve liaison and unity of effort.

Implementation of rule of law requires a holistic approach to the various components needed to make it effective. Any plan must be flexible and integrated with the host-nation efforts. Along with the physical numbers of police, internal security forces and special law enforcement units are the commensurate civil laws and judicial systems to support the effort. The counterinsurgent must also strengthen the LLO along the governance track to ensure courts, jails, judges and lawyers, ministries of interior, and

border and customs activities are developed in parallel with the capacity of the host nation to absorb them.

The aforementioned insights and observations appear consistently in any historical or contemporary situation involving COIN where the use of police and law enforcement agencies represent a large percentage of the manpower within the security LOO. The next chapter explores contemporary examples of policing and law enforcement in COIN to ascertain unique lessons learned at the strategic and operational level, along with some tactical lessons for COIN practitioners.

6. Examples of Policing Within COIN Operations

*Here at COP Falcon, American soldiers live side by side with Iraqi army and police. They always patrol together, and the Iraqi forces, especially the police who are from the area, connect with the local population much better than the Americans could. 'The Iraqi police by far are our intelligence gatherers,' Bajema said. 'You'd be surprised what people will tell the IP.... The people just open up to them.'*³⁵

*Bombs Target Police – Kill 6 People in Algeria. Seven bombings that targeted police in Algeria killed six people and injured nearly 30 others, the Interior Ministry said in a statement. It said two of the dead and 10 of the injured were police officers. The attack occurred in the Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou districts east of the capital, Algiers. Al Qaeda in Islamic North Africa—the new name for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, known by the French abbreviation GSPC—claimed responsibility for the Tuesday morning strikes....*³⁶

This chapter explores several case studies to compare the effects of law enforcement and policing levels on the outcome of specific COIN efforts. It is prudent to take a look at examples in COIN offensive-policing applications to ascertain key lessons for leaders, strategists, and planners at the strategic and operational level. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to help set the conditions for an environment of effective governance and prevent the government's destruction by insurgents. Effective police and law enforcement activities in COIN are essential to this objective and are the primary means by which the state maintains a monopoly of force over the illegitimate and illicit transactions of bad actors.

This research explores aspects of policing and law enforcement in these scenarios:

- a. Over 30 years of COIN and counterterrorism operations in Northern Ireland during the *Troubles* (imperial policing)

- b. The ongoing efforts to develop police and national law enforcement agencies in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (economy of force or adjuncts to security LOOs)
- c. The policing and law enforcement model used to defeat insurgents in central India (main effort strategy).

Northern Ireland 1969–2007 (the *Troubles*)

When Ireland achieved independence in 1922, six of the nine northern counties of Ulster remained under governance of the United Kingdom (U.K.). The population of Northern Ireland was divided between Catholics and Protestants. Religious tensions between the two grew as a result of the division:

- a. Catholics, as the republicans (or nationalists), advocated for the unification of all Ireland and established a political organization—Sinn Féin—and an insurgent armed-action wing, the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
- b. Protestants, as loyalists (or unionists), wanted to continue political affiliation with the U.K.

By the 1960s, it appeared Protestants were consistently favored politically over the Catholic population and thus Catholic grievances resulted in the outbreak of demonstrations and riots in 1968 and 1969. While the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) nicely handled the 1968 riots and demonstrations, the August 1969 riots were beyond police capability, and British troops were deployed to back the civil order.³⁷ At the same time, the government missed the initial armed propaganda nature of the urban guerrilla insurgency.

The now-nicknamed *Troubles* had all of the aspects of insurgency and terrorism with the insurgent action arm, the urban guerrillas of the IRA—now dubbed the Provisional IRA (PIRA). They resorted to attacks on the police forces of the RUC and acts of terror and sabotage against symbols of governance, particularly the Ulster Defence Regiment (military forces). Initially, the PIRA appeared as a defensive measure for the disaffected Catholic areas of Northern Ireland.

However, as the urban guerrillas grew bolder, the organization began to move politically toward the Marxists and leftists. In what would be its first mistake in implementing a policing and civil-order strategy against

the PIRA, the local government responded with the use of special police in repressive raids and reprisal (the use of the infamous “B” specials of the police reserve), an act from which they would not recover in terms of winning “hearts and minds” as discussed in COIN doctrine and practices.³⁸

As disorder grew, the size and contingent of U.K. military forces deployed into Northern Ireland increased under the name *Operation Banner*. At the peak of this operation, more than 21,000 troops were deployed. However, throughout the operation the government response was seen as a policing problem (consistent with U.K. history of imperial-policing doctrine) using the RUC as the principal security force. All operations against the insurgent and terrorist organizations were conducted with law enforcement in mind:

All operations against the insurgent and terrorist organizations were conducted with law enforcement in mind . . .

forensic evidence was gathered during detainment of likely insurgents, whether detained by police or the Army.

Operation Banner’s objectives focused on the implementation of law and order, the defeat of the insurgency, and a return to a point in security operations whereby the RUC could resume control. Throughout, the military conducted all of their operations in consort with or approval of the RUC and always supported the police forces. In essence, the military forces acted as a constabulary force. The RUC eventually grew to over 9,000 in strength to handle the problem. More than 277 policemen were killed during the peak of operations, attesting to the nature of law enforcement involvement on the front lines of the COIN and counterterrorism effort.

The Special Air Service deployed and operated with spectacular success in Northern Ireland during the emergency, and the RUC attempted to emulate their activities (covert operations and pseudo operations) through the formation of special police units: unit E4A for surveillance, a Special Patrol Group, and a “Bronze” Section for active counterterrorism measures.³⁹

During the escalation of violence in 1972, the Army launched a divisionalized operation to clear urban areas of barricades and insurgents, primarily in Londonderry. The capture of PIRA urban guerrillas and auxiliary during this operation effectively ended the overt insurgency phase of the operation, forcing the PIRA to resort back to armed propaganda and terrorism.

The RUC was able to regain primacy for the security LOO by 1976, keeping the Troubles manageable for decades without intervention by larger

military forces. Cease-fires and reconciliation occurred in the 1990s, and since 2000, much of the political issues of Northern Ireland have been peacefully negotiated between the U.K., the Northern Ireland government, and the disaffected parties. The U.K. closed down its last military operations in Northern Ireland in 2007.

Salient observations and overall key tactical lessons learned during the operations on the part of the British military during Operation Banner, derived from official government briefings, follow:⁴⁰

- a. If possible, use a campaign plan to resolve unity issues—that is, implement effective *command and control* between military and police forces, with particular importance given to the formal command relationships between military and police. Control measures, such as tactical and operational boundaries, should be similar between the police and the military, and if at all possible, similar to those of any overall coordinating intelligence body. Establish joint police-military committees or organizations at all levels. It is also paramount to establish a single, good IO directorate.
- b. Borders pose strategic and operational problems in a COIN environment because the insurgent may operate between the seams of the various sovereignties represented by the border. Insurgents or their support structures may operate transnationally or may seek to find sanctuary across the border. Cooperation and interoperability are needed between the military and law enforcement agencies of bordering countries affected by the insurgency on such matters as customs, immigration, and border security.
- c. Develop early in the campaign the legal requirements for operational framework as the military begins to act more like police (constabulary) and the police become more military-like. Rules of engagement and special law powers to equip the military will normally be required.
- d. Special training is required to prepare military forces for policing operations in COIN environments. There should be consideration for COIN schools to deal with policing techniques for the military units chosen to operate in urban insurgencies. Comprehensive and dedicated training of the police and military on aspects of COIN (e.g., population resource and control measures, PSYOP, IO, and Civil Affairs) and operating with each other will help the two forces succeed.

Riot control is the most essential training, and the police and military must act smoothly together to prevent loss of life and minimize damage to property during these demonstrations.

- e. Air units become a supporting arm, principally through the employment of helicopters and STOL fixed-wing aircraft. Police will need the same mobility requirements as the military.

Policing and law enforcement operations lessons learned suggest that organizational experience in investigative functions should form the basis of a consolidated intelligence-gathering service during COIN and irregular warfare acts of terrorism from urban guerrillas.⁴¹

Although police tend to become more military-like in COIN (a by-product of offensive policing), remember that police and law enforcement agencies also must continue their work against normal criminal activity. Communities may feel alienated from law enforcement due to police focusing on COIN tasks at the expense of ordinary crime, thus making the populace uncommitted and uncooperative. IO campaigns will need to focus on portraying police and law enforcement agencies as still dedicated to protecting law and order and prepared to fight crime through community policing, even during COIN operations. Failure to do so may result in a negative manifestation of intended results—the establishment of community vigilantism.⁴²

Finally, a comprehensive police review is needed upon resuming normal policing—that is, once COIN efforts are successful—for the optimal move from offensive style policing back to civil and community policing. The review will ascertain what reform and new roles the various police and law enforcement agencies need to pursue. Police may be prejudiced to a higher notion of fighting war vice fighting crime (which changes the nature of police response to community needs), thus requiring some amount of deprogramming.⁴³

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom

A review of contemporary policing and law enforcement in COIN environments will briefly cover the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are not similar, they both represent the *American way of war*—that is, how the U.S.

strategically, operationally, and tactically views the role of host-nation police and law enforcement agencies within the context of COIN campaigns. These operations are typical of employing police and law enforcement as supporting or adjuncts to ongoing security LOOs. Both countries will eventually have force strengths of local and national law enforcement agencies that will equal or outnumber military forces significantly, once final security assistance training objectives are achieved.

Although U.S. COIN doctrine views the role of law enforcement as supporting the military effort, it seeks to train and establish police along LOOs in the security sector with establishing governance as a primary objective. This paper argues that the military could support the law enforcement as the lead in such a strategic approach.

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq

After the initial capture of Baghdad and the overthrow of the Ba'athist regime, the coalition placed less emphasis on police training than creating military forces in their plans to reestablish a security force sector. The U.S. military leadership preferred that others (interagency, United Nations, NATO alliance structures, or civilian contractors) train the Ministry of Interior forces (e.g., police, border security, and customs). Military leadership further clarified U.S. military forces would not be heavily involved in conducting the program. The Department of State and the Department of Justice were soon overwhelmed by the trainer and advisor (mentor) requirements.⁴⁴

The Coalition Provisional Authority did not disband police initially, but did discharge a large number of the police work force from the Ministry of Interior during their initial de-Ba'athification activities. The Department of Defense was not initially the lead agency for the formal plan on rebuilding of civil internal security forces, especially police and other law enforcement agencies under the Ministry of Interior. Paradoxically, the vast majority of the manpower pool available to U.S. counterinsurgent effort was (and still is) the Ministry of Interior forces.

The Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in conjunction with Department of Justice rule-of-law teams, contracted with DynCorp to establish a Jordanian International Police Training Center for this effort. Counteracting the effects of the shortage of police training teams and police liaison and mentor teams, the

Department of Justice contracted with MPRI to provide the initial response of police personnel under the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program. The numbers provided by MPRI did not reach the established requirement.⁴⁵

The Department of State provided International Police Advisors (IPAs). The friction resulting from employment of Iraqi police, supervised by inter-agency contractors while maneuvering in conjunction with the U.S. military, was apparent:⁴⁶

Perhaps an insignificant reflection on Operation Baton Rouge was the lack of formal interagency coordination between U.S. military and supporting civilian agencies, specifically the Department of State-contracted International Police Advisors. Despite the recognized directive that military commanders were the senior U.S. representatives in each sector of Iraq, there was no single place, agency, or force that directed interagency cooperation. Cooperation was based on ad hoc relationships. Seams in interagency cooperation were strained as each commando company was split to conduct individual missions. The IPAs seemed more focused on a long-term strategic goal of rebuilding Iraqi police units that leaned more toward ‘community police patrols.’

DoD assumed the lead in training the Iraqi Police Service under National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36), and the U.S.-led coalition declared 2006 the *Year of the Police* in recognition of the incontestable value policing and law enforcement bring to success in a COIN campaign.

The number of Ministry of Interior forces ranges from 135,000 to 194,000 for the Iraqi Police Service and about 60,000 for the National Police, border patrol, emergency response, forensics units, and diplomatic protection units. Ministry of Interior forces continue to outnumber Ministry of Defense military forces as the first response to the security sector situation in Iraq.⁴⁷ As a symbol of government response, Iraqi security forces overall experience casualties about twice as much as other coalition forces; from June 2003 to July 2006, the number of security forces and police killed was estimated at 5,071.⁴⁸

Overall observations from government committee hearings and findings of the U.S. State Department include key lessons from initial policing efforts in the Iraqi War and are mentioned here. They suggest that



Figure 8. Iraqi police conducting training in urban close Quarters Battle Drills in Baghdad. Source: Colonel (U.S. Army, Ret.) Mark French.

joint coordination centers serve as the best method to integrate the public safety system during an insurgency. All elements of military, police, border security, and intelligence functions are effectively aligned and can provide enhanced efforts to suppress terrorist, insurgent, or criminal acts. Joint Intelligence Centers should also be co-located at this level to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information provided by the law enforcement community to all government forces responding to the insurgency.⁴⁹ The military can also provide training in logistics, planning, intelligence, patrol techniques, and administration, although civilian-experienced, contracted police experts are most preferred,

Additionally, one of the largest problems in developing a multiethnic or multicultural police force is the infiltration of subversive clan factions. The country's Ministry of Interior must have an aggressive counterintelligence and internal investigations capability. Combining the capabilities of SOF with police efforts can be a very effective counterorganization technique.

Finally, to effectively grow manpower in COIN, counterinsurgents should develop police and law enforcement auxiliary forces (as is now being implemented in the country's security plan). COIN security improved dramatically when coalition forces were approached by tribal sheiks in al-Anbar province to provide men for Iraqi police forces—that is, local security. Auxiliary forces, however, must be given a modicum of training in basic police procedures, how to defend themselves against insurgents, and enough basic equipment to perform their jobs effectively. They must also be loyal to the Iraqi government rather than just in the pay of U.S. forces.⁵⁰

Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan

The COIN operation in Afghanistan illustrates what occurs when the government does not rapidly expand the policing and law enforcement sectors as part of the COIN security LOO. However, the case of Afghanistan in recent years also illustrates effects that can be achieved when importance is placed on the build-up of internal police and law enforcement security sectors. The existence of a professional police and law enforcement element in the Government of Afghanistan will be a key factor for a successful exit of coalition military forces and the return of governance and legitimacy to the country.

Upon the capture of the major cities in the spring of 2002, the allied coalition quickly moved to support the interim Afghan government elected in the May Loya Jirga, with Hamid Karzai as its head. At this stage of the war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), first responders in the form of tribal, local, and regional police were nonexistent. The lack of capacity in this arena contributed to the protraction of the fight against the insurgents and made operations against them extremely challenging.

Gaining local level intelligence, useful in detecting and capturing key members of the guerrilla organization, was particularly daunting without the services of a traditional law enforcement organization. Eventually, recognition of the importance of a professionalized police force and the significant role they should and can play in COIN became an important element of coalition efforts.

Donor countries agreed to assist in the rebuilding of the country and its security forces to prevent the return of a Taliban regime. The U.S. opted to train the Afghan National Army, while the majority of U.S. forces and coalition SOF contingents continued hunting the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban remaining in Afghanistan. Germany led the effort to develop a national Afghan police capability based on the Bonn Agreement:

The Afghans and the coalition partners agreed to set the ANP [Afghan National Police] force ceiling at 62,000, a figure based on a calculation by representatives of the government of Afghanistan and German planners as to the minimum number that could function effectively and be supported and financed by the Afghan government over the long term. That figure included 44,300 uniformed police, 12,000

border police, 3,400 highway police, and 2,300 counternarcotics police. During the January 2006 international donors' conference in London, conferees reconfirmed the 62,000 ceiling while adding a standby reaction police force and adjusting the size of other ANP subdivisions.⁵¹

As the initial National Police program progressed, no attempt was made to establish, rebuild, or improve existing police and judicial capacity at the village and province levels. Twenty-plus years of war replaced civil law-and-order systems with warlord security force structures. (Since 2005, efforts have been to improve the legal system to include building courthouses and selecting judges to serve in them.)

To fill some of this void, U.S. Special Forces teams and Special Forces companies were deployed throughout the country in 2002 and 2003 with their attached militias and Afghan National Army contingents performing in a manner similar to constabulary operations, often serving as the immediate law in semipermissive and hostile territory. The law enforcement skills of many of the U.S. National Guard Special Forces members greatly assisted local Afghan efforts to restore some modicum of policing and police posts at the village and regional level.

Lack of credible police to provide local security (community policing based on their new Constitution and newly passed laws), lack of progress in police programs and equipping, corruption, control by drug warlords and regional warlords, and a weak national government have allowed the Taliban to reemerge in most of the south and southeastern provinces of the




Figure 9. Afghan irregulars and locally hired security forces maneuvering with Special Forces teams initially comprised the internal security forces in the aftermath of the Taliban defeat in 2002, providing for constabulary-like operations in the remote countryside where government control was nonexistent. Source: Combined and Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan.

country. It was no surprise that the Taliban forces No. 1 target for destruction were the Afghan local police and police posts.

A year after Canadian and American forces drove hundreds of Taliban fighters from the area, the Panjwai and Zhare districts southwest of Kandahar, the rebels are back and have adopted new tactics. Carrying out guerrilla attacks after NATO troops partly withdrew in July, they overran isolated police posts and are now operating in areas where they can mount attacks on Kandahar, the south's largest city The setback is part of a bloody stalemate that has occurred between NATO troops and Taliban fighters across southern Afghanistan this summer. NATO and Afghan Army soldiers can push the Taliban out of rural areas, but the Afghan police are too weak to hold the territory after they withdraw.⁵²

In time, the ANP training program began to falter, requiring U.S. intervention and placement of the equipping function under the command of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), and executed through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) with the use of contractors and embedded military trainers and advisors.

Developing police in Afghanistan into *offensive* police with a military-like capability to stand up to insurgents is a challenge. It took until 2007 for both the Afghan National Army and ANP to have all their leadership vetted by the United Nations—attempting to rid those forces of criminal and undesirable elements (the vetting process also including the Ministry of Interior and Corps-level police officials). The communications to support a police network also was not completed until 2007.

Factors that have ceded vast territory and populace to the insurgents follow:

- a. Lack of military participation in government internal security sector forces development (civil forces) until after 2005
- b. Period of having only an interim government (and now a weak government), uncoordinated and conflicting coalition agendas
- c. Lack of COIN campaign planning incorporating a strategy for the use of police.

Lack of effective civil security forces in remote rural areas also creates a vacuum whereby warlord militias and armed bands form to serve as rule of law. Where police do exist, their efforts are mitigated by corrupt practices.

Colonel Jeff Nelson (U.S. Army, Ret.), a JSOU senior fellow, commented on the required “unity of effort” needed to conduct effective internal security operations and shared intelligence requirements based on his experience in the region:

More work has been done to improve the command and control and coordination of the entire internal security force sector between the NATO and allied forces commands, the CFC-A, the U.S. State Department, and the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD). In the early years of the war, a lack of unity of effort hampered effective security sector operations. In January 2006, the first video teleconference between the MoD and the MoI occurred as a result of a joint exercise. Since that time, the linkage between the police and the military from the local to the national level has improved. Most IED events are joint MoI/MoD responses. The problem is Afghanistan is not a GWOT member, so it has not been entitled to shared intelligence. The intelligence-sharing crisis has improved (glacier-like) since 2006, initially in response to IEDs. Police and military worked these issues with the NATO/CSTC-A actively since 2006. The problem is the GWOT-intelligence-sharing system.⁵³

Police and law enforcement agencies need commensurate training to prepare them for their unique roles within a COIN environment (offensive policing). They also need militarizing with capabilities to provide for their own force protection and response to insurgent attacks. Police in Afghanistan are now being trained more and more with military skills needed to battle insurgents and have been updated in mobility platforms and weapon systems to improve their responsiveness and survivability. As improved road infrastructure develops in Afghanistan, the police will become even more effective in remote areas and during the harsh winter months, which now trap them within their districts for weeks at a time.

In rural and remote areas, U.S. Army Special Forces still contribute to this growing capability. Most recently, Special Forces units sponsored some advanced training for village and tribal police, known as *Arbikia* (police auxiliary hand-picked by tribal elders with tribal area jurisdiction) as an

attempt to fill the gap until the Afghan government response can be more robust. One of the recent SOF commanders completing a tour on Operation Enduring Freedom during 2007 remarked:

The use of the village auxiliary police, supported by Special Forces, is a very successful method to conduct combined raids. The populace sees members of its own tribe conducting security operations, vice foreigners entering their compounds. As an example, one of the best raids netted a suicide bomber as a result of the tribal police information network. The FBI and ATF [Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] operating in Afghanistan say most local fugitives of the law are captured in Afghanistan by the local, tribal law enforcement units as a result of their intelligence systems at that level. All of this type of COIN maneuver is best enhanced through agreements between SOF, the military chain of command through to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, with the U.S. State Department in overall oversight.⁵⁴

The overall lessons learned from efforts to improve the police and law enforcement sectors in Afghanistan make it clear that security of the populace at the lowest levels must be a key COIN objective to prevent insurgents from owning space and separating the populace from the legitimate government. Additionally, counterinsurgents in Afghanistan have recognized the importance of incorporating police and law enforcement activities—offensive policing—as a key consideration in their COIN objectives. Finally, leaving these programs under the auspice of contractors as part of inter-agency-rebuilding projects no longer rates as the only method to improve the security sector—the military can vastly improve efforts to build police forces.⁵⁵

COIN Policing in India

The last example of a contemporary policing model in COIN is a study from field research on the police operations in central India to combat the Naxal insurgents. This form of policing and law enforcement in COIN represents a direct strategy, where police and law enforcement are the main effort, supported by the military.

India experiences various insurgency threats from Maoists and separatists (leftists) as well as from radical Islamic forces (Punjab and Kashmir). Until the November 2008 attacks on the city of Mumbai, India had been effective at eliminating or controlling the internal insurgent threats, primarily when the policing model was used (the ongoing COIN in Kashmir is a pure military operation).

A one-week research field trip to India in November of 2006 was useful for gathering primary research data *in situ* on the mechanisms and principles used by the Indian Internal Security Forces to combat insurgents. Initial data was gathered through interviews with key members of the MoI and interviews with deployed senior police personnel. Additionally, an on-site visit provided the opportunity to observe the policing model used in the state of Chhattisgarh, in its Kanker district.

The insurgent threat in central India is in three states—Chhattisgarh, Orissa (east of Chhattisgarh), and Andhra Pradesh (to the southwest). The threat comes from the Naxal movement, a leftist insurgency based on Maoist and People's War doctrine, focusing on the plight of the village peasants. The goal of the Naxalites is to replace the government in these states. Captured Naxalites often have Mao's Red Book in their possession.

The Insurgency. The Naxalites vary in strength, but estimates hover around 400–500 insurgents in each state. The Naxalites find sanctuary in the rugged terrain of the mountains and jungles found in central India and have yet to move into an urban guerrilla format. While the insurgents are lightly armed with captured police weapons, it is believed they have received arms from the Maoists in Nepal. The wide supposition is that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) also supports these movements in their conduct of unconventional war against India.

The Naxalites have both a political and propaganda arm. They also have begun to utilize IEDs (crude and hand-made) and mines to limit police mobility. IEDs and mines are made from packing gelignite and dynamite, captured from mining and construction projects, into carved bamboo containers or steel cooking pots. IEDs and mines are typically buried along the edges of the roads to avoid disturbing the asphalt and police detection. Initiators consist of crude wire strung up to 200 meters to a battery for electrical power. This method allows the insurgent to escape back into the jungle



Figure 10. Crude IEDs formed from hollowed-out bamboo constructed by Naxal insurgents, found emplaced on roads used by police patrols.

after detonation. While the incidents of IEDs and mines are small, this technique hampers police patrolling and access to guerrilla sanctuaries.

The Naxalites basic form of combat is to either ambush police patrols or attack police posts. They also conduct terror and reprisal attacks on the unarmed populace. They form only a small core of dissidents, however, not indigenous to the areas in which they operate. Naxalites conduct forced recruiting from young men found in the villages near their operating bases. Captured insurgents have been described as young men, lean and hungry, who remained with the insurgents because they felt it gave them self-esteem and adventure.

The government, through the police, has attempted counterpropaganda using leaflets, handbills, and verbal announcements each time the police travel through a village. The government forces also attempted to stir up the populace to form an anti-insurgent movement, but the insurgents retaliated by killing villagers and burning their homes. The Indian government is now considering an expansion of a home-guard type system, arming villagers with simple small arms and training them in local defense (as done previously in other insurgencies).

In Raipur (Central India), discussions and interviews with key police (the inspector general of the Chhattisgarh district) and law enforcement intelligence personnel provide key points on police operations in COIN environments (from the Indian perspective):

- a. All government responses to insurgency are on a case-by-case basis. Upon arrival into the contested area, conduct analysis and study

- the context. Some COIN operations require military solutions, but overall the police model is preferred, using minimum force as the doctrinal template.
- b. The preferred method for overall police unity of command is to emplace an overall district police inspector or inspector general to lead the COIN effort, backed by the national police and in support of local and regional police.
 - c. A variety of police units can be used in a COIN/counterterrorism environment—special paramilitary, counterterrorism/SWAT type forces, and customs agents, where required. Police must be multitiered to cover the village, district, and territorial areas. The insurgency may dictate the use of specialized hunter-killer teams.
 - d. Special police powers granted from the state are helpful. The police must be exempted from legal consequence when insurgents resist arrest. They need the same degree of latitude in self-defense and in protecting civilians from the insurgents when insurgent deaths occur.
 - e. The sharing of intelligence requires remembering the difference between what the military and the police need for their own uses. The differences will help reconcile tension between them. The military often is looking for tactical intelligence to defeat insurgents, while the police are looking for investigative, forensic style information to build cases and make arrests. Understanding differences aids in the collection, analysis, and distribution of the raw data to be shared between the two forces.
 - f. The study of the numbers incidents by geographic location will allow the determination of where to focus the national security assets. The study will also reveal when to shift assets and ascertain when the decision must be made to transition from a policing operation to a military operation. The best command and control is a cooperative, mutually agreed system between the police and the military. A trans-border sanctuary situation is pre-agreed upon: the military must take the lead in these operations as they are seen as a threat to sovereignty.
 - g. Mobility is a key enabler; helicopters and STOL aircraft are the most preferred means of rapid mobility as well as to provide logistics, transport, and medical evacuation. Generally, police forces do not own these types of mobility assets. Vehicular mobility is essential.

Some of the police vehicles are armored (but not armored cars) for use in transport of distinguished visitors. Also, armored tactical vehicles are needed for SWAT and assault type units. Foot mobility (paramilitary forces patrolling) is limited due to the rugged terrain and lack of capacity to keep personnel resupplied for long duration operations in the field.

- h. Senior leadership in the military should be experienced in small wars, and leaders (who include politicians) must be seen frequently visiting the front lines to keep a tactical understanding of what is occurring in the insurgency. Leadership cannot manage and call the shots from afar.

Military forces operating in conjunction with police should employ classic COIN techniques: counterinsurgency warfare, cordon and search (but only to man the outer rings—police should go into the buildings), ambushes on guerrillas, civil-military operations, Listening Posts/Observation Posts along suspected guerrilla lines of communication (police can be trained to operate along smuggling routes where terrorists and insurgents share transportation), and Quick Reaction Forces to support the police forces. If a major fight occurred, the command of the effort should be transferred to the military, including defense of police posts, if attacked where the Army was present.

In the Kankeer district, about 170 kilometers south of Raipur, this author visited with the police superintendent, field police posts, and the commander of the police paramilitary maneuver unit. All of the officers chosen to lead police units in the COIN effort were highly educated and often had background experience in previous international policing efforts, such as with the United Nations force in Kosovo.

As to the efficacy of the policing model vice the military model for COIN within the district, senior police representatives in the district considered the policing model to be more effective. The rationale was that the people relate to local police; they are familiar, whereas someone they see in the military is not. The people know the policemen share their same dangers because they live there, plus the police have the context of every situation (something the military would not have). The policeman is usually a person from that area, thus related to the local tribe and clan. Additional benefits of a police-led COIN effort are that the police have a vast historical record of

all the activities of their areas (e.g., who has been arrested, who lives there). This information forms the basis of their intelligence.

Special police powers during an insurgency are essential, as previously mentioned. Often witnesses will not come forward for fear of retaliation by the insurgents. The police need to be able to make cases and arrests without placing the witnesses at risk by their appearing in court to testify. The word of the police officer must be paramount in court.

Throughout the field trip it was apparent that the Indian police forces, both at the national level and at the local/regional level, understood the value of training for COIN with importance attached to training specifically as follows:

- a. Intelligence matters
- b. Explosive ordnance and bomb disposals
- c. PSYOP/IO
- d. Civil Affairs
- e. Knowledge of paramilitary operations. Using special police units—described as *Greyhounds*—to hunt and fight guerrillas while the local police handle security issues in their towns.

The Indian police subject matter experts also agreed that a variety of bureaus and directorates will need to be established within the law enforcement and policing COIN response, such as an intelligence directorate (start in specialized cell at police stations), a counterintelligence capability, a Civil Affairs/PSYOP liaison cell, a counterpropaganda cell, and some type of bureaus to handle a rewards, demobilization, and repatriation process for surrendering insurgents.

The police in India use a variety of classical COIN techniques and principals; a few examples follow:

- a. Village self-defense committees
- b. Civil Affairs projects
- c. Counterpropaganda programs within their PSYOP expertise.

The activities of the police in COIN are coordinated at each level, with the districts under the overall command by the regional superintendent, who sits on a weekly council of district and State Police along with civil authorities.

The author also interviewed officers of a unit of the Central Paramilitary Force. The role of the paramilitary forces was to bolster the existing State Police posts and to conduct limited foot patrols around their sector. The paramilitary force also served as the defensive unit for the outpost and as Quick Reaction Force to other posts, if needed.

Additional discussions in Raipur with senior officers addressed a proposal for the establishment of a local and regional police and law enforcement system within a COIN environment. How would a counterinsurgent campaign planner implement a police system capable of handling insurgents in a province where none exists? These are suggestions from senior Indian police counterinsurgent practitioners for establishing a viable law enforcement system in rural, nongoverned or under-governed areas (or reestablishing a system if the situation exists within a failed state):

- a. At the village level, pick a man from the locals to be the policeman (or he may hire a few folks to help him, thereby policemen). Give him a commensurate rank and pay, so he has respect. His only job is to report to the police posts on activities in the village, not to have powers of arrest. He will use the village elder system to handle minor matters of law enforcement (and he may also use the local religious person, since they have controlling civil powers in a village). Otherwise, his police tasks are very restrictive. Establish a small office for him where people can come and sit and talk. You may require him to keep basic records of his law enforcement activities.
- b. Based on the context of the region, a specified number of villages results in the establishment of a centrally located police post establishment. The police post will be led by a constable, with help from a subinspector and an assistant subinspector. It is at this place that we first find police powers for arrest and detainment, and they should not detain anyone for more than 24 hours. There should be a facility strictly for local detention. The police post exercises responsibilities for investigation, intelligence, and reporting/recording crime. The police from the various villages report to the police station. The police in the station are responsible for going to the villages if an arrest is deemed necessary or to investigate a crime. Because police stations must be capable of defending themselves against insurgents, they may have

- special paramilitary units attached to them. (Sufficient manpower is needed to defend and tackle the insurgents.)
- c. For a specified number of police posts (situation dependent), a district commander is established with a superintendent. The intelligence unit must be focused on the insurgency and may have specialized hunter-killer teams to conduct counterorganization activities.
 - d. Within the district, the superintendent should establish a system to employ auxiliary security forces made up of the local populace: home guards in villages and towns and point security guards (like night watchmen) to protect vital assets.
 - e. Above the district level is the magistrate (one for every four to five police posts) where the judicial and administrative legal systems are found. These systems may have to be initially manned by levying the state for the expertise, until magistrates are trained from the local area. The magistrate office contains the prison or detention facility and a court system with legal advocates for the defense and prosecution. The prosecutors are government employees.

All of the examples in this chapter provide important lessons for the counterinsurgent contemplating the employment of police and law enforcement agencies within the security LOO of the campaign plan. While these examples are few, strategists, planners, and military professionals must continue the research and study various historical COIN experiences to form principles on the application of police and law enforcement in these operations.

COIN Police Needs Assessment

From these examples, it is possible to derive the requirements and scope of policing efforts in COIN environments. Table 1 provides an illustration of an assessment model to determine the government security sector response to the insurgency; as the body of knowledge grows, analytical products could be established to include expanded requirements for the various phases of insurgency in order for the response to remain flexible and adaptable; eventually, the matrix should also include tests—that is, for feasibility, acceptability, and affordability.

Table 1. Policing vs. Military Requirements in COIN Scenarios

Insurgency Environment	Military	Police and Law Enforcement Agencies
Transnational Threat Treats to Sovereignty Cross-border or border area sanctuary	High use of military response	Supporting effort while continuing community policing
Urban insurgency Law enforcement credible Aspects of criminality Good intelligence	Limited, supporting role	High use of police response
Small, rural insurgency Law enforcement credible Government legitimacy high Insurgent lacks popular support	Minor, supporting, or no role	High use of police response
Small, rural insurgency Law enforcement noncredible Government legitimacy low Insurgent has popular support	High use of military response; may include constabulary	Professionalize and reform police for supporting effort
Large insurgency Law enforcement credible Government legitimacy high Split popular support	High use of military response	High use of police response

7. Conclusions

The primary frontline COIN force is often the police, not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.⁵⁵

The ability to prevent an outbreak of insurgent activities rests on the perceived legitimacy of the government to provide its citizens security, rule of law, and a better way of life within some type of moral framework acceptable to the culture. When effective, police and law enforcement institutions can control just about any level of criminality and violence to a level acceptable to the populace. If the violence emanates from the armed actions of insurgents, police and law enforcement retain the capabilities to manage the situation at an acceptable level—that is, if the government correctly identifies the origins of the violence as insurgent in nature. If policing efforts cannot contain the insurgent threat, then they must either be reinforced or the government must choose to inject military might to defeat the insurgency.

Whether the government chooses a course of action to reinforce policing measures or deploy its military, maintaining the rule of law will remain paramount throughout the crisis to buttress legitimacy. In order to prevent a protracted conflict, which is a central component of insurgent strategy, combined military and paramilitary policing efforts, while simultaneously continuing community policing, are often the best method to defeat the enemy and return society to a level of law enforcement reasonable to control societal violence.

The police and law enforcement sectors are key enablers for the COIN practitioner. The police and law enforcement organizations often outnumber the personnel in the military, are closest to the problem, and are normally the first responders to insurgent violence. Conversely, a low level of perceived legitimacy on the part of the populace towards its law enforcement institutions, often due to corruption and ineptness within the police, can almost guarantee that the COIN effort will become more difficult in achieving its objectives.

The police and law enforcement organizations often outnumber the personnel in the military, are closest to the problem, and are normally the first responders to insurgent violence.

Overall conclusions about the Thick Blue Line described in this paper are provided here:

- a. Effective police and law enforcement, used in quantity and quality in the early stages of violence perceived as manifestations of insurgency, are the best response on behalf of the government to defeat the adversary—even if it means reinforcing the policing effort to make it more paramilitary like. Arguably, effective policing and law enforcement, perceived as legitimate by the populace, in consort with other measures implemented by the government to improve the quality of life and ensure security, would serve as a preemptive or preventative measure against any chance of an insurgency taking root.
- b. COIN campaigns are considerably enhanced by considering both police and the military as a combined security LOO. Assessments and planning must always take into consideration the roles offensive policing and community policing play as an integrated portion of the government's response to insurgency.
- c. To effectively move police from a community policing posture to an offensive-policing posture will require paying the same attention to their training and equipping as that for the preparation of COIN military units. Police will need to have increased mobility platforms, personal survival protection, and firepower to take on insurgents until they can be reinforced by Quick Reaction Forces. Additional skills (e.g., in intelligence, bomb disposal, and homeland defense measures) will be required in order for police to be postured for a COIN environment. The capacity to train and enable police is increased by incorporating assets from allies and partners with known capacity in police and law enforcement training.
- d. The best intelligence for counterinsurgents will often come from military and law enforcement combining their information databases and establishing joint-intelligence centers during the COIN effort. Priority should be given to the police for the formation of any type of pseudo operations when conducting counterorganization activities.
- e. Community policing efforts must be maintained on top of offensive-policing support to the COIN effort in order to maintain the legitimacy of the government. This requires expanding the numbers of police during COIN to handle both of these efforts. Police reserves,

community volunteers, auxiliaries, and specialized police units are all resources that can be used to expand the capacity of law enforcement. Policing also includes retailoring or expanding other law enforcement institutions during the insurgency—for example, border patrols, maritime and customs patrols, and highway patrols.

- f. Part of the policing efforts in COIN will require fresh legislative authority or the expansion of police emergency powers until the insurgency is over. The expanded policing effort will also need commensurate legal institutions for the capture, detention, sentencing, or repatriation of insurgents—for example, prisons, stockades, additional judges, and lawyers (parallel institutions of governance).
- g. At the conclusion of a successful COIN effort, when political end states have been met, policing and law enforcement institutions that have been utilized in specialized COIN roles will require demobilization or retraining to return them to a normal community policing role.

Adopting offensive police measures in COIN will contribute to a successful campaign against insurgents. The military is used to buy time, but the successful end state for COIN hinges on maintenance of legitimacy to win the war while protecting the civil populace. This aspect is the realm where law enforcement serves best as an instrument of the state.

A success metric for a COIN end state is when the security situation begins to revert to one that can be handled once again by police and law enforcement—back to an acceptable level of violence a society can live with. Thus, the military finds itself inextricably tied to the law enforcement environment in any COIN mission:

- a. Once in taking over COIN from law enforcement
- b. Again when conducting the COIN campaign integrating the efforts of police and law enforcement to provide security, stability, and governance



Figure 11. A senior U.S. Army officer meets with his Iraqi police counterpart to discuss and coordinate matters concerning the Iraqi Police training. Photo: Colonel (Ret.) Mark French.

- c. Again when it must transition its efforts back to law enforcement at the successful conclusion of the COIN effort.

All efforts should then be made to continue our understanding of the military/law enforcement mix in irregular warfare through capture of ongoing techniques, lessons learned, and from the insight, study, and observations of our professionals. Through these means we will amass a growing knowledge of theory and principle relevant for doctrinal updates. This monograph was meant to contribute to that process.

As we shift to indirect strategies based more on “SOft power,” the training of police and law enforcement agencies within a host nation by U.S. resources during security assistance or FID operations will continue to be problematic. In the short term, this will be based on the lack of capacity within our interagency and lingering cultural bias (and to some extent lack of capacity) within our military.

Bridging solutions through contractors, combined with the efforts of our partners and allies, can sustain police and law enforcement efforts on a slow but steady progression towards building both capacity and capability within the internal security forces of our partners. If we are to achieve success, our military, and most certainly SOF, will increasingly participate in future irregular warfare activities involving the Thick Blue Line. ↑

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 27. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., telephone interview 23 January 2008, Dipping Springs, Texas.
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 29. Peter Abbot and Philip Botham, *Modern African Wars (1): Rhodesia 1965–1980*, Osprey, Men at Arms Series 183 (Oxford, U.K.: 1986), pp. 18-37.
 30. Lawrence E. Cline, “Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Other Countries” (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p. 1; available from www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi (accessed 12 August 2007).
 31. John M. Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives* (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002), p. 189.
 32. Alan J. Vick, “Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions,” RAND Corporation, Project Air Force (Arlington, VA, 2006), pp. 78-79.
 33. This research does not explore policing as a function of peace enforcement or peace-keeping operations. However, a recommended source for a full discussion on executive policing—the employment of international police and practice of law enforcement within a particular territory as a United Nations operation—can be found in the edited work of Renata Dwan, *Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations*, SIPRI Report No. 16 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
 34. Discussions were from the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Clearinghouse, sponsored by the Afghanistan COIN Academy (afghanistanCOINacademy@gmail.com) during a roundtable debate from a variety of participants.
 35. Michelle Tan, “Fighting to Gain a Foothold: Combat Outpost troops report steady progress in Ramadi,” *The Army Times* (Springfield, VA: Ganett Newspaper, Military Times Media Group), 19 February 2007, pp. 10-11.
 36. *USA Today*, 14 February 2007, p. 11A.

37. "Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland," Army Code 71842, prepared under direction of the chief of the general staff, publications coordinator, U.K. Ministry of Defense, July 2006, pp. 1-1 to 2-4.
38. Leroy Thompson, *Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*, (London: Arms and Armour, 1994), pp. 85-89.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.
40. "Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland," Army Code 71842, prepared under direction of the Chief of the General Staff, Publications Coordinator, U.K. Ministry of Defense, July 2006, pp. 4-1 through 4-13.
41. Lindsay Clutterbuck, "Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a Police Function," *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 114.
42. Andrew Silke, "Bitter Harvest: The Royal Ulster Constabulary's Response to Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 27-46.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
44. "Development of the Iraqi Security Forces – Stand Up and Be Counted: the Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces," U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 110th Congress, 2007, p. 6.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 13-18.
46. John P. J. DeRosa "Operation Baton Rouge: Perspectives from an Iraqi Security Forces Advisor," *ARMOR Magazine* (Vol. CXV, No. 6), November-December 2006, p. 38.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
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49. Gordon J. Knowles (MAJ, U.S. Army), "Countering Terrorist, Insurgent, and Criminal Organizations: Iraqi Security Forces Joint Coordination Centers – A Unique Public Safety System" *Military Police Magazine* (PB 19-06-2), Fall 2006, p. 15.
50. T.G. Kessler (SSgt, U.S. Marine Corps combat correspondent, 2d Marine Division), "Unprecedented Recruiting Event Yields Record 60-Plus Recruits," *Leatherneck*, May 2007, p. 19.
51. "Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness," The Office of the Inspectors General of the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense (Report Nos. ISP-IQ0-07-07 and IE-2007-001, respectively), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 14 November 2007, p. 5.
52. From a conversation between the author and a senior Special Forces Army officer recently returned from Afghanistan during a 2007 rotation. Due to ongoing

operations in Operation Enduring Freedom by SOF, the officer's name and position will remain anonymous.

53. Jeffrey W. Nelson, telephone interview 2 August 2008, Hurlburt Field Florida.
54. David Rhode, "Afghan Police Suffer Setbacks as Taliban Adapt," *The New York Times*, 2 September 2007 (Vol. CLVI, No. 54,055), p. 1.
55. For further information about the progress of the police program in Afghanistan and a status of police reform, see the International Crisis Group's work, "Reforming Afghanistan's Police," in their Asia Report No. 138, 30 August 2007.
56. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, paragraph 6-90.

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